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ABSTRACT
This book explores how American legal scholarship treats the corporation by
providing a history of American corporate legal theory, a history of corporate (social)
responsibility from the perspective of the Berle–Dodd debate, an analysis of how
legal scholars understand corporate lawmaking in America, and an initial inquiry into
how the prevailing opinions about the corporation are realized in the context of a
critical assessment of whether or not this resulting corporate governance holds the
potential to compliment the efforts of new governance regulators.
This book consists of four essays about American corporate governance.
Three essays trace how three particular presumptions about the corporation came to
become part of the dominant narrative about the corporation within the American
academic context. The first presumption is that the American contractarian theory of
the corporation most accurately frames an understanding of the corporation. This
presumption underpins much of Delaware’s corporate law. Second is the notion that
shareholder value maximization provides the necessary precondition for effective
corporate governance. The modern incarnation of this presumption was inadvertently
inspired by the early 20th Century work of Adolf A. Berle. Third is the idea that there
is market competition for incorporations between states, and this competition creates
a “race to the top.” Such presumptions help shape the dominant narrative about the
American corporation. In the final chapter, the elements of these presumptions, and
the narratives they weave, are reconsidered within the context of new governance,
which encourages private actors, like corporations, to play larger roles within the
administrative functions of governments. It is explained how new governance thought
presumes that corporations are becoming more imbued with a sense of public
spiritedness. This presumption is closely examined and then ultimately rejected as
dangerously optimistic considering the narratives that dominate corporate legal
thinking—at least in the American context.
Each of the four chapters has been published in U.S. law reviews, creating a
portfolio of essays regarding the American corporation and its place in society.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
I. PRELIMINARY NOTE TO DISSERTATION: KNOWLEDGE-POWER, NARRATIVE, AND
THE CORPORATION
The introduction to this dissertation starts by offering a perspective upon the
role of narrative and its impact on corporate law. The chapters of this book focus
upon some of the grand legal narratives and theories of the American corporation.
Chapter 2, in particular, discusses how these grand narratives/theories are
indeterminate, shifting over time. It is suggested that they bend to accommodate the
political preferences of the moment, helping to legitimate the manner in which market
activities are organized. In others words, although corporate legal narratives may
appear authoritative, it is suggested that, most times, such legal narratives do not
dictate social activities, but merely rationalize the endorsement of one political
preference over another ex post facto. That does not diminish the significance of such
study though, since tracing the history of such shifts in corporate narratives provides
one with a useful roadmap to the history of the rationalization of economic power
within the American context.
Much of this thinking is aligned with a somewhat recent symposium on
corporate narrative entitled Business Law and Narrative Symposium.

1

1

This

This Symposium was held at Michigan State University College of Law on
September 10, 2009. For more on the Symposium, see Michigan State University
College of Law, News Release, “Michigan State Law Review to Host Business Law
1

symposium generally suggested that corporate academic scholarship does not play a
significant role in how the corporation is viewed and functions in American society.2
For instance, the introducers to the Business Law and Narrative Symposium suggest
that corporate legal scholars are deluding themselves if they think they are writing
“the signification of the corporation,” which basically means that such scholars do not
play a major role in manufacturing of how Americans view the corporation.3 This
may be true, but there is also a danger in discounting the academic contribution too
deeply for reasons that will be explored in the following comment on the
interrelationships between narrative, knowledge, and power.
In one of the articles from this symposium, Larry Backer provides a model of
knowledge-power, which elucidates how corporate knowledge is produced. 4
However, this model, although highly insightful, fails to draw a clear distinction
between Nietzsche’s notion of the operation of knowledge and power and Foucault’s
notion of knowledge-power. 5 The result is that Backer overemphasizes the
and
Narrative
Symposium”
(10
Sep
2009)
<http://www.law.msu.edu/news/2009/releases/business-narrative.html>.

online:

2

See e.g. Mae Kuykendall & David Westbrook, “Introduction: Unsettling
Questions, Disquieting Stories” (2009) 2009 Mich St L Rev 817 at 827.
3

Ibid at 827.

4

See generally, Larry Cata Backer, “The Drama of Corporate Law: Narrator
Between Citizen, State, and Corporation” (2009) 2009 Mich St L Rev 1111.
5

See generally Frederick Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morality, revised
student ed, Keith Ansell-Pearson ed, translated by Carol Diethe (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008) [Nietzsche, On The Genealogy]; Friedrich
2

importance of the narrator, if he is adopting a Foucaudian perspective. 6 While
Nietzsche, like Backer, would have primarily focused on the privileged producers of
knowledge, assuming they are the controllers of knowledge,7 Foucault would not do
so. Foucault would focus on knowledge, assuming that knowledge is the controller of
those who produce knowledge.8 This will be explained, but first, Backer’s reasoning
will be traced.
Again, to be fair, Backer’s description of the social construction of corporate
knowledge is otherwise excellent. He emphasizes that to understand this social
production of corporate legal knowledge and its significance, one must understand the
history of how particular knowledge became privileged and the process by which this
occurred, including the way that this information was conveyed to others and how

Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, translated by RJ Hollingdale (New York: Penguin
Books, 1990) [Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil]; Michel Foucault,
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, Colin
Gordon ed, translated by Colin Gordon et al (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980)
[Foucault, Power/Knowledge]; Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of
the Prison, Vintage Books 2d ed, translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage
Books, 1995) [Foucault, Discipline and Punish]; Michel Foucault, Politics,
Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984, Lawrence D
Kritzman ed, translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Routledge, 1988) [Foucault,
Politics, Philosophy, Culture]; Michel Foucault, Power, James D Faubion ed,
translated by Robert Hurley et al (New York: New Press, 2000) [Foucault, Power].
6

See Backer, supra note 4.

7

See generally Nietzsche, On The Genealogy, supra note 5.

8

See generally Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra note 5; Foucault, Politics,
Philosophy, Culture, supra note 5; Foucault, Power, supra note 5.
3

others internalized this privileged knowledge. 9 Backer continues that law, as a
doctrinal force, “serves as a critical component” for normalizing corporate
knowledge.10 Backer explains:
Power over the management of the knowledge-reality on which law is
founded (and which founds law) is a central aspect of social control.
But it is also the central element in the allocation of social power,
prestige, and the ordering of human hierarchies. And thus one moves
from knowledge-reality (at the heart of narrative) to the ordering
element of the narrator—that is, to power-knowledge. And thus we
come to an understanding of ourselves [as corporate legal academics],
of our function within the academy.11
In the above quotation, Backer cites Foucault for the notion of powerknowledge, but as he continues, a tension develops between his use of powerknowledge and Foucault’s notion.12 Backer casts legal experts as the controllers of
their narratives, as if they exist as agents somewhat independent of the knowledge
that shapes their understandings.13 From this perspective, the narrator can be the
master of the narrative/knowledge that he or she creates, and thus is the master of
power-knowledge.

14

Backer comes close to acknowledging the power of

narrative/knowledge over the narrator, but falls sort of the Foucauldian notion:
9

Backer, supra note 4 at 1115.

10

See ibid at 1116-17.

11

Ibid at 1116-17.

12

Ibid at 1117.

13

See Ibid at 1118–20, 1165.

14

See Ibid at 1118.
4

Yet narrative also serves to situate the narrator at that core, and indeed,
to define that core in ways that perpetuate the narrator control of both
story and its disciplinary consequences. Like Nietzsche’s notions of
the power-knowledge framework of religious narrative, the narrator
serves as a critical element of narration.15
It is at this point that Backer conflates Nietzsche’s notion of the operation of
knowledge and power with that of Foucault’s knowledge-power. For Foucault, the
individual actor/narrator is much less significant, because he or she is faced with the
untamable tyranny of knowledge, which all narrators feed in subjugation, arguably
without the potential for emancipation. In other words, although Foucault, both in his
writing and way of life, was constantly challenging the oppressive nature of the
imposition of the normal upon the individual, his theory of knowledge-power
suggests the paradox of such self-critical challenging, exposing the presumption of
free will as problematic.16
To understand this final point, a short history of the development of
Foucault’s notion is justified, starting with a quick review of Nietzsche’s position. In
On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche identified the understanding of “the good”
15

Ibid at 1124.

16

For more on Foucault’s theory, see Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra note
5 at 27, 184-85; Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected
Essays and Interviews, Donald F Bouchard, ed, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1977) at 207 [Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice]; Foucault,
Politics, Philosophy, Culture, supra note 5 at 43; see also Alan Sheridan, Michel
Foucault: The Will to Truth (New York: Tavistock, 1980) at 131 (quoting Foucault’s
Théories et Institutions Pénales (Penal Theories and Institutions)). For more on his
lifestyle, see David Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault (New York: Vintage Books,
1995).
5

that contemporary thinkers of his time regarded to be truth. 17 Nietzsche then
conducted a historical examination of how individuals at different points in time and
from different social traditions held different conceptions of “the good.”18 Thus, his
comparative historical analysis relativized contrasting conceptions of “the good.”19
This exercise exposed how truths were mere culturally conditioned preferences.20
Nietzsche concluded that blind adherence to a concept of “the good” was socially
manufactured and could serve as a coercive tool for subjugation. 21 Nietzsche’s
contribution was to point out that individuals often simply internalize a predetermined
normative order, which imposes arbitrary social preferences and amounts to a form of
self-imprisonment.22

17

Nietzsche, On The Genealogy, supra note 5 at 10-34.

18

Friedrich Nietzsche, “Human, All Too Human”, Volume I, Section 45, in
Nietzsche, On The Genealogy, supra note 5 at 123-24; see also Nietzsche, On The
Genealogy, supra note 5 at 10-34.
19

Ibid.

20

Ibid at 11.

21

Ibid at 11-12.

22

Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, supra note 5 at 47-49; see also Maudemarie
Clark & David Dudrick, “Nietzsche on the Will: An Analysis of BGE 19” in Ken
Gemes & Simon May eds, Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009) 247 at 263.
6

Until Nietzsche, such critical theorists, such as Karl Marx, 23 critiqued
consciousness, arguing that the particular beliefs did not reflect reality, creating a
“false consciousness.” 24 However, they were willing to introduce an alternative
version of reality, which they believed was not a “false consciousness.”25 This is
where Nietzsche was radical and different. He refused to manufacture an ideal to
replace or improve on “the good” that he criticized, because he believed any social

23

Emmet Kennedy, a leading American history of France and French, wrote:
“Marx inherited the word ‘ideology’ not from Hegel, who used the word once in
reference to the French Ideologists and therefore cannot be, strictly speaking, credited
with an explicit theory of ideology, but only from the cumulative usages current in
the 1830s and 1840s and specifically from Destutt de Tracy.” Emmet Kennedy,
“‘Ideology’ from Destutt de Tracy to Marx” (1979) 40 J Hist Ideas 353 at 366.
24

Marx and Engels linked ideology to “false consciousness.” False consciousness
is a term sometimes attributed to Marx, but it was actually coined by Engels in the
following passage from a letter he wrote to Franz Mehring: “Ideology is a
process…[of] false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown
to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all. Hence he imagines
false or apparent motives…[and] works with mere thought…which he accepts
without examination…for a more remote process independent of thought…” Letter
from Friedrich Engels to Franz Mehring, (14 July 1893) in Karl Marx & Friedrich
Engels, Selected Correspondence, 1846-1895, translated by Dona Torr (Westport,
Conn: Greenwood Press, 1975) 510 at 511.
25

In The German Ideology’s Preface, Marx and Engels, in their mocking
declaration, observed that men have constantly created false self-concepts, “products
of their brains,” which have imprisoned and oppressed them. They wrote: “Let us
teach men, says one, how to exchange these imaginations for thoughts which
correspond to the essence of man; says another, how to take up a critical attitude to
them; says the third, how to knock them out of their heads; and existing reality will
collapse.” Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, 3d ed (Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1976) at 29.
7

construction of “the good” would subjugate others to his own biased perspective.26 As
Nietzsche wrote, “But what am I saying? Enough! Enough! At this point just one
thing is proper, silence: otherwise I shall be misappropriating something that belongs
to another, younger man…”27
Weber studied the operation of power, domination, and legitimacy.28 In one
sense, Weber explored the relationship between power and subjugation more
systematically than Nietzsche did. 29 Weber detailed the processes in which the

26

Nietzsche, On The Genealogy, supra note 5 at 66-67.

27

Ibid at 67.

28

Weber defines power as “the probability that one actor within a social
relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance,
regardless of the basis on which this probability rests. Max Weber, Economy and
Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, eds,
(New York: Bedminster Press, 1968) vol 1 at 53. Domination is defined as “the
probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given
group of persons.” Ibid. Weber viewed legitimacy as an essential element of
domination. Ibid at 212-15.
29

Nietzsche’s thoughts on power and subjugation can be summed up in the
ending line of The Will to Power, in which he wrote: “This world is the will to
power—and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power—and
nothing besides!” Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Walter Kaufmann, ed,
translated by Walter Kaufmann & RJ Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1967)
at 550 [Nietzsche, The Will to Power]. Weber believed that power and domination
were intimately tied together, and as such there would always be a ruling class. He
wrote: “Any thought…of removing the rule of men over men through the most
sophisticated forms of ‘democracy’ is utopian.” W Mommsen, Max Weber and
German Politics, 1890–1920, translated by Michael S Steinberg (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1984) at 394 (quoting Weber).
8

individual internalized the legitimate order being imposed.30 He drew a distinction
between power and domination. Power was the ability of an individual to act in
accordance with his or her will, regardless of what resistance he or she might face.31
On the other hand, domination was the ability to transform that will into a command,
which others would obey.32
Weber’s notion of the process of rationalization of action is complex, and the
secondary literature has broadly explored its implications.33 For present purposes, it is
sufficient to say that he argued that there exists the interplay of four types of
rationality: purposive (rational), value (moral), affectual (emotive), and traditional
(habitual).34 These rationalities persuade the subjugated to submit.35 Weber argued

30

Weber, supra note 28 at vol 1 at 31-36, 313-15, 323, vol 3 at 954. For more on
Weber’s position on this matter, see David M Trubek, “Max Weber on Law and the
Rise of Capitalism” (1972) 1972 Wis L Rev 720 at 725-27.
31

Weber, supra note 28 at vol 1 at 53.

32

Ibid.

33

See generally Jürgen Habermas, “Law and Morality” (The Tanner Lectures on
Human Values, delivered at Harvard University, 1-2 October 1986), translated by
Kenneth
Baynes,
online:
<http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/habermas88.pdf>; Guenther Roth
& Wolfgang Schluchter, Max Weber’s Vision of History: Ethics and Methods
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Wolfgang Schluchter, The Rise of
Western Rationalism: Max Weber’s Developmental History, translated by Guenther
Roth (Berkeley: University of California Press 1981).
34

Weber, supra note 28 at vol 1 at 24-26.

35

Specifically, Weber argued that rational grounds are one of the grounds on
which legitimacy may be based. Ibid at 215.
9

that legitimacy was tied closely to the notion of rationality.36 Legitimacy was a tool
used to secure voluntary compliance of others, i.e., to secure domination.37 Thus,
Weber thought that privileged groups exercised their power by using rationalities that
legitimated their commands and secured domination over the weaker.38 As Weber
wrote:
Every highly privileged group develops a myth of its…superiority.
Under the conditions of stable distribution of power that myth is
accepted by the negatively privileged strata.39
In other words, the poor and the weak subjected themselves to domination because of
a subjective knowledge about reality, which coerces them into believing that acting in
the interests of the highly privileged group is in fact acting in their own self-interest.40
The powerless internalize the rationalities, or reasons, for their subjugation to
power.41
Foucault used the thought of each of these authors to inform his own
understanding of the operation of knowledge and power in society. From Nietzsche,
36

For Weber, the idea of legitimate order was based on the idea that “social
action…may be guided by the belief in the existence of a legitimate order.” Ibid at 31.
37

Weber believed that rulers used domination in such a way that it appeared “as if
the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its
very own sake.” Weber, supra note 28 at vol 3 at 946.
38

See ibid at 954.

39

See ibid at 953.

40

See Weber, supra note 28 at vol 1 at 212, vol 3 at 952-54.

41

See Weber, supra note 28 at vol 1 at 212-13, vol 3 at 952-54.
10

and Marx and Engel’s limited “false consciousness,”42 he took the understanding that
there is only historically and socially contingent constructions of reality.43 From
Weber, he developed the understanding that rationalities are primary for legitimating
domination within society.44 Foucault then opined that power is not something people
wield, but is something that knowledge wields. 45 Knowledge is power when
rationalities legitimated particular actions within a society. 46 Such rationalities
encourage members to embrace acting in particular ways (normal) and to avoid acting
in other ways (abnormal).47 Such rationalities also impose the normal upon not only
the weak, but also the strong. Knowledge dominates, not people.

42

See supra note 24 and accompanying text.

43

The genealogy approach that Foucault used in Discipline and Punish: The Birth
of the Person was used to bring to mind Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals. See
Foucault, Power/Knowledge, supra note 5 at 53 (“If I wanted to be pretentious, I
would use the ‘genealogy of the morals’ as the general title of what I am doing.”);
Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra note 5 at 29; see also generally Michael
Mahon, Foucault's Nietzschean Genealogy: Truth, Power, and the Subject (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1992).
44

For an excellent analysis of this, see Colin Gordon, “Governmental Rationality:
An Introduction” in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller, eds, The
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1991) 1.
45

See Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, supra note 16 at 207;
Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, supra note 5 at 43; Foucault, Discipline and
Punish, supra note 5 at 27, 184-85.
46

See Sheridan, supra note 16 at 131 (quoting Foucault’s Théories et Institutions
Pénales (Penal Theories and Institutions)).
47

See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra note 5 at 184.
11

The social construction of reality suggests that society exists by defining,
institutionalizing and imposing the normal.48 There must be such distinctions, which
define what is normal, for order to exist, and thus, there must be the normal and the
abnormal.49 From another vantage point, deviance is the challenging of order, and
must be discouraged to protect order. 50 Therefore power, or what Weber might
consider domination, exists as long as there are distinctions that define order.51
Foucault engaged in a historical study of epistemology, which focuses upon
the operation of the verification theory of knowledge. 52 This verification theory
operated throughout history to exclude the deviant from the normal. 53 Foucault
48

See Peter L Berger & Tomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966) at 54-58,
62, 72-73.
49

See ibid at 54-55, 72.

50

See ibid at 168-69.
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See ibid at 55, 61-62, 168-69.

52

See generally Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra note 5; see also Joseph
Rouse, “Power/Knowledge” in Gary Gutting, ed, The Cambridge Companion To
Foucault (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 95.
53

During the Enlightenment, there were thinkers who imagined finding a method
to view society that could draw a distinction between socially constructed values and
true knowledge. It was from such pursuits that the quest to find the Archimedean
point was reinvigorated. The Archimedean point is the presumed observation point
from where an observer can remove him/herself from subjective bias and see
objectively the subject of inquiry. This quest for objectivity became the foundation
for the school of thought in the social sciences called, positivism, within which its
students attempt to discover authentic knowledge through methodologies which
mirror the methods of the natural sciences in order to verify social observations. See
e.g. Auguste Comte, A General View of Positivism, translated by JH Bridges
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argued that this process is central to the connection between knowledge and power.54
This process of legitimating the normal excludes people who do not conform to the
legitimated normative standards.55 This is similar to Nietzsche’s understanding of
“the good” and how those that did not conform to this understanding of “the good”
could be subject to sanction. 56
Foucault’s historical narratives illustrate this principle in operation,
documenting how those who failed to conform to normative standards were
disqualified, excluded, rehabilitated, punished, or some combination of each.57 The
marginalization of these populations provides evidence of how power (excluding,
punishing, and/or reforming) was the condition and effect of knowledge
(normalizing), and how normalizing was the condition and effect of excluding,
punishing, and/or reforming. 58 In other words, he demonstrated how systems of
knowledge and power were mutually reinforcing, how they needed each other. One

(London: Trübner & Co, 1844); Francis Bacon, “The Great Instauration of Lord
Bacon” in Francis Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon, Lord Chancellor of England,
vol 3 (London: Longman, 1859) at 329, 347.
54

See Colin Gordon, “Introduction” in Foucault, Power, supra note 5 at xi, xviii-

xix.
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See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra note 5 at 184.
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See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra note 5 at 182-83.
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See ibid at 182-84.
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shaped the other. One sustained the other. Both coevolved. And, both co-dependently
shaped the behavior of individuals and, thus, society.59
Foucault’s study of epistemology deconstructed the processes of knowledge
and power, revealing how manufactured assumptions construct identities of
individuals and societies.60 Again, at the center of this process is the distinction
between what is normal and deviant.61 In other words, to think in Weber’s terms,
rationalities legitimate domination. 62 However, for Foucault, domination is not
something that resided primarily with the individual, although the individual is certain
the vessel through which knowledge has social impact.63 Rather, power/domination
resides primarily in the system of thought itself.64 In order words, a social order needs
rules, which are legitimated as normal, and thus require a catalogue of normal and not
normal (like the mad, the sick, and the criminal) against which the social order can
define itself.
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See ibid at 27.
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The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language, translated by Alan
Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1982).
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Returning to Backer, from Foucault’s perspective, a focus upon the privileged
producers of knowledge might blind an observer to the subtleties of a particular
genealogy of knowledge. Thus, the presumption that narrators control the production
of corporate thought leads to a presumption that the production of knowledge has
occurred in a particular way. This might prove to be problematic. As Backer astutely
suggested, we must identify privileged knowledge, the process by which this
knowledge became privileged, the way that it was conveyed, and how others
internalized it65 — but he should have stop at this point.
Ultimately, an overemphasis upon the narrators may lead to less than useful
presumptions about the nature of knowledge production. The power of the
Foucauldian insight is that it can trace how knowledge was produced and how this
lead to a particular exercise of power, contributing to an understanding of the present,
but it cannot predict how knowledge-power will manifest, and which actors will play
leading roles in such future manifestations.
At times, this book tacitly assumes that corporate legal scholarship does in
fact play a role in the process of defining the corporation and how corporate
governance plays out in everyday situations. Admittedly, such assertions are not
defended. No attempt is made to establish how, or if, such academic knowledge
migrates from the obscurity of the ivory tower to inform and shape the dominant
business narratives. Such cause and effect is left open to the contestation of others.
65

Backer, supra note 4 at 1115.
15

Thus, in part, this book leans upon the uncertainty of how a particular narrative comes
to shape the dominant knowledge, relying on the notion that the source of an idea will
not be determinative as to what impact the idea may have upon the world view of a
particular society, since whether an idea influences the dominate narrative may have
less to do with the source of the idea and more to do with how that idea captures the
pre-existing spirit of the moment.
II. THESIS AND OBJECTIVES
From the outset, it is important to take a moment to reflect upon the
commonality between each of the four essays about American corporate governance.
Three essays trace how three particular presumptions about the corporation came to
become part of the dominant narrative about the corporation within the American
academic context. The first presumption is that the American contractarian theory of
the corporation most accurately frames an understanding of the corporation.66 This
presumption underpins much of Delaware’s corporate law. Second is the notion that
shareholder value maximization provides the necessary precondition for effective
corporate governance.
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The modern incarnation of this presumption was
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For instance, Delaware law prefers to regard the inability of an oppressed
minority shareholder in a closely held corporation to exit as the product of bad
bargaining, not inequity, and, therefore, refuses to offer an equitable remedy. Another
example is how weak shareholder rights in publicly traded corporations are justified
by the consensual nature of purchasing shares and the ability to exit.
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See e.g. Jordan A Schwarz, Liberal: Adolf A. Berle and the Vision of an
American Era (New York, London, UK: Free Press, Collier Macmillan, 1987) at 6016

inadvertently inspired by the early 20th Century work of Adolf A. Berle.68 Third is the
idea that there is market competition for incorporations between states, and this
competition creates a “race to the top.”69 Such presumptions help shape the dominant
narrative about the American corporation. In the final chapter, the elements of these
presumptions, and the narratives they weave, are reconsidered within the context of
new governance, which encourages private actors, like corporations, to play larger
roles within the administrative functions of governments.70 It is explained how new
governance thought presumes that corporations are becoming more imbued with a
sense of public spiritedness. This presumption is closely examined and then
ultimately rejected as dangerously optimistic considering the narratives that dominate
corporate legal thinking—at least in the American context. Each of the four chapters
66; see also Henry G Manne, “Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting: An Essay
in Honor of Adolf A. Berle” (1964) 64 Colum L Rev 1427 [Manne, “Some
Theoretical Aspects”]; Henry G Manne, “The ‘Higher Criticism’ of the Modern
Corporation” (1962) 62 Colum L Rev 399 [Manne, “The ‘Higher Criticism’”].
68
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Aspects”, supra note 67; Manne, “The ‘Higher Criticism’”, supra note 67.
69

See generally Ralph K Winter, Jr, “State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the
Theory of the Corporation” (1977) 6 J Legal Stud 251.
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See e.g. John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How it Works, Ideas for
Making it Work Better (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008); Colin
Scott, “Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory State”
in Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur, eds, The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and
Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar,
2005) 145; Julia Black, “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of
Regulation and Self Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World” (2001) 54 Current
Probs 103.
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has been published in U.S. law reviews,71 creating a portfolio of essays regarding the
American corporation and its place in society.
III. A ROADMAP OF THE BOOK’S CHAPTERS
Again, this book visits four specific examples of how America has legally
treated the corporation: a history of American corporate legal theory, a history of
corporate (social) responsibility from the perspective of the Berle–Dodd debate,72 an
analysis of how legal scholars understand corporate lawmaking in America, and an
initial inquiry into how the prevailing opinions about the corporation are realized in
corporate governance and whether or not this resulting corporate governance holds
the potential to compliment the efforts of new governance regulators.
Chapter 2 is entitled “Indeterminacy and Balance: A Path to a Wholesome
Corporate Law.” It explores three theories of the corporation: the concession, entity,

71

Fenner L Stewart, Jr, “The Economizing Corporation and its Place in the
Wilderness of New Governance” (Osgoode Hall L Sch Comp Res in L & Pol Econ
Res Paper Series, Paper No 31/2012, 2012) [forthcoming in Ind J Global Legal Stud,
Spring/Summer 2014]; Fenner L Stewart, Jr, “Indeterminacy and Balance: A Path to a
Wholesome Corporate Law” (2012) 9 Rutgers Bus L Rev 81; Fenner L Stewart, Jr,
“Berle’s Conception of Shareholder Primacy: A Forgotten Perspective For
Reconsideration During the Rise of Finance” (2011) 34 Seattle UL Rev 1457; Fenner
L Stewart, Jr, “The Place of Corporate Lawmaking in American Society” (2010) 23
Loyola Con L Rev 147.
72

See AA Berle, Jr, “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” (1931) 44 Harv L
Rev 1049 [Berle, “Corporate Powers”]; E Merrick Dodd, Jr, “For Whom Are
Corporate Managers Trustees?” (1932) 45 Harv L Rev 1145; AA Berle, Jr, “For
Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note” (1932) 45 Harv L Rev 1365
[Berle, “A Note”].
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and contractarian theories. Each of these theories is essential to an understanding of
the corporation.73 Each is essential in the sense that every corporation is created
through an incorporation process (concession theory), which creates its status as a
legal person (entity theory), and provides the complex social and legal contexts for
corporate governance (contractarian theory). They are also inherently indeterminate
in the sense that it is the normative presumptions that attach to each of these theories
(for instance, contracts are consensual and efficient 74 ), which determines which
policy outcomes the theory will endorse. A potentiality arises here that most
advocates of the prevailing contractarian theory do not acknowledge. Although the
contractarian theory’s position in American corporate legal thought is solidified,75 the
normative presumptions that attach to it, namely that contracts are necessarily
consensual and efficient, are not as concrete. If these normative presumptions shift,
this could trigger a shift within contractarian thinking, resulting in the promotion of
different policy outcomes than is presently advocated.
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Easterbrook and Fischel” (1992) 59 U Chicago L Rev 1391.
19

Chapter 2 asserts that all of these essential theories of the corporation ought to
be considered. Taking seriously all of these factors will encourage legal discourse on
corporate governance, which will reveal the underlying normative preferences that
give rise to favoring one policy outcome over another. If this level of engagement
were to occur, there would be more opportunities for candid debates centering upon
that which is at stake within corporate governance.
In particular, Chapter 2 traces through the histories of the concession, entity,
and contractarian theories to the present. It explains how the concession and entity
theories today are dismissed as largely irrelevant and how the prevailing contractarian
theory enjoys more or less full reign over steering corporate legal thinking. The
chapter predicts that, in the near future, there is a greater likelihood of a policy shift
within the contractarian model than any shift away from it. That said, Chapter 2
concludes with the recommendation that it endorsed at the outset: Scholars need to be
self-critical of their roles in the manufacturing of corporate knowledge and, in part, be
leery of accepting a priori knowledge as fact. This critical approach should lead to a
more wholesome corporate law, whatever that law might look like.
Chapter 3 is entitled “Berle’s Conception of Shareholder Primacy: A
Forgotten Perspective for Reconsideration during the Rise of Finance.” It traces how
the shareholder primacy theory developed from the rise of the modern corporation
through to present day. Adolf A Berle Jr developed this theory in the 1920s and 1930s
based on his belief that managerial opportunism was running rampant on Wall Street
20

in the 1920s, threatening the whole of the American economy.76 He believed that the
only tool that the law had to police this dangerous opportunism was to ensure that
managers had only one master: shareholders.77 Chapter 3 explores his theory through
the Berle–Dodd debate, which is regarded as the seminal American corporate social
responsibility debate within legal scholarship.78
Until Charles O’Kelly’s important promotion of the work of Berle with his
annual Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Symposium on Corporations, Law and Society at the
University of Seattle,79 commenters footnoting Berle’s contribution to corporate legal
literature were becoming forgetful of Berle’s position, suggesting in passing
references that Berle was the forefather of the modern shareholder primacy
movement,80 without mention of the fact that Berle would be opposed to its present
incarnation.
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Chapter 3 explains Berle’s relationship to today’s shareholder primacy
argument within its historical context, including with it a further explanation of how
Henry Manne “flipped”81 his arguments.82 Berle used shareholder primacy to endorse
corporate power directly serving the wider polity, while Manne reframed Berle’s
shareholder primacy in order to limit the ability of corporate power to directly serve
the wider polity. Manne detached Berle’s underlying normative preference from the
shareholder primacy argument and attached his own, retooling it for his own
purposes.
As with the essentialist theories explained in Chapter 2, until the shareholder
primacy argument is combined with additional normative claims, the policy outcome
that it legitimatizes is indeterminate. Berle constructed “the shareholder” as
representing the general public, and thus presumed that the shareholder would lend its
proxy to initiatives supporting the interests of the polity. Manne constructed “the
shareholder” as representing the residual claim of the corporation, and thus presumed
81

A flip occurs when legal language is used to endorse a particular reform (like
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that it would lend its proxy to sustainable maximization of the corporation’s residual.
As such, Berle’s use of shareholder primacy was to direct managers to focus on a
more Keynesian and political management of the economy, while Manne’s was to
direct managers to narrow their focus squarely upon economic efficiency of their
organizations.
Therefore, while Berle is considered the grandfather of modern shareholder
primacy theory, up to very recently the literature on this topic often glossed over this
shift in the modern shareholder primacy argument from Berle’s conception to
Manne’s conception. Thus, the article focuses on Berle, but also on the indeterminate
nature of shareholder primacy. The interest of shareholders as a collective can never
be truly determined, however “the shareholder,” as an empty signifier, can be filled
with a variety of contrasting meanings, thereby becoming a point of contention.83 As
with the prevailing contractarian theory of the corporation, a revolution in corporate
function could occur without undermining the dominance of shareholder primacy
thinking today, thereby representing a potentiality if the appropriate circumstances
were to arise.
Chapter 3 ends with a discussion of the rise of finance. It suggests that
investors are now less connected to the social consequences of their investment
choices and that this blindness negatively influences society. Those in the world of
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Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, Paul Kecskemeti, ed
(London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952) at 197-98.
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investing and finance think in terms of decoupling value from risk and are
disconnected from the social consequences such financialized choices have in the real
world.
As a result, the chapter concludes that Berle would not favor today’s
incarnation of shareholder primacy. It ends with suggesting that a strong look should
be taken at the pros and cons of the rise of finance and the role of shareholder
primacy within it. It further suggests that there exists a potentiality in Berle’s
application of the shareholder primacy, demonstrating how managers can be
encouraged to serve a more enlightened and socially conscious construction of the
shareholder.
Chapter 4 is entitled “The Place of Corporate Lawmaking in American
Society.” It takes a critical look at the market for attracting incorporations, known as
the charter market, and Delaware’s place within it. Specifically, the article looks at
how legal thinking has been captured by the idea that competition, not politics, drives
corporate legal development and how this framing of legal development influences
how corporate governance mechanisms are conceived as being non-politically
constitutionalized.
After a brief history of incorporation in America, Chapter 4 introduces the
Cary–Winter debate84 that arose concerning how to deal with the charter market. On
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William L Cary, “Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware”
(1974) 83 Yale LJ 663; Winter, supra note 69.
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the one hand, William Cary claimed that charter competition was producing a race-tothe-bottom in the manufacturing of corporate law. He believed that states were
watering down corporate law in order to attract state revenue from incorporation fees
and franchise tax.85 On the other hand, Ralph Winter claimed that this competition
actually created a race-to-the-top, because corporate managers would choose the state
that had the most beneficial default rules that promote debt and equity capitalization,
and as such, state competition was fostering rules that would make the corporation an
efficient economizing device.86
These two positions would shape the debate from the 1970s to the present.
While Cary supporters favor anti-managerialism, federal governmental intervention,
and centralized planning,87 Winter supporters call for managerialism, unlimited state
competition, and decentralized markets.88 Over the years, legal scholars used event
studies to support Winter’s position, while Cary supporters fired back, claiming that
85
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Rev 1168.
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the event studies that were used were not sophisticated enough, and simply could not
account for the complexities of the American charter market.89
The Enron scandal was a circumstance that provided an opening to Cary
supporters, and their race-to-the-bottom argument garnered greater attention. The
federal government seemed to agree, resulting in the passing of Sarbanes–Oxley
Act. 90 After observing such federal intervention, Mark Roe turned the state
competition debate on its head by arguing that Delaware, the de facto national
corporate law, was never in competition with other states for incorporations.91 Thus,
Delaware enjoys no competitors unless it triggers circumstances in which a
reactionary public demands that the federal government intervenes – as had occurred
with the Enron scandal and to a lesser degree with the Credit Crisis. Using Roe’s
insight, Chapter 4 then continues to explain how Delaware is in fact a private caucus
of managers and, to a lesser extent, shareholders who set corporate policy for
themselves with the awareness that if they go too far, the federal government will step
in.
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In the end, the result is similar – Delaware favors managerialism within
American corporate governance. Stephen Bainbridge’s director primacy theory is
used as the reflecting Delaware policy. 92 Bainbridge argues that the rise of
independent directors has led boards to stop merely serving as rubber stamps for
CEOs.93 Chapter 4 explores how Bainbridge argues there is no need to empower
shareholders further, as directors ensure corporate governance takes the shareholder
maximization norm into consideration. His opponents, in particular Lucian Bebchuk,
demand a greater shareholder voice in Delaware lawmaking. Bebchuk commits to
advocating for more federal intervention, threatening Delaware’s primacy in the
hopes that it will concede to his policy demands.94
A

potentiality

in

this

situation

is

that

even

though

Bebchuk

welcomes/threatens federalization of corporate law in his writing,95 and Bainbridge
fiercely attacks federal intervention,96 neither appears willing to acknowledge the
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significance of Roe’s insight, which exposes the frailty of Delaware’s privilege to a
degree that neither is comfortable with acknowledging.
Chapter 5 is entitled “The Corporation, New Governance, and The Power of
Narrative.” It takes a critical look at the idea of publicization and how it plays out
within new governance. Publicization is a vague, but popular, notion that the
delegation of public power to for-profit agents—what John Braithwaite calls the
“privatization of the public”97—will lead to such agents exercising this power as
idealized public servants—what Braithwaite calls the “publicization of the private.”98
This chapter argues that publicization of the private is a dangerous metaphor which
offers a romanticized picture of functionally efficient decentered actors99 acting with
the integrity of public servants. It is suggested that publicization of the private is an
empty promise, which will lead the faithful to be less critical of privatization.
Accordingly, Chapter 5 suggests that new governance initiatives may be leading to
the privatization of the public—without the publicization of the private.
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New governance is an umbrella term for theories of governance that marry the
best of both the public and private orderings.100 It celebrates a “blurring” of public
and private functions.101 It is a noble venture that attempts to construct a governance
alternative, which encourages economic growth,102 while balancing it with the need to
generate sustainable and balanced policy options that protect human dignity and
ensure a habitable natural environment for future generations. Part 2 of Chapter 5
introduces readers to some of the literatures that inform the current development of
the new governance literature.
The hopefulness of the new governance literature, with its suggestion that
society is on a course toward the “reassertion of the public interest” within
governance103 is contrasted with the normative presumption of mainstream corporate
law. In Part 3 of Chapter 5, many of the central notions, which anchor how corporate
legal experts understand the corporation and the law that regulates it, are reviewed.
100
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This provides a snapshot of the mindset that dominates American corporate legal
culture and the commonsense position in the business world. This section offers a
concise summary of much of what can be gleaned about American corporate legal
culture from Chapters 2, 3, and 4. The main message of this section is that regulators
would face serious resistance if they attempted to publicize corporate governance, and
that any presumption to the contrary needs more sober revaluation.
Part 4 of Chapter 5 explores the idea of technocratic narratives, its dominance
within public and private governance, and its tendency to discourage publicization.
To understand the nature of technocratic narratives, Chapter 5 draws a distinction
between humanistic narratives and technocratic narratives. It defines humanistic
narratives as storylines that package information in a manner that mirrors life
experience. Technocratic narratives consist of the spectrum of scientific language, but
most predominately economic ones, employed in order to attempt to resolve
governance issues in a more abstract manner.
Technical experts, who guide much of governance today, embrace
technocratic narratives, while ignoring humanistic narratives. The use of technocratic
narratives may appear depoliticized, but Chapter 5 argues that it limits choices within
the “regulatory calculus” to those that embrace “efficiency, expertise, and costcontainment.”104 It plays out so that humanistic narratives are regarded as unsuitable,
and are thus marginalized within decision-making. By divorcing governance
104
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decisions from humanistic narratives, social conflicts can be abstractified, practically
concealing the connection between particular choices and their violent consequences.
This section challenges the notion of publicization from a different
perspective: if it is assumed that there will be the “percolation”105 of values from
public governance to private governance, what if there needs to be a publicization of
the public as well? This discussion of technocratic narratives suggests that this is
quite likely the case.
Chapter 5 ends with the suggestion that the blurring of public and private in
governance today will probably not lead to the publicization of corporations in some
spontaneous way, and that the notion of publicization may not be capable of leading
to the noble ends to which new governance aspires. And if this is the case, then new
governance, and its call for a further blurring of public and private functions, may
merit a critical re-evaluation.
Chapter 6 then concludes with some reflections on the book and some insights
into the potential for further study of the relationships between corporate governance
and society.
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CHAPTER 2: INDETERMINACY AND BALANCE: A PATH TO A
WHOLESOME CORPORATE LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporations are central players in the mediation of tensions between markets
and society.1 Thus, it stands to reason that we as corporate legal scholars ought to
invite a robust debate that encourages broad discussions about the role of the
corporation in society in order to help in finding and re-finding the “appropriate”2
balance. To achieve this end, we must be constantly challenging and reassessing our
assumptions about how the law ought to mediate corporate conflicts.3 Put differently,

1

Andreas Georg Scherer, Guido Palazzo & Dorothee Baumann, “Global Rules
and Private Actors - Towards a New Role of the Transnational Corporation in Global
Governance” (2006) 16 Bus Ethics Q 505; Neva Goodwin, “The Social Impacts of
Multinational Corporations: An Outline of the Issues with a Focus on Workers”
in Alfred D Chandler, Jr & Bruce Mazlish, eds, Leviathans: Multinational
Corporations and the New Global History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005) 135; Dennis A Rondinelli, “Transnational Corporations: International Citizens
or New Sovereigns?” (2002) 107 Bus & Soc’y Rev 391.
2

This term (and others) is in quotations because this chapter sets aside the
questions of whether evaluations such as “better” are possible in this context. In other
words, this chapter is mindful, and wary, of drawing distinctions between
good/legitimate forms of governance and bad/illegitimate ones, leaving such attempts
at “objective” measure to others.
3

William W Bratton, Jr, “The ‘Nexus of Contracts’ Corporation: A Critical
Appraisal” (1988) 74 Cornell L Rev 407 at 464-65 [Bratton, “Nexus of Contracts”].
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we need to be aware of how the processes of socialization impact our norms,
preferences, and politics as academics.4
Today, the corporation is generally held to be a nexus-of-contracts.5 It is also
assumed that the contracts that bind corporate constituents are both consensual and
efficient. 6 Such efficiencies occur because legal requirements upon corporate
governance have been relaxed, and relaxed legal requirements allow market forces to
inspire corporate constituents to use their ingenuity to negotiate contracts in their own
best interest.7 What follows from this is that corporate law ought to be permissive in
nature, rejecting mandatory legal rules as generally suboptimal.8
4

Peter L Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966) at 74,
177.
5

Bratton, “Nexus of Contracts”, supra note 3 at 458 (arguing that “the nexus of
contracts concept places the corporation on a foundation of contractual consent”). For
an example of a “real adherent,” see Stephen M Bainbridge, The New Corporate
Governance in Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) at
30-31 (Bainbridge’s application of “The Hypothetical Bargain Methodology”)
[Bainbridge, New Corporate Governance].
6

Thomas W Joo, “Theories and Models of Corporate Governance” in H Kent
Baker & Ronald Anderson, eds, Corporate Governance: A Synthesis of Theory,
Research, and Practice (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2010) 157 at 170 (arguing
that “incorporating efficient-market assumptions, contractarianism makes two claims:
that governance is consensual and that it is efficient”) [Joo, “Theories and Models”].
7

Thomas W Joo, “Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations
Law” (2002) 35 UC Davis L Rev 779 (arguing that the contractarian vision of
contract is a laissez-faire one, which justifies the assumption that “economic
relationships are the product of individual free will and rational deliberation, and the
law respects them for this reason”) [Joo, “Contract, Property”]. For an excellent
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Recent corporate and financial scandals appear to challenge the prudence of
these assumptions,9 yet they prevail over corporate legal thinking.10 To be fair, they
may still be the best option available, and conceding this, this chapter ought not to be
construed as an attack on these prevailing presumptions. Rather, this chapter merely
suggests that more self-reflexive debates about the “right” way to mediate corporate
conflicts will improve the ways we think about and discuss the corporation and thus,
it is assumed, will improve our understanding of corporate governance. In other
words, if we accept the tenuous nature of the choices we make, we can be more openminded to a broader spectrum of considerations. With a more open-minded
understanding, we ought to make “better” choices about how corporate governance
ought to be regulated.11 Such a critical mindset is important, as our assumptions

example of an adherent to this theory, see Bainbridge, New Corporate Governance,
supra note 5 at 30-31 (Bainbridge’s application of “The Hypothetical Bargain
Methodology”).
8

Joo, “Theories and Models”, supra note 6 at 171.

9

For examples and analysis, see Nancy B Rapoport, Jeffery D Van Niel & Bala G
Dharan, eds, Enron and Other Corporate Fiascos: The Corporate Scandal Reader, 2d
ed (New York: Foundation Press, 2009). However, also consider the wider literature
on the Credit Crisis of 2008. See Simon Johnson & James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The
Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown (New York: Pantheon Books,
2010); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street
and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System—and Themselves (New York:
Viking, 2009).
10

Joo, “Theories and Models”, supra note 6 at 170.

11

Ibid.
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frame how corporate governance is conceptualized, influencing the way that
participants within corporate governance calculate and respond to problems.12
Specifically, to improve the processes of understanding how to mediate
corporate conflicts,13 this chapter recommends focusing upon the indeterminacy of
corporate legal theories. In doing so, corporate legal thinking “habitualizes” being
critical and mindful of such indeterminacies,14 resulting in greater pluralism, since no
corporate legal theory would become “heavily privileged” over any other, allowing
each to make contributions within legal thinking.15 When such a balance between
theories exists, a robust debate can occur where no ideas are raised to the status of
“truth” while other theories are off the table before the debate begins.16 This would
lead to fewer consensuses, 17 but more complexity than presently exists within
12

For the interplay of corporate legal discourse, theory, doctrine, and policy, see
Ron Harris, “The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality
Theories: From German Codification to British Political Pluralism and American Big
Business” (2006) 63 Wash & Lee L Rev 1421. For challenges to Harris’s position,
see Lawrence E Mitchell, “The Relevance of Corporate Theory to Corporate and
Economic Development: Comment on The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on
Corporate Personality Theories” (2006) 63 Wash & Lee L Rev 1489 [Mitchell, “The
Relevance of Corporate”].
13

Bratton, “Nexus of Contracts”, supra note 3 at 464-65.

14

Berger & Luckmann, supra note 4 at 74, 177.

15

Bratton, “Nexus of Contracts”, supra note 3 at 464-65.

16

Ibid.

17

Ibid at 465.
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corporate legal discourse, helping to immunize the law from the sort of
oversimplifications that might offer “ease of comprehension” at the risk of “positive
error.”18 This chapter argues that adding such complexity and balance to corporate
legal discourse would be “wholesome” for corporate law.19
To be clear, this chapter does not reject the argument that relaxed legal
requirements lead to optimal corporate governance results over time.20 Rather, it
argues that the assumptions that underpin this argument are too fragile to assert that
relaxed legal requirements will produce the assumed outcome in all circumstances.21
Thus, such fragile a priori knowledge22 of the corporation must be recursively subject
to careful scrutiny in today’s fast-changing society. If this is true, then no single
theory or model ought to be treated as authoritative.
18

Joo, “Theories and Models”, supra note 6 at 170.

19

Bratton, “Nexus of Contracts”, supra note 3 at 465.

20

Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate
Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 35 [Easterbrook & Fischel, The
Economic Structure].
21

For arguments supporting this anti-essentialist notion of corporate law, see
William W Bratton, “Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law” (2005) 2
Berkeley Bus LJ 59 at 70 [Bratton, “Welfare”]; Bratton, “Nexus of Contracts”, supra
note 3.
22

A priori knowledge is “knowledge that rests on a priori justification. A
priori justification is a type of epistemic justification that is, in some sense,
independent of experience.” Bruce Russell, “A Priori Justification and Knowledge” in
Edward N Zalta, ed, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2011), online:
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/>.
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If an idea “works,” then that is the best we can hope for, and if circumstances
change and what worked stops working, then we had better figure out how to adapt so
that theory reflects practice as quickly as possible.23 As Fred Block suggests, “market
societies”24 are patchworks of regulations which do not necessarily fit together easily,
generating social systems that have an “always under construction” nature.25 Within
this context, it is suggested that embracing the indeterminacy of corporate theory will
necessarily generate a more responsive and critical discourse that, over time, will
improve corporate function within an ever-changing global marketplace.

23

William James wrote of pragmatism: “Rationalism sticks to
logic. . . . Empiricism sticks to the external senses. Pragmatism is willing to take
anything, to follow either logic or the senses and to count the humblest and most
personal experiences. She will count mystical experiences if they have practical
consequences. . . . Her only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of
leading us, what fits every part of life best and combines with the collectivity of
experience’s demands, nothing being omitted.” William James, Pragmatism: A Series
of Lectures by William James, 1906–1907 (Rockville, Md: Arc Manor, 2008) at 40.
24

Fred Block uses the term “market society,” which he attributes to Karl Polanyi.
Block describes “market society” as Polanyi’s conception of a society that is
constituted by two opposing movements: “the laissez-fair movement to expand the
scope of markets, and the protective countermovement that emerges to resist . . . the
impossible pressures of a self-regulating market system.” Fred Block, “Introduction”
in Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of
Our Time, 2d ed (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001) xviii at xxviii.
25

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “Markets and Society: The Life and
Thought of Karl Polanyi, Part 5: The Legacy” (webcast) (Posted 8 August 2006, 9:53
pm) (interviewing Fred Block), online: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
<http://www.insidethecbc.com/ideas-series-markets-and-society-available-fordownload/>.
37

Part 2 of this chapter introduces three essentialist theories of the corporation:
the concession theory, the entity theory, and the aggregate contractarian theory. These
three theories have always been relevant variables when considering the modern
corporation. 26 Put differently, since the rise of the modern publicly traded
corporation,27 the corporation has always been a group of aggregate constituents28
connected through contract,29 while at the same time being an entity with personhood
that only exists because of a concession made by the state.30 It is argued that each of
these three theories is indeterminate.31 Indeterminate, in this context, means that these

26

David Millon, “Theories of the Corporation” (1990) 1990 Duke LJ 201 at 204,
242-51; see also Joo, “Theories and Models”, supra note 6.
27

For an historical account of the rise of the modern corporation at the end of the
19th century, see Fenner Stewart, Jr, “The Place of Corporate Lawmaking in
American Society” (2010) 23 Loyola Con L Rev 147 at 151-55 [Stewart, “The Place
of Corporate Lawmaking”].
28

Santa Clara County v Southern Pacific Railroad Co, 118 US 394 (1886) [Santa
Clara]; see also Joo, “Theories and Models”, supra note 6 at 159.
29

Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization” (1972) 62 Am Econ Rev 777 at 783-84.
30

For more on the historical roots of the concession theory, see William W
Bratton, Jr, “The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from
History” (1989) 41 Stan L Rev 1471 at 1502-05 [Bratton, “New Economic Theory”].
31

John Dewey, “The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality” (1926)
35 Yale LJ 655 at 669 [Dewey, “Corporate Legal Personality”].
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essentialist theories do not support or reject any position with corporate governance
until combined with additional normative claims.32
Parts 3 and 4 trace this history of indeterminacy, pulling together a synthesis
of these three essentialist theories of the corporation throughout the twentieth century
to present. They offer insight into how each essentialist theory has been used to
rationalize contrasting policy positions. In other words, they focus on how each of the
essentialist theories have been used to embed a prescription as to how to regulate the
corporation, and then later, how that same theory was used to advocate for a policy
prescription that undermines the original.33 Thus, they present historical examples of
this indeterminacy in action. Specifically, this chapter explains how this has occurred
in the use of both the concession and entity theories. Part 4 ends by predicting how
the prevailing aggregate contractarian theory has already past its high-water mark,
pointing to how alternative and contrasting versions of it may emerge. This history of
legal thought draws attention to the patterns of how we manufacture knowledge about
the corporation and corporate law over time.34

32

Ibid.

33

See text accompanying notes 55-56, 64-67 & 69-71.

34

For the interplay of corporate legal discourse, theory, doctrine and policy, see
Harris, supra note 12. For challenges to Harris’s position, see Mitchell, “The
Relevance of Corporate”, supra note 12. See also Berger & Luckmann, supra note 4
at 74, 177.
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In conclusion, the chapter reasserts that embracing the indeterminacy of
corporate theory will generate the sort of robust debate that we as corporate legal
scholars ought to have. In the end, the chapter leaves the reader with a simple
proposal for conceptualizing the corporation: be self-critical of one’s role in the
manufacturing of corporate legal knowledge and, in part, be leery of accepting a
priori knowledge as fact.
II. THREE ESSENTIALIST THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION AND THEIR INDETERMINATE
NATURE
The thoughts of John Dewey explain how the essentialist theories of the
corporation35 are indeterminate. This part explains his position and then evaluates its
implications, before disagreeing with his recommendations on what ought to be done
about this indeterminacy. Then this part delves into an explanation of the three
essentialist theories of the corporation: the concession theory, the entity theory, and
the aggregate contractarian theory. Finally, it foreshadows the historical narrative
explored in Parts 3 and 4 by briefly explaining how each of these essentialist theories

35

For the purpose of this chapter, essentialist theories of the corporation are
models of the corporation that assert it has a set of characteristics that all corporations
must possess. There will be three considered: the concession theory, the entity theory,
and the aggregate contractarian theory. These theories purport to be determinative for
particular normative positions. However, if Dewey’s anti-essentialist theory of
corporate law is correct, then this is not the case. See Dewey, “Corporate Legal
Personality”, supra note 31 at 669.
40

can be used to endorse contradictory policy prescriptions by altering the additional
normative suppositions attached to the essentialist theory in question.
It may not be accurate to call Dewey a realist, but he was most definitely an
antiformalist, who was very sympathetic to the realist movement against formalism
that was occurring in a number of disciplines, including law,36 in the early part of the
twentieth century.37 He was acutely aware that social modeling and formal reasoning
easily became safe havens for undisclosed normative agendas separate from the
reasoning itself.38
In 1926, Dewey published one of the most important articles that the Yale Law
Review ever printed on corporate theory.39 In the article, Dewey expressed concern
over how a number of notions about the “inherent and essential attributes” of the
corporation had been “shov[ed] . . . under the legal idea” of the corporation, leading
36

See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law (New Orleans:
Quid Pro, 2011); William W Fisher III, Morton J Horwitz & Thomas A Reed,
American Legal Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) at 4; Felix S
Cohen, “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach” (1935) 35 Colum L
Rev 809 at 816; Morris R Cohen, “Property and Sovereignty” (1927) 13 Cornell LQ 8
at 12; Robert L Hale, “Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State” (1923) 38 Pol Sci Q 470.
37

Morton White, Social Thought in America:
Formalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).
38

The

Revolt

Against

John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications, 1958) at
422-27 [Dewey, Experience and Nature].
39

Dewey, “Corporate Legal Personality”, supra note 31.
41

to “a confused intermixture.”40 In fact, he insisted that “there [was] no clear-cut line,
logical or practical, through the different theories” and that “[e]ach theory [had] been
used to serve the same ends, and each [had] been used to serve opposing ends.”41 He
argued that since these essentialist theories were indeterminate, legal thinkers must
learn to assess critically whether legal assumptions attached to these theories reflected
functional reality of the corporation.42
By identifying such legal assumptions and pragmatically assessing their merit,
Dewey asserted that the law could better address corporate legal problems.43 Put
differently, Dewey’s solution was not to take essentialist theories too seriously until
“the concrete facts and relations involved [had] been faced and stated on their own
account” 44 in order to forge direct connections between legal reasoning and the
facts. 45 The weakness of Dewey’s suggestion is that by discounting essentialist
theories when mediating corporate legal conflicts, a normative void can emerge,
which might tempt the less pragmatically minded to fill the void, potentially

40

Ibid.

41

Ibid at 669.

42

Ibid at 657-58.

43

Ibid at 673.

44

Ibid at 673.

45

Ibid.
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compromising the problem solving Dewey had envisioned for corporate legal
thought.46
This chapter agrees with Dewey’s observations about the potentially negative
impact of essentialist theories of the corporation, but it disagrees with his solution.
Rather than largely disregarding essentialist theories as Dewey recommended,47 this
chapter advocates focusing primarily upon the indeterminacy of these essentialist
theories.48 Such methodology defends against the meritless privileging of any one
theory over any other, tearing down monopolies of thought, and creating more
balance between competing ideas and interests. Corporate legal debates would then
become less shielded from the complexity of governance and more prepared to reject
the sort of oversimplifications of corporate function that increase the risk of “positive
error”49 within corporate governance.
This chapter next considers each of these essentialist theories: the concession
theory, the entity theory, and the aggregate contractarian theory. The concession

46

Ibid.

47

Ibid.

48

Bratton, “Nexus of Contracts”, supra note 3 at 464-65.

49

Ibid at 465.
43

theory asserts that corporations are merely creatures of statute. 50 The classic
articulation of the concession theory was proffered by William Blackstone in his
Commentaries on the Laws of England.51 He argued that for a corporation to exist, the
monarch’s consent was “absolutely necessary.” 52 Today, this observation is still
technically correct: government authority must grant permission for the incorporation
of a business. However, since the dawn of the twentieth century, corporate law has
made the approval of this granting process guaranteed as long as the rules of
incorporation are not violated.53 In other words, instead of the legislature creating
each corporation through legislation, corporations could be created merely through
compliance with a general enabling statue. Incorporation now occurs automatically as
long as the appropriate information and fees are submitted in accordance with
regulatory requirements.54
50

Trustees of Dartmouth College v Woodward, 17 US (4 Wheat) 518 at 636
(1819) [Woodward]. For more on the historical roots of the concession theory, see
Bratton, “New Economic Theory”, supra note 30 at 1502-05.
51

William Blackstone, Commentaries, vol 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1979) at 460.
52

Ibid.

53

For legislative treatment of this issue, see, for example, Del Code Ann tit 8, §
101 (West 2011) (requiring only the filing of a certificate of incorporation with the
Division of Corporations in the Department of State); Model Bus Corp Act §§ 2.01,
2.03 (2002); NY Const of 1846 art VIII, § 1.
54

Of course, this is an oversimplification of the job that lawyers must undertake
to organize the governance structure of a corporation in a manner that best suits their
44

That said, such legislative reforms do not diminish the basic claim that the
corporation is a creature of statute. This is a characteristic that all corporations
possess. It is an essential consideration. It is also indeterminate until additional
normative claims are introduced. For instance, when the additional normative claim is
introduced that incorporations are granted in order to help ensure society’s economic
welfare,55 the concession theory suggests that whether or not a corporation meets this
standard will dictate if the state will intervene. However, when the additional
normative claim is introduced that “the state provides the corporate form… solely as
a means of facilitating private ordering amongst people,”56 then the concession theory
suggests something much different. In sum, incorporation is essential to the
corporation, but what follows from this acknowledgement is indeterminate.

client’s needs. See Charles RT O’Kelley & Robert B Thompson, Corporations and
Other Business Associations, 6th ed (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2010) at 8-19.
55

Citizens United v FEC, 130 S Ct 876 at 971 (2010) (Stevens J, dissenting)
(arguing that “[u]nlike other interest groups, business corporations have been
‘effectively delegated responsibility for ensuring society’s economic welfare’; they
inescapably structure the life of every citizen”).
56

Stephen Bainbridge, “Citizens United v. FEC: Stevens’ Pernicious Version of
the
Concession
Theory”
(1
January
2010),
online:
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/citizensunited-v-fec-stevens-pernicious-version-of-the-concession-theory.html [Bainbridge,
“Citizens United”].
45

The entity theory asserts that the corporation is something that exists beyond
its aggregate parts.57 The clearest case of this is how the law treats the corporation.
Examples of this include:

judicial enforcement of limited liability, 58 judicial

reluctance to pierce the corporate veil,59 the general refusal of courts to burden
corporations with pre-incorporation contractual obligations made by its promoters,60
and the capacity of the corporation to enter into contracts,61 hire workers,62 and
acquire property.63 In each of these legal examples, the law treats the corporation as

57

George F Canfield, “The Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory”
(1917) 17 Colum L Rev 128.
58

Consider the emergence of limited liability companies. See O’Kelley &
Thompson, supra note 54 at 535-38; see also Elf Atochem North America, Inc v
Jaffari, 727 A 2d 286 (Del Sup Ct 1999).
59

See O’Kelley & Thompson, supra note 54 at 608-11. In contractual situations,
see Consumer’s Co-op v Olsen, 419 NW 2d 211 (Wis Sup Ct 1988); K C Roofing
Center v On Top Roofing, Inc 807 SW 2d 545 (Miss Sup Ct 1991). In torts situations,
see Western Rock Co v Davis 432 SW 555 (Tex Sup Ct 1968); Baatz v Arrow Bar,
452 NW 2d 138 (SD Sup Ct 1990).
60

See O’Kelley & Thompson, supra note 54 at 658-59; see also RKO-Stanley
Warner Theatres, Inc v Granziano, 355 A 2d 830 (Pa Sup Ct 1976).
61

Morton J Horwitz, “Santa Clara Revisited: The Developments of Corporate
Theory” (1985) 88 W Va L Rev 173 at 221 (quoting Gerard Carl Henderson, The
Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1918) at 166 [Horwitz, “Santa Clara”].
62

Prudential Insurance Co of America v Cheek, 259 US 530 at 536 (1922)
(holding that corporations have a right “to enter into relations of employment with
individuals” subject to the law creating the corporation).
63

Jones v NY Guaranty & Indemnity Co, 101 US 622 (1879).
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though it was separate from, and something other than, the sum of its aggregate parts.
This is a characteristic that all corporations possess; it is an essential consideration.
And like the concession theory, it is also indeterminate until additional normative
claims are introduced. For instance, the entity theory could regard the corporation as
the private property of shareholders,64 justifying a shareholder primacy perspective,65
or it could be defined as a social corpus that is separate from its shareholders,66
justifying a stakeholder perspective.67
Finally, the aggregate contractarian theory argues that the corporation is the
sum of the contractual obligations that each of its constituents (labor, management,
shareholders, creditors, the community-at-large, etcetera) owe to each of its other
constituents. 68 Again, all corporations possess this characteristic. Again, it is an
essential consideration. And again, it is also indeterminate until additional normative

64

AA Berle, Jr, “For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note” (1932) 45
Harv L Rev 1365 [Berle, “A Note”]; AA Berle, Jr, “Corporate Powers as Powers in
Trust” (1931) 44 Harv L Rev 1049 [Berle, “Corporate Powers”].
65

Ibid.

66

E Merrick Dodd, Jr, “For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?” (1932) 45
Harv L Rev 1145 at 1153 [Dodd, “Corporate Managers”].
67

Ibid.

68

Ibid.; see also Michael C Jensen & Clifford W Smith, Jr, “Stockholder,
Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory” in Michael C
Jensen, ed, A Theory of the Firm: Governance, Residual Claims, and Organizational
Forms (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) 136 at 136.
47

claims are introduced. For instance, the aggregate contractarian theory could stand as
a barrier to state intervention, based on the assumption that contracting is consensual
and efficient,69 or it could transcend the notions of market/state and public/private70
based on the assumption that contracting is a complex, multi-polar governance
practice, which animates and transcends “the contract.” 71 This revitalization of
relational contract theory invites one to take seriously “the larger context and
framework within which someone enter[s] into and assume[s] a particular contracting
position.”72
These three theories represent dimensions of the corporation that ought to be
taken into consideration when mediating corporate conflicts, because they are
essential to understanding the contemporary corporation. Furthermore, all of these
theories are indeterminate, meaning that they could be used as a platform to take
either side of any corporate governance debate. Accordingly, each of the theories
69

Joo, “Contract, Property”, supra note 7 at 800 (arguing that the contractarian
vision of contract is a laissez-faire one, which justifies the assumption that “economic
relationships are the product of individual free will and rational deliberation, and the
law respects them for this reason”); see also Bainbridge, New Corporate Governance,
supra note 5 at 30-31 (Bainbridge’s application of “The Hypothetical Bargain
Methodology”).
70

Peer Zumbansen, “Rethinking the Nature of the Firm: The Corporation as a
Governance Object” (2012) 32 Seattle UL Rev 1469 at 1496.
71

Ibid at 1490.

72

Ibid at 1493.
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could support or reject any central issue within corporate governance.73 In other
words, these essentialist theories do not bias one normative claim over another. For
instance, aggregate contractarian theory does not inherently support the claim that the
corporation is private, that default rules are superior to mandatory rules, that
efficiency is more important than fairness, that the law should focus on process and
leave substance to corporate governance, and that reputational enforcement is better
for all concerned than state enforcement.
That said, certain normative preferences tend to attach to each theory at
different times in history. 74 For instance, Morton Horwitz rejected Dewey’s
indeterminacy argument, in part, when he used a critical legal history analysis to
explain how the entity theory became associated with the private nature of the
corporation. He asserted that conservative interests used the entity theory in a
determinate way in order to reject governmental intervention. 75 Thus, Horwitz
claimed that the entity theory was a private theory of the corporation.

73

For a more exhaustive list of debates within corporate governance and how they
play out in the American legal context, see Bratton, “New Economic Theory”, supra
note 30.
74

Morton J Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law: The Crisis of Legal
Orthodoxy, 1780–1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 68 [Horwitz,
Transformation of American Law]; Horwitz, “Santa Clara”, supra note 61 at 204-06.
75

Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, supra note 74 at 68; Horwitz,
“Santa Clara”, supra note 61 at 204-06.
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David Millon qualified Horwitz’s argument by illustrating that the entity
theory was later used to support the public nature of the corporation. 76 By
highlighting the indeterminacy of the entity theory, Millon did not however diminish
Hortwitz’s argument that “the rise of a natural entity theory of the corporation was a
major factor in legitimating big business,” 77 because, although theories may be
inherently indeterminate, they become less indeterminate when studied within their
historical contexts. Put differently, indeterminate theory can be used in a determinate
manner when additional normative claims are imported. Horwitz asserted, “[W]hen
abstract concepts are used in specific historical contexts, they do acquire more limited
meanings and more specific argumentative functions. In particular contexts, the
choice of one theory over another may not be random or accidental because history
and usage have limited their deepest meanings and applications.”78
In sum, the concession, entity and aggregate contractual theories are all
essential to an understanding of what the corporation is. Each of these theories is
indeterminate and can be used to justify or reject any position within corporate
governance. To build an argument for or against any position, additional normative
claims need to be imported. These claims are not inherently connected to the
76

Millon, supra note 26 at 204, 242-51; Dewey, “Corporate Legal Personality”,
supra note 31 at 669.
77

Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, supra note 74 at 68.

78

Ibid.
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essentialist theory. Finally, examining these theories within their specific historical
contexts helps to expose how additional normative claims are imported to these
essentialist theories in order to create safe havens for undisclosed normative agendas
separate from the theories themselves.
III. THE CONCESSION AND ENTITY THEORIES - A BRIEF HISTORY
A. The Concession Theory
The concession theory was quite compelling in the early part of the nineteenth
century when corporations were created exclusively through the legislative process.79
The legislation in question would prescribe the corporate powers and purpose,80
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Woodward, supra note 50 at 636 (“A corporation is an artificial being…existing
only in contemplation of law.” [emphasis added]); Cassatt v Mitchell Coal & Coke
Co, 150 F 32 at 44 (3d Cir 1907) (“[A corporation] is a creature of the state.”); Adolf
A Berle, Jr, “Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection of
Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power” (1952) 100 U Pa L Rev
933 at 935, n 3 [Berle, “Constitutional Limits”]; Adolf A Berle, Jr, “The Theory of
Enterprise Entity” (1947) 47 Colum L Rev 343 at 343 [Berle, “Enterprise Entity”].
80
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which would, in principle, be designed for the satisfaction of the public interest.81
Corporations had no right to act outside of these legislated boundaries, and they bore
only some resemblance in function to the modern corporation.82
As early as 1819, the shift away from the concession theory can be observed
within American case law.83 In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the
United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that corporations were created by
the unilateral legislative act of the state and endorsed the argument that a corporate
charter was a bilateral contract between the state and the incorporator. 84 Put
differently, instead of accepting Blackstone’s more traditional view of a unilateral
sovereign authority over incorporation,85 this process was regarded as a contractual
relationship.86 The state granted the power and privilege to operate as a corporation,
and the incorporator promised to engage in the objectives for which corporation was
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created. 87 Thus, the court held that the power of the state to either revoke
incorporation or modify the terms of the corporate charter was quite limited.88
The case that marked the demise of the concession theory, as well as the death
of the public corporation within American legal thinking and practice, was Santa
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, in which the Supreme Court
held that corporations are entitled to the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection of
the law on the same footing as individuals.89 Up until Morton J. Horowitz wrote his
classic article on the case,90 it was conventionally understood that the Santa Clara
Court granted the corporation Fourteenth Amendment rights because Justice Field,
writing for the majority, adopted the entity theory. 91 Horowitz considered the
theoretical deliberations at the time, and then argued that it was more likely that
Justice Field was following an early prototype of the aggregate theory of the
corporation, which asserted that it could be treated much like a partnership.92 This
point of technical clarity is not as important as Horowitz’s argument about the
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significance of the case. His argument proceeded to contextualize Santa Clara within
the larger shift in corporate legal theory and practice to shield economic activities
from government interference at that time.93
Later, David Millon wrote that the development of corporate theory and
doctrine was a more complicated matter than Horwitz’s critical narrative suggested;
in particular Millon suggested that the theory at the time was employed not only to
advocate for a private conception of the corporation, as Horwitz’s critique might
suggest, but also a public one.94 That said, Millon himself also asserted that this case
was a watershed moment in the shift toward protection of corporate power from state
interventions.95
There were a series of corporate law reforms immediately after Santa Clara,
which contributed to this turn to private theories of the corporation. Starting in 1888,
states began to allow business people to acquire incorporation through an

93

Ibid at 204-06.

94

Millon, supra note 26 at 204, 242-51.

95

Ibid at 213.
54

administrative process, rather than a legislative one.96 This made incorporation more
or less automatic.97 The ultra vires doctrine98 was also largely dismantled.99
By the start of the 20th Century, states legislated the right for corporations to
possess all of the freedoms of a natural businessperson. 100 Other corporate law
reforms that were enacted at this time granted the corporation the capacity to buy and
sell shares of other corporations.101 The corporate form could now become a holding
company with many new powers and potentials.102 These new corporate holding
companies created the ability to construct complex and opaque ownership structures.
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Each of these chipped away at the idea that the corporation was merely a creature of
government concession, which resulted in the denial of its public dimension.
Upon reflection, it is unfortunate that American legal scholarship largely
rejects the concession theory today, because it is one of the essentialist theories that
ought to be taken seriously in order to obtain a comprehensive appreciation of the
modern corporation. The prevailing attitude toward the concession theory is reflected
in the following passage from Stephen Bainbridge:
It has been over half-a-century since corporate legal theory, of any
political or economic stripe, took the concession theory seriously. In
particular, concession theory is plainly inconsistent with the
contractarian model of the firm, which treats corporate law as nothing
more than a set of standard form contract terms provided by the state
to facilitate private ordering. The state provides the corporate form not
so the corporation can ensure social welfare, but solely as a means of
facilitating private ordering amongst people.103
It is significant to note that Bainbridge’s statement demonstrates much of
what is problematic about corporate law from Dewey’s perspective. If Dewey is right,
then it follows that the “contractarian model” [aggregate contractarian theory] and the
concession theory can be “used to serve the same ends,” or “to serve opposing
ends;”104 thus, they can be consistent or inconsistent with each other. In other words,
both essentialist theories are indeterminate. So how can they be “plainly
inconsistent?” In actuality, Bainbridge proves that they can be consistent in the last
103
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sentence of the passage:

“The state provides the corporate form not so the

corporation can ensure social welfare, but solely as a means of facilitating private
ordering amongst people.”105 Bainbridge is employing a variation of the concession
theory here that states: at the point of incorporation the state does not impose an
obligation upon the corporation to ensure social welfare, but merely offers a means to
facilitate private ordering without a social welfare obligation. This is a version of the
concession theory, one he takes seriously, and it is consistent with his version of the
aggregate contractarian theory.
B. The Entity Theory
It is important to note from the outset that there can be a distinction drawn
between the corporation as an artificial entity and the corporation as an entity, whose
nature emerges from social action.106 For the purpose of this chapter, the artificial
105
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meaning attributed to the agent or agents, as types, in a pure type constructed in the
abstract. In neither case is the ‘meaning’ to be thought of as somehow objectively
‘correct’ or ‘true’ by some metaphysical criterion. This is the difference between the
empirical sciences of action, such as sociology and history, and any kind of prior
discipline, such as jurisprudence, logic, ethics, or aesthetics whose aim is to extract
from their subject-matter ‘correct’ or ‘valid’ meaning.” Max Weber, “The Nature of
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entity theory is considered to be a version of the concession theory, based on the
reasoning that the artificial entity theory concentrates on the concession and the
consequences of that concession.107 This version claims that the corporation is created
by incorporation, and thus it is an artificial construction of the state. By contrast, the
natural entity theory [hereinafter just “entity theory”] suggests that the corporation is
a “‘natural’ phenomenon” that is something more than merely an artificial creation of
the state.108
Millon explains that prior to the twentieth century the corporation was
considered to be an artificial entity and it was not until the beginning of the twentieth
century that the entity theory started to gain popularity.109 In the American context,
the entity theory was first used as a vehicle to make the normative claim that “the
corporation [was] the creation of private initiative rather than state power.”110 As
Millon explains:
The triumph of the new theory therefore signaled a willingness to
dispense with the use of corporate law as a regulatory tool designed to
address the special social and economic problems that Americans saw
Social Action” in WG Runciman, ed, Weber: Selections in Translation (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1978) 7 at 7.
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as stemming from the rise of the business corporation. Theory instead
tended to assimilate corporate persons to the status of natural persons,
eliminating the many special limitations on corporate freedom of
action that the states had imposed in the past. With this change in
theory came a new willingness to treat corporate activity as
fundamentally private in nature, differing in no important ways from
ordinary individual commercial activities and therefore free from
special legal regulations designed to protect public welfare.111
Millon’s explanation is an example of Horwitz’s “history and usage” analysis,112
which acknowledges that the “deep[er] meanings and applications” of an essentialist
theory may be limited by the social context in which it is used.113 Although this
version of the entity theory was used to block state intervention in corporate affairs,114
much like how the aggregate contactarian theory is used today,115 in time, a new
version emerged that changed this usage. This new version of the entity theory was
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used to attempt to tie corporate managers to a social responsibility agenda, as the
works of scholars such as Adolf A. Berle116 and E. Merrick Dodd117 demonstrate.
It is important to note that European scholars have had a much richer
intellectual history of contemplating the corporate form as a natural entity. 118
Generally, these European scholars advanced entity theories, which asserted that there
was something essentially natural about how individuals congregated in order to
accomplish tasks and that the power and complexity that emanated from such
organization ought to be studied at a social rather than an individual level.119 Such
theories took very seriously the effects of the social dimensions of group activity.
Today, for instance, Marjatta Maula is taking the German theory of the corporation as
a social system120 in a promising direction, offering an accessible theory of “the
116
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model of living organizations, which explains the processes or learning and
renewal . . . that are based on continuous co-evolution and self-production of an
organization.”121
American corporate legal scholars never attempted to grapple as deeply with
these more social implications of the entity theory. This could be because, as Thomas
Joo suggests, “[t]he general emphasis on groups as entities may have been too
reminiscent of socialism and communism and too alien to American individualism”
to be seriously contemplated. Thus, although the potential options for understanding
the corporation as an entity were and are numerous,122 American scholars narrowly
conceived the corporate entity, the general scope of which can be appreciated from a
reading of the Berle–Dodd debate of the 1930s.123
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The dawn of the twentieth century marked the rise of large corporations,
professional management, and passive investors. 124 This shift to professional
management created new opportunities for the exploitation of shareholders,125 who
were not only growing in number, but were also increasingly less sophisticated.126
This created a fear in some that the social bonds, whether fiduciary or contractual in
nature, between those who nominally owned and those who in fact controlled were
too weak to adequately prevent managerial opportunism. The champion of these
concerns was Adolf A. Berle, who, starting in 1923, developed legal arguments to the
effect that the contractual and fiduciary bonds owed by corporate managers to
shareholders needed to be taken more seriously. 127 Accordingly, his shareholder
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primacy argument declared that stock ownership was a new type of private property,
which divorced ownership from control and, thus, demanded heightened fiduciary
duties to complement the contractual obligations placed upon corporate managers.128
Yet, these obligations were not between the managers and the owners; rather, the
obligations were between the managers and the property, which had “a corporal
existence distinct from that of its owners.”129
Underpinning Berle’s efforts was the ever-widening diversity of share
ownership, which he thought continued to increase the potential for democratizing
corporate power. 130 For this reason, Berle theorized that if the law compelled
corporate managers to act for the sole benefit of shareholders, then the corporation
would eventually be aligned with the broader polity of American society.131 This was
the foundational motivation for Berle’s shareholder primacy argument.132
Cumulative Preferred Stock” (1923) 23 Colum L Rev 358 [Berle, “Non-Cumulative
Preferred Stock”].
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It is important to note that in 1932 Berle published The Modern Corporation
and Private Property with Gardiner C. Means.133 This book, in part, has a much
different message than his shareholder primacy argument.134 Berle understood that
shareholder primacy was not the only path to making corporate power respect public
interest concerns.135 He believed that another path was that of greater government
intervention in corporate affairs, which he endorsed in the last chapter of the book.136
However, he also appreciated that greater government intervention was only possible
if the political landscape shifted. And by the early 1930s, Berle began to appreciate
that such a shift might occur if Roosevelt won the election in 1933.137
The first article of the Berle–Dodd debate is a replication of a chapter from
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, with one key omission: Berle’s
shareholder primacy argument was constructed “with full realization of the possibility
that private property may one day cease to be the basic concept in terms of which the
courts handle problems of large scale enterprise.”138 He also admitted in this omitted
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text that it was possible that “the entire system [had] to be revalued” and that “the
corporate profit stream in reality no longer [was] private property,” asserting that a
new theory of the modern corporation would likely develop.139 But he qualified these
views as a matter of sociological study, which had not yet attained a standing as a
“matter of law.”140
Accordingly, Berle recommended that until a new corporate theory became a
“matter of law,” lawyers and legal academics must do their best within the existing
legal framework—that being to think “in terms of private property.”141 Berle did just
that in his 1931 article, arguing “all powers granted to a corporation . . . are . . . at all
times exercisable only for the ratable benefits of all the shareholders as their interest
appears”142 without qualification. Knowing that the concession theory would not be
accepted in the 1920s, and still wanting to tie corporate power to the concerns of the
boarder polity, he believed that the only corporate theory that could adequately serve
as a tool to regulate the firm—at that time—was the corporation as private
property.143 Berle saw this as his only solution.144
139

Ibid.

140

Ibid.

141

Ibid at 219-20.

142

Ibid at 220; Berle, “Corporate Powers”, supra note 64 at 1049.

143

Berle & Means, supra note 125; Berle, “A Note”, supra note 64 at 1367; Berle,
“Corporate Powers”, supra note 64.
65

Berle did not directly explain the entity as private property, but the theory is
simple enough. The law regulates the corporation as property. This property is owned
by shareholders. Shareholders have the authority to elect directors because of their
ownership interest in the corporation. When shareholders elect directors, they also
delegate the authority to run the corporation to the directors. Directors then in turn
delegate part of this authority to executive management to oversee the day-to-day
affairs of the corporation. Thus, directors and management had an obligation to
shareholders as a class and not merely to the group of shareholders that consolidated
control. 145 This created fiduciary and contractual obligations to protect minority
shareholder interests in all circumstances. 146 In other words, the law imposed
obligations upon directors and management to treat all shareholders evenhandedly,
guaranteeing that the interests of ownership were not undermined.147
E. Merrick Dodd thought Berle’s shareholder primacy argument was
dangerous, because such shareholders only cared about profits and not about the
broader issues of corporate social responsibility.148 Dodd endorsed a more radical
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entity theory of the firm that hinted at the idea that the corporation was more than
private property, and thus when managers served the best interests of the corporation,
they would be serving more than merely the interests of property holders.149 Dodd
was, in fact, suggesting that the corporation was separate from its aggregate parts, a
social entity which tied managers to serve the interests of a broader spectrum of
corporate constituents.150 He never clearly articulated what the corporation was as an
entity, and yet he pushed forward, advocating for managers to be freer than Berle
thought they should be. 151 Dodd thought this would protect better employees,
creditors and the community-at-large;152 this “theory,” which promotes a broader
discretion for managers over corporate function, has been called managerialism.153
Although Berle was sympathetic to the ends of Dodd’s managerialism, he
thought that Dodd’s agenda was dangerously optimistic, because his theory was
theoretically impoverished.154 Berle argued that this form of managerialism would
free directors and executive officers from the constraints of their fiduciary duties to
149
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shareholders, basically granting them broad discretion over corporate power in the
vain hope they would be responsible.155 This freedom to engage opportunism was
precisely what Berle was attempting to avoid, and he was thus skeptical and leery of
Dodd’s corporate social responsibility agenda.156
Berle’s and Dodd’s entity theories of the corporation largely framed discourse
until the start of the 1970s. For instance, in 1970 Milton Friedman took up a version
of Berle’s private property entity theory of the corporation,157 writing:
In a free enterprise, private property system, a corporate executive is
an employee of the owners of the business. He has [a] direct
responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct
business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to
make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules
of society.158
It is interesting to note that Friedman constructed the interests of shareholders as
those of profiteers with minimal regard for corporate social responsibility, while
Berle constructed the interests of shareholders as those of the broader polity with
great regard for corporate social responsibility.
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A counter example to Friedman’s entity theory was that of his mid-twentieth
century contemporary John Galbraith. Galbraith argued that management of the
economy was to be carried out as a public–private partnership between large
corporate entities and government; implicit in this argument is a Dodd-ish
managerialism that suggested that managers were not accountable to shareholders but
to the corporation, which in turn was accountable to broader public interest
concerns.159 It is also important to note, for general context, that this sort of heroic
managerialism captured the public imagination at the time. It was deeply enamored
with the vision of corporate managers as stewards of society. Like with Dodd’s
theory, there was little concern for theoretical assumptions that underpinned this
enthusiasm, regarding the corporation as a “social institution” without further
contemplation for what sort of entity this might be.160
Upon reflection, what is clear about the use of the entity theory during the
mid-twentieth century was that it could be, and was, employed by both advocates for
free markets, like Friedman, 161 and by advocates for government control, like
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Galbraith. 162 This observation conforms to Dewey’s 163 and Millon’s 164 arguments,
which contended that these essentialist theories are indeterminate, and also
Horwitz’s 165 historical narrative that argued that this indeterminacy has been
narrowed at different points in history, because of its political usage by prevailing
interests. Thus, although the entity theory was used to advocate the private nature of
the corporation, it was also used to argue for government intervention. When the
indeterminacy of an essentialist theory is exposed in this manner, it becomes more
translucent and the interests behind the theory become more visible.
As with his rejection of the concession theory, when Bainbridge rejects the
entity theory, he provides another excellent example of how some aggregate
contractarian theorists fail to appreciate that all essentialist theories, including the
aggregate contractarian theory, are indeterminate. Bainbridge writes:
[An entity theory] requires one to reify the corporation; i.e., to treat the
corporation as something separate from its various constituents. While
reification provides a necessary semantic shorthand, it creates a sort of
false consciousness when taken to extremes. The corporation is not a
thing. The corporation is a legal fiction representing the unique vehicle
by which large groups of individuals, each offering a different factor
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of production, privately order their relationships so as to collectively
produce marketable goods or services.166
Bainbridge steps into the world of the sociology of knowledge when he chooses to
discuss how theory reifies reality, and he is only partly correct in his assessment. The
entity theory reifies the corporation, but all essentialist theories “reify the
corporation.”167 The entity theory provides a form of “semantic shorthand,” but all
essentialist theories are forms of “semantic shorthand.”168 The entity theory creates
“false consciousness,” but all theories create “false consciousness.”169 Bainbridge
slips when suggesting that aggregate contractarian theory is superior to the other
theories. Simply put, his tacit claim that aggregate contractarian theory is nonreifying is unsupportable.
Dewey appreciated this point: the factualness of a claim was neither absolute
nor arbitrary.170 He suggested that the “eventful character of all existences” was no
reason to attempt to find balance by clinging to either extreme.171 Instead, he advised
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that the inquirer should examine the relevant variables involved in a problem,172 so
that no claim is uncritically reified as fact. 173 Dewey suggested that without a
reflective re-assessment of claims within specific social contexts, these claims stop
serving as tools for the honest observation of social function, and can start
“prevent[ing] the communication of ideas,”174 and thus learning. Consequently, if
Dewey is correct, embracing the indeterminacy of various essentialist theories ought
to better equip legal thinkers to learn how corporations function.
IV. THE RISE OF THE AGGREGATE CONTRACTARIAN THEORY
The entity theory of the corporation as private property began to lose its hold
on American corporate legal thinking in the 1960s.175 In 1962, Henry Manne attacked
Berle’s model of ownership and control, arguing that there were links between the
price of stocks on secondary markets, the residual value of the corporation, and
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managerial behavior that anachronistic thinkers like Berle never appreciated.176 For
instance, Manne detailed how poor corporate management can depress share price to
a level in which share price does not reflect the corporation’s potential profitability;
the corporation at this point may lure an investor to take over the corporation and
replace its management team in order to improve corporate performance
(profitability).177 Such threats to corporate boards thus become a control mechanism
for managerial performance.178 What is most germane to the rise of the aggregate
contractarian perspective is that, to make such arguments, Manne employed classical
economic thinking, which understands the corporation by observing it through the
lens of the aggregate theory.179
Manne borrowed from the contribution made by economists, like Ronald
Coase,180 who set out to challenge the entity theory of the corporation.181 Coase
suggested that to better understand the corporation, observers ought to focus on the
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transaction costs that a corporation confronted when operating within the market.182
By directing legal thinkers to understand the corporation in terms of how its
aggregates make decisions about how to allocate resources based on price indicators,
Manne planted the seeds of the modern aggregate theory within corporate legal
thinking.183 At the core of Manne’s thinking were ideas like Friedrich Hayek’s.
Hayek suggested that private ordering depended upon the price mechanism, which
facilitated the necessary information transfers between actors for decentralized
market-based transactions to occur.184 Such decentralized transactions were desirable,
Hayek argued, because they were efficient at allocating scarce resources to meet
demands within an economic system.185
Coase observed the operation of large corporations and concluded that these
economic units function in a manner that circumvented the operation of the price
mechanism. 186 The corporation took what was occurring in the market and
internalized that function of the market within itself.187 For instance, instead of a shoe
182
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producer contracting individually in the market with the makers of shoe soles, leather
uppers, laces, insoles, and so forth, a corporation may hire all of the people necessary
to make the shoes and thus it centralizes all of the components of production inhouse. The result is that the corporation makes shoes less expensively by controlling
production.
From Coase’s perspective, the corporation was like a more highly coordinated
micro-market that operated within the larger market and imposed cost efficiencies
upon the components of production.188 Put differently, the corporation was a centrally
controlled production system within the larger economy that avoided transaction costs
by reducing the price of production to less than what occurred in the market without
such coordinated efforts. Thus, the function of the corporation could be understood in
terms of the transaction costs within the firm versus those outside the firm.
From this understanding of the corporation, Coase argued that it was possible
to understand what controlled the size of corporations. 189 He suggested that
corporations are created to lower costs below the cost of production in the market.190
The corporation would only internalize transactions (components of production) until
the cost of production was equal to or higher than the cost of transactions in the
188
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market.191 At this point, the centralized system was no longer more efficient than the
function of the market.192 Thus, firm size was dependent on the transaction costs
inside and outside of the corporation.193 A good example of how this theory actually
translated into practice is when a number of corporations reduced their size in the
1990s as a result of innovations in communication, logistics and transportation, which
made outsourcing more cost-effective than maintaining many components of
production in-house.194 In other words, innovations in communication, logistics and
transportation made production in market more efficient than production in the
corporation.
In 1970, Manne’s theory for a market for managerial control was reinforced
by a brilliant young economist named Eugene Fama, who had just completed his
doctoral work on the efficiency of markets.195 Building upon how price mechanisms
reflect the available knowledge about products and the role that competitive markets
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played in gathering that knowledge, Fama suggested that the price of corporate
securities was based on the available information about corporate stocks known by
investors.196 His research became synonymous with the “efficient capital markets
hypothesis,” which assumes that financial markets efficiently respond to available
information.197
In a practical sense, Fama’s economic model provides an empirical basis for
studying how sophisticated financial analysts and investors, who closely examine the
data about publicly traded companies, ensure that stock markets are always highly
efficient at pricing firm value.198 As new information about a company becomes
publicly known, the theory asserts that stock price will adjust accordingly.199 Thus,
the price of a stock reflects the best available opinion as to whether or not a company
will be profitable moving forward.200
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Fama’s theory explained the complex interrelationship of managers (directors
and executives) and risk bearers (investors) as aggregate participants within corporate
governance. Fama’s work reinforced the work of Henry Manne, which argued that
investors far removed from the nuances of a corporate governance structure could
meaningfully participate in corporate governance by responding to price signals that
reduced the complexity of information into a readily understandable signal: the rise
and fall of stock value. 201 Thus, the evolution of “efficient capital markets
hypothesis” helped to kindle faith in the ability of market competition to produce
optimal corporate governance outcomes, leading to the general opinion that
government intervention in corporate governance and markets was not only
unnecessary, but could in fact hamper the performance of corporations, and even
possibly, as Milton Friedman, suggested lead to totalitarianism! 202 If markets
occurred naturally, and if regulation impeded their natural operation, then it was
assumed that efficient function of financial markets prevented suboptimal corporate
governance arrangements, simply by exit (selling their stocks).203 In other words, if
financial markets were largely free from regulation, and if securities law required
201
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corporate managers to provide relevant information about corporate governance,
sophisticated financial analysts and investors could adjust stock value based on the
present potential for profitability of any particular corporation.
Fama’s theory and method for establishing the correlations that existed
between poor corporate governance performance and stock price gave Manne’s
“market for corporate control” empirical prowess.204 Discounting the stock value not
only impacted the capability of a corporation to raise capital, but it also increased the
risk of corporate takeover, which directly threatened the jobs of corporate
managers. 205 The theory made a convincing argument that it was possible to
accurately discount stock value as a response to poor corporate governance
performance.206 It also provided a flexible, responsive and consensual mechanism for
enforcement, which ensured that corporate managers were performing effectively.
More specifically, it provided a picture of corporate governance as a complex web of
aggregate risk bearers and managers all joined by the price mechanism.
A couple of years after Fama published his seminal 1970 article,207 Armen
Alchian and Harold Demsetz made another landmark contribution to the aggregate
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theory of the corporation by introducing the nexus-of-contracts theory as an
expansion and revision of Coase’s theories.208 They argued that Coase exaggerated
the importance of transaction costs when attempting to understand why corporations
exist.209 For Alchian and Demsetz, it was not the reduction of transaction costs that
made the firm more efficient than markets; rather the firm was more efficient because
it could channel information between aggregate constituents of the corporation better
than the market could (resulting in lower information costs).210
Another perspective that added to the advancement of the aggregate theory
was the 1976 article by Michael Jensen and William Meckling. 211 This article
changed the way American legal scholarship thought about agency theory by more
firmly harnessing an expanded theory of transaction costs to agency theory.212 The
authors tacitly appreciated the operation of the disclosure requirements of the
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Security Exchange Commission,213 when they argued that one way that managers
could be held accountable would be to require financial disclosure and inspection of
the firm’s accounts by independent auditors. 214 The work of such independent
auditors necessarily created “monitoring costs,” which were necessary evils if
competition was to police managerial discretion.215 This suggestion was much in line
with Fama’s work on efficient capital markets216 and Manne’s work on market for
control. 217 However, the authors admitted that monitoring strategies 218 could not
eliminate the risk of opportunism and other inefficiencies created by the agency
relationship.219 They called these inevitable costs “residual loss,”220 referring to the
shareholder’s residual claim on the corporation. With the growing acceptance of this
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understanding of the agency relationship, the issues of agency theory were decisively
shifted from the entity to aggregate theory.221 Jensen and Meckling’s theory also was
much in line with Alchian and Demsetz’s.222 They also argued that all of the firm’s
activities could be explained in terms of the contracts (the formalized normative legal
information) that shape the relationships between constituents.223 They suggested that
the corporation was no more than a “nexus for a set of contracting relationships
among individuals.”224
221
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In the 1980s, Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel crystalized the
aggregate contractarian theory within American corporate law by publishing the
lion’s share of this legal and economic theorizing. 225 Their translation of the
arguments of Coase, 226 Hayek, 227 Friedman, 228 Fama, 229 and other economists 230
persuaded corporate legal thinkers that if corporate law better facilitated freedom of
contract, then the potential of markets could be unleashed.231 Furthermore, there was
no need to be concerned about the loss of regulatory control, because competitive
markets insured a consensual enforcement mechanism for managerial decisionmaking based on the ability of self-interested actors to hold each other in check.232
Thus, if markets were left to their own devices, then they would find an equilibrium
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that established an optimal balance between all corporate constituents. 233 With
Easterbrook and Fischel’s publications, these already popular economic notions about
corporate governance, markets and regulation soon prevailed over other essentialist
theories within corporate legal thought.234
By the 1990s, Easterbrook and Fischel marveled at the efficiency of modern
corporate law.235 They detailed the consequences of providing off-the-rack default
rules for incorporation. 236 On the one hand, these optional rules assisted less
sophisticated incorporators to select a low-cost framework that, for most firms, would
“maximize the value of corporate endeavor[s] as a whole”.237 On the other hand, their
optional nature averted corporate law from imposing a rigid regulatory framework,
which most certainly would restrict shrewd business people from customizing
corporate entities to exploit uncommon business opportunities. 238 They described
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modern corporate law as an “economizing device” which reduced the cost of
consensual bargaining without sacrificing dynamism.239
Easterbrook and Fischel compared corporate law to the regulation of other
areas of society, determining that it was unique.240 They compared it to administrative
law, observing that the discretion of administrative officials was tightly constrained
by regulation and closely scrutinized by judicial oversight.241 By comparison, they
observed that corporate law “allow[ed] managers and investors to write their own
tickets, to establish systems of governance without substantive scrutiny from a
regulator,”242 and furthermore, that the “business judgment rule” instructed courts to
adopt a “hands-off approach.” 243 While the administrative officials were tightly
regulated and closely scrutinized, corporate managers were free to do basically
whatever they like.244
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Easterbrook and Fischel explained that, upon close inspection, corporate
managers were not as free as they might appear at first glance.245 Although corporate
law stepped back from imposing command-and-control regulation upon corporate
governance, they asserted that there were still enforcement mechanisms that regulated
the action of corporate managers.246 They detailed how other constituents of the firm
(such as investors, employers, consumers, creditors etc.) contracted/negotiated with
corporate managers in a manner that would make some decisions profitable and
others not. 247 For instance, corporate managers did not engage in opportunistic
behavior, not because the law was capable of preventing such behavior, but because it
would decrease the performance of the corporation, which would in turn decrease the
value of its shares, resulting in ex ante contractual penalties for the managers.248
Examples of such ex ante contractual penalties include the decreased potential value
of a manager’s stock options, the threat of removal due to poor performance and/or
the threat of damage to reputation.249 Thus, a cocktail of free contracting, highly
liquid markets, free flow of information, and self-interest created a balancing of
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interests between market actors within corporate governance that tended to optimize
corporate performance in each particular situation, depending upon the competence of
the negotiating parties in question.250 And, in a world of consensual contracting,
without notable power imbalances and information asymmetries, equity was satisfied
in all but a few cases, because those who freely obliged themselves to bad bargains
could be expected to suffer the burden of the bargains, hopefully learning from the
experience, and thus, better equipping themselves for future contracting.251
The classic concern of corporate governance was the separation of ownership
and control.252 From this perspective, the most obvious challenge to letting markets
police managerial behavior was that investors did not have the time, skill, or
knowledge in order to be able to properly negotiate and enforce the terms of corporate
governance.253 The authors were quick to suggest how this was a misconception.254
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They explained that American stock markets had teams of professional investors
working alongside investment advisors in order to oversee corporate performance.255
Even though an individual investor might not have the capacity to contract effectively
they would be able to respond to increases or decreases in stock value triggered by
more sophisticated and powerful investors in the market.256
The large sophisticated investors, having enough financial might in stock
markets, could push the price enough to signal other investors that a stock value is too
high or too low.257 These professional investors constantly engage in detailed analysis
of corporate management, governance structure, debt/equity ratios, and relative
prowess when compared to competitors.258 Thus, tacitly relying on the commonly
accepted arguments of Friedrich Hayek,259 Henry Manne260 and Eugene Fama,261 the
authors suggested that the operation of an effective price mechanism provided enough
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information for decentralized actors to make efficient decisions.262 The corporate
legal world quickly warmed to the idea that a corporate law that allows actors to
“consensually” contract to protect their own interests resulted in more optimal
corporate governance structures.263 By doing less and allowing markets to function
efficiently, corporate law encourages “what is optimal for the firm and investors.”264
In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of powerful critiques reacted to the
aggregate contractarian theory.265 In 1985, Mark Granovetter noted that modeling
based on this theory tended to either undersocialize 266 or oversocialize 267 the
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corporation, leading to the same result of formalizing the actual social relationships to
a degree that did not reflect what was actually happening within corporations.268 In
1989, Bratton carefully contemplated a number of questionable assumptions about
discrete contracts and contractual gaps, which needed to be accepted, if the theory
was to work. 269 In 1995, Lawrence Mitchell argued that the theory favored
shareholders at the expense of other corporate constituents, who either had no
contract (like the community at large), or had little power to negotiate the terms of
their contract (like un-unionized workers).270 Each of these critiques, and others like
them, suggested that, in the end, this seemingly neutral theory might not be as
objective as some assumed.271 But, in the end, these critiques had little impact on the
use of this theory in corporate legal academia.272
During the last decade, one model of the aggregate contractarian theory,
which largely mirrors the operation of Delaware’s General Corporation Law, 273

268

Ibid at 485-87.

269

Bratton, “Nexus of Contracts”, supra note 3 at 461-63.

270

Mitchell, “Cooperation and Constraint”, supra note 265; Mitchell, “Trust.
Contract. Process.”, supra note 265.
271

Mitchell, “Cooperation and Constraint”, supra note 265 at 448, 455, 461, 464.

272

See e.g. Joo, “Contract, Property”, supra note 7; Joo, “Theories and Models”,
supra note 6.
273

General Corporation Law, 8 Del C § 101 et seq (Lexis 2013).
90

stands out: Bainbridge’s director primacy model.274 Bainbridge adopts a hierarchical
management structure that earlier contractarians tempted to flatten.275 These earlier
contractarians used contract to explain away corporate hierarchy,276 but Bainbridge
rejects such temptations, embracing the need for contract theory to account for
“asymmetric information” and “bilateral monopoly.”277 Bainbridge is not as willing
as Easterbrook and Fischel were in 1991 to optimistically believe in the power of the
market to arbitrate equity within corporate governance.278 Bainbridge describes his
model as follows:
Instead of viewing the corporation either as a person or an entity,
contractarian scholars view it as an aggregate of various inputs acting
together to produce goods or services. Employees provide labor.
Creditors provide debt capital. Shareholders initially provide capital
and subsequently bear the risk of losses and monitor the performance
of management. Management monitors the performance of employees
and coordinates the activities of all the firm’s inputs. Accordingly, the
firm is not a thing, but rather a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts
establishing rights and obligations among various inputs making up
the firm.279
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This model does have its contractarian challengers. Contractarian purists, like Lucian
Bebchuk, are not so willing to give up the market for corporate control.280 Bebchuk
rejects Bainbridge’s notion that allowing for managerial discretion maximizes
shareholder wealth and most effectively protects the interests of shareholders as a
class.281
The Bebchuk–Bainbridge debate282 may prove to be the high watermark for
the present embodiment of the aggregate contractarian theory. The debate exemplifies
how, in the highest echelons of American corporate legal discourse, such debates
could fit comfortably within the still largely uncontested aggregate contractarian
theory. This chapter uses the words “largely uncontested,” because in 2005–2006,
when their debate occurred, cracks had emerged in this paradigm. The succession of
shockwaves, which started in March 2000 when the Dot-Com Bubble started to burst,
damaged the credibility of this theory. 283 The Enron fiasco did not help things
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either,284 marking a potential opportunity for a significant shift in corporate law.285 By
2008, confidence in the efficient market hypothesis was clearly shaken;286 even some
of the most prominent advocates of the market efficiency theory, such as Alan
Greenspan, publicly began to express doubt about it as presently conceived.287
In light of this, Thomas Joo envisions that corporate legal scholarship is about
to enter into a new post-contractarian era, 288 seeing promise in the work being done
in behavioral finance,289 although some scholars question the merits of a turn to
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psychology in corporate law and scholarship. 290 This chapter agrees with Joo’s
observation that a shift appears to be occurring,291 but predicts a different outcome. It
expects that the emerging innovations will be generated within the aggregate
contractarian theory. As this chapter has illustrated, history indicates that the
indeterminacy of a given essentialist theory of the corporation allows for counter
positions and apposing policy positions to emerge within it.292 There does not appear
to be any reason why it would not happen again within the aggregate contractarian
theory. In other words, if an understanding of history helps foresee the potential for
future events, the aggregate contractarian theory ought to remain the dominant
theoretical approach in legal academia. Leading thinkers will still regard the
corporation as being a group of aggregate constituents who are connected through
contract, but their assumptions about contracts and markets will change to
accommodate factual circumstances, leading to different policy prescriptions.
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V. CONCLUSION
The contestation that has emerged about aggregate contractarian theory is like
the history of the entity theory at the beginning of the twentieth century.293 As
covered in this chapter, the entity theory shifted from defending claims about the
private nature of the corporation to defending the opposite claim by the 1930s.294 And
yet, the future of corporate legal theory does not need to be predetermined; history
does not have to repeat itself. As an alternative, we could embrace the indeterminacy
of the aggregate contractarian theory (and the other essentialist theories of the
corporation), providing a path to a corporate legal discourse with greater contestation
and complexity. Such contestation and complexity ought to be welcomed. Joo argues
when considering post-contractarian directions in corporate theory that, “[a]s the best
theorists appreciate, rational behavior theory, and grand constructs generally, offer
ease of comprehension at the cost of oversimplification. The spectacular recent
failures in the financial markets illustrate how the costs of oversimplification can
outweigh the benefits.”295
Of course, Joo is not suggesting that there is a direct correlation between the
prevailing version of the aggregate contractarian theory and the recent failures in the
293

See supra notes 124-165 and accompanying text.
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Joo, “Theories and Models”, supra note 6 at 170.
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financial markets. Rather, he is suggesting that this example provides a dire warning
about how theorizing that blindly adheres to oversimplified versions of reality risks
disastrous results.296 If Joo is correct, then corporate legal theory ought to offer
complexity and indeterminacy to legal thought, not an “ease of comprehension,”
because such “oversimplification” can lead to the serious risk of misapprehension and
poor judgment.297
This final thought brings this chapter back to the introduction with Bratton’s
comment about the elements of a “wholesome” corporate legal dialectic.298 Consider
his words carefully:
Whatever the future interplay of theory and power, the concepts that
make up theories of the firm – entity and aggregate, contract and
concession, public and private, discrete and relational – will stay in
internal opposition. This tendency toward contradiction should be
accepted, not feared. The contradictions are intrinsic. No foreseeable
scholarship or legislative reform will resolve them. The contradictions
also are wholesome. Studying and reflecting on their interplay in the
law enhances our positive and normative understanding. Legal theories
that heavily privilege one or another opposing concept risk positive
error. Theory, instead of denying the existence of the contradictions,
should synchronize their coexistence in law.299
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Unfortunately, this particular message of Bratton never gained enough traction in
corporate legal academia to bring about the quality of discourse that this passage
suggests.
This chapter will end with the recommendation that it endorsed at the outset.
We as corporate scholars need be self-critical of our roles in the manufacturing of
corporate knowledge and, in part, be leery of accepting a priori knowledge as fact. If
we will do this, it should lead to a more wholesome corporate law, whatever that law
might look like.
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CHAPTER 3: BERLE’S CONCEPTION OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY:
A FORGOTTEN PERSPECTIVE FOR RECONSIDERATION
DURING THE RISE OF FINANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1970s marked an American revolution in corporate governance as
managers shifted their focus toward greater market accountability with the rebirth of
the shareholder primacy argument.1 By the late 1980s, the resulting efficiency gains
1

Much of this revolution occurred in the economic literature, which built on the
work of Henry Manne in the 1960s. For Manne’s work on shareholder primacy, see
Henry G Manne, “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control” (1965) 73 J Pol
Econ 110 [Manne, “Mergers and the Market”]; Henry G Manne, “Some Theoretical
Aspects of Share Voting: An Essay in Honor of Adolf A. Berle” (1964) 64 Colum L
Rev 1427 [Manne, “Theoretical Aspects”]; Henry G Manne, “The ‘Higher Criticism’
of the Modern Corporation” (1962) 62 Colum L Rev 399 [Manne, “Higher
Criticism”]; Henry G Manne, “Corporate Responsibility, Business Motivation, and
Reality” (1962) 343 Annals Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 55 [Manne, “Corporate
Responsibility”]; Henry G Manne, “Current Views on the ‘Modern Corporation’”
(1961) 38 U Det LJ 559 [Manne, “Modern Corporation”]; Henry G Manne,
“Accounting for Share Issues Under Modern Corporation Laws” (1959) 54 Nw UL
Rev 285 [Manne, “Accounting for Share Issues”]. For more on the economic
literature of the 1970s, see Armen A Alchian & Harold Demsetz, “Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization” (1972) 62 Am Econ Rev 777;
Michael C Jensen & William H Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure” (1976) 3 J Fin Econ 305. This
economic literature was translated by Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel in
the early 1980s. See Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, “Close Corporations
and Agency Costs” (1986) 38 Stan L Rev 271 [Easterbrook & Fischel, “Close
Corporations”]; Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, “Optimal Damages in
Securities Cases” (1985) 52 U Chicago L Rev 611 [Easterbrook & Fischel, “Optimal
Damages”]; Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, “Limited Liability and the
Corporation” (1985) 52 U Chicago L Rev 89 [Easterbrook & Fischel, “Limited
Liability”]; Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, “Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors” (1984) 70 Va L Rev 669 [Easterbrook & Fischel,
“Mandatory Disclosure”]; Frank H Easterbrook, “Two Agency-Cost Explanations of
Dividends” (1984) 74 Am Econ Rev 650; Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel,
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placed the firm in a competitive position to dominate within an increasingly global
marketplace. The firm no longer looked like the tired and bloated conglomerate of the
1960s; it had shed its skin and transformed itself into a glistening profit-maker
designed to entice the interest of the emerging class of global investors.
As detailed in Chapter 2, although a collection of academics created the
theoretic groundwork that inspired this heroic rebirth of the American firm, Henry
Manne deserves much of the credit. Manne’s success can be attributed, at least in
part, to how he redefined the interests of shareholders by “flipping”2 Adolf A Berle,

“Voting in Corporate Law” (1983) 26 JL & Econ 395 [Easterbrook & Fischel,
“Voting”]; Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, “Auctions and Sunk Costs in
Tender Offers” (1982) 35 Stan L Rev 1 [Easterbrook & Fischel, “Auctions”]; Frank H
Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, “Corporate Control Transactions” (1982) 91 Yale LJ
737 [Easterbrook & Fischel, “Corporate Control Transactions”]; Frank H Easterbrook
& Daniel R Fischel, “The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer” (1981) 94 Harv L Rev 1161 [Easterbrook & Fischel, “The Proper
Role”]. Easterbrook and Fischel’s work from the 1980s was then used to form the
basis for The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, which is perhaps their most
influential work to date. Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, The Economic
Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991)
[Easterbrook & Fischel, The Economic Structure].
2

A flip occurs when legal language is used to endorse a particular reform (like
Berle advocating shareholder primacy to open the corporation to public-interest
concerns) and then that same language is used to endorse the opposed reform (like
Manne advocating shareholder primacy to close the corporation to public-interest
concerns). For more on how arguments can be flipped, see Duncan Kennedy, A
Critique of Adjudication: Fin de siècle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997);
see also Kerry Rittich, “Functionalism and Formalism: Their Latest Incarnations in
Contemporary Development and Governance Debates” (2005) 55 UTLJ 853 at 857.
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Jr’s “shareholder primacy” argument. 3 For the Berle of the 1920s and 1930s,
shareholders were the middle- and working-class “Everyman.”4 Berle believed that if
shareholder primacy was ensured, it would correct the democratic deficit that existed
in the management of the American economy. For Manne of the 1960s, shareholders
were much different; they were rational actors whose constructed intentions could be
used to ascertain and justify market function. 5 While Berle believed that the
democratization of the shareholder class would make the corporation a tool for the
wider polity, Manne used shareholder primacy to focus managerial efforts on
economic efficiency. When Manne’s thoughts on shareholder primacy were married
3

For Manne’s work on shareholder primacy, see Manne, “Mergers and the
Market”, supra note 1; Manne, “Theoretical Aspects”, supra note 1; Manne, “Higher
Criticism”, supra note 1; Manne, “Corporate Responsibility”, supra note 1; Manne,
“Modern Corporation”, supra note 1; Manne, “Accounting for Share Issues”, supra
note 1.
4

“Everyman” is a reference to The Summoning of Everyman, usually referred to
simply as Everyman, written in the late fifteenth century. See Anonymous, The
Summoning of Everyman, Geoffrey Cooper & Christopher Wortham, eds (Nedlands,
WA: University of Western Australia Press, 1980) (15th century). The term may not
be altogether the best term to use because there was a large population of female
investors at the time. See Harwell Wells, “The Birth of Corporate Governance”
(2010) 33 Seattle UL Rev 1247 at 1257, n 39 [Wells. “Birth of Corporate
Governance”].
5

The aggregate, private, contractual theory of the corporation that Manne
endorsed was later employed by Armen A Alchian, Harold Demsetz, Michael Jensen,
and William Meckling in a manner that allowed theorists to use the sum of the
constructed motives of economic actors to explain why organizations (like
corporations) and institutions (like the market) functioned as they did. See Alchian &
Demsetz, supra note 1; see also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1 at 308-10, 319.
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with those of Ronald Coase’s on transaction cost theory, 6 what emerged was a
powerful reconceptualization of the corporation in legal thought.7 With the success of
Manne’s perspective, the shareholder wealth maximization norm eventually became
firmly embedded within the corporate legal literature, 8 defining the interest of
shareholders and planting the seeds for the financialization of the firm.9

6

RH Coase, “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) 4 Economica 386.

7

See Oliver E Williamson, “The Economics of Governance” (2005) 95 Am Econ
Rev 1 at 2-5. See generally Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 1; Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 1.
8

See e.g. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Economic Structure, supra note 1; Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, “The End of History for Corporate Law” (2001) 89
Geo LJ 439 at 439 (arguing that it is settled that corporate law’s main purpose is to
maximize “long-term shareholder value”); Roberta Romano, “Less is More: Making
Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance”
(2001) 18 Yale J on Reg 174 at 186, n 30 (arguing that “the objective of U.S.
corporate law…is to maximize share value”).
9

Financialization of the corporation occurred when the understanding of the
corporation successfully endeavored to narrow the understanding of all social
relationships within the corporation so that their value can be translated into an
exchangeable instrument, which makes it possible for the financial industry to assess
value to them and trade them. See generally Simon Deakin, “The Rise of Finance:
What Is It, What Is Driving It, What Might Stop It? A Comment on ‘Finance and
Labor: Perspectives on Risk, Inequality and Democracy’ by Sanford Jacoby” (2008)
30 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 67; Lawrence E Mitchell, “The Morals of the Marketplace:
A Cautionary Essay for Our Time” (2009) 20 Stan L & Pol’y Rev 171 [Mitchell,
“Morals of the Marketplace”]; Peer Zumbansen, “The Evolution of the Corporation:
Organization, Finance, Knowledge and Corporate Social Responsibility” (Osgoode
Hall L Sch Comp Res in L & Pol Econ Res Paper Series, Paper No 6/2009, 2009)
online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346971>.
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Today, Berle is celebrated as the grandfather of modern shareholder
primacy,10 but this description glosses over his opposition to Manne’s flip of his
argument. 11 Berle’s objection is not always appreciated in commentaries of his
shareholder primacy argument. For this reason, this chapter offers a closer reading of
Berle’s argument, providing a clear observation point for examining the shift from his
shareholder primacy argument to the one of today. This shift is a transition from
promoting shareholder primacy in order to protect minority constituents to promoting
shareholder primacy in order to protect majority rights and the right of exit for any
disgruntled minority.12 It is also the shift from promoting shareholder primacy in
order to tie corporate managers to public interest to promoting shareholder primacy in
order to endorse minimizing transaction costs—even when efficacy gains
unfortunately result in costs being externalized upon people who did not ex ante
negotiate contract safeguards to protect themselves against such risk.13 From this

10

See William W Bratton & Michael L Wachter, “Shareholder Primacy’s
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation” (2008) 34 J Corp L
99 at 101.
11

Adolf A Berle, “Modern Functions of the Corporate System” (1962) 62 Colum
L Rev 433 at 435 [Berle, “Modern Functions”]. And for what inspired Berle to reply
to Manne, see Manne, “Higher Criticism”, supra note 1 at 400-06.
12

William W Bratton, “Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law”
(2005) 2 Berkeley Bus LJ 59 at 74-76 [Bratton, “Welfare”].
13

Williamson, supra note 7 at 11-13.
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point of observation, the shareholder primacy argument offers another perspective
upon investor empowerment during the “rise of finance.”14
Part II briefly recounts the early life of Berle. It then introduces Berle’s theory
of the corporation and how this theory plays out in his early endorsement of
shareholder primacy from 1923 to 1926. Part III explores the development and
content of The Modern Corporation and Private Property, with particular emphasis
on the relationship between the book and the Berle–Dodd debate. Part IV provides a
fresh analysis of the debate. Part V contextualizes Berle’s thoughts on shareholder
primacy within the rise of finance as an organizing force not only for the firm, but
also for the rest of society. Finally, Part VI offers a concluding thought.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE: 1923–1926
A. Berle as a Young Man
Adolf Augustus Berle, Jr showed his intellectual capacity from an early age.
He was homeschooled15 by his father, who taught him “how to learn what he needed
to know before others [could detect] his ignorance.”16 This teaching probably served

14

Deakin, supra note 9.

15

Jordan A Schwarz, Liberal: Adolf A. Berle and the Vision of an American Era
(New York, London, UK: Free Press, Collier Macmillan, 1987) at 7-9.
16

Ibid at 23.
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him well, as he entered Harvard at the age of fourteen.17 By the age of twenty-one, he
had received three Harvard degrees and was the youngest student ever to graduate
from Harvard Law School.18 After a year at Louis Brandeis’s Boston law firm,19 Berle
enlisted in the army20 and was placed on inactive duty to assist in sorting out the title
system in American-occupied territories in order to boost sugar production, which
was in high demand and short supply.21 Berle was next assigned by the military to the
Paris Peace Conference as an expert (which he was not) on Russian economics.22 The
destruction, disease, starvation, and general desolation of postwar Europe horrified
and marked young Berle.23 Upon returning to America, he spent a short time at a
lucrative New York law firm before establishing a modest practice on Wall Street in

17

Ibid at 13.

18

Ibid at 13-17. For additional information on Berle’s education, see ibid at 1-17.

19

Ibid at 16.

20

Ibid at 17.

21

Adolf A Berle, Navigating the Rapids 1918–1971: From the Papers of Adolf A.
Berle, Beatrice Bishop Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs, eds (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1973) [Berle, Navigating the Rapids].
22

Ibid at 23-24 (writing of how his “expertise” consisted of a few months research
after coming back from the Dominican Republic).
23

Ibid at 28.
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1924. This position freed Berle to pursue more legal scholarship and social
activism.24
B. Berle’s Foundation of a Shareholder Primacy Theory
The beginning of the twentieth century was marked by a period of violent
labor relations.25 Berle regarded the trends toward the consolidation of economic
power in the hands of elites as a dangerous misstep toward plutocracy and away from
egalitarianism and democracy,26 which could further destabilize American society.
Berle wanted to place economic and corporate power in the hands of the people.
Berle published an early plan for how this transfer of power could be
accomplished in a short article entitled “How Labor Could Control”.27 In the article,
he explained that the corporation could be used as a tool for the redistribution of
wealth and power to “the staff of the plant, including, of course, the chairman of the

24

Berle, Navigating the Rapids, supra note 21 at 19 (entry from Berle’s personal
diary on 25 August 1932).
25

See generally Graham Adams, Jr, Age of Industrial Violence, 1910-1915: The
Activities and Findings of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).
26

Berle suggests that the rise of Bolshevism in Italy and Russia was being caused
by the needless division between capitalists and labor. See AA Berle, Jr, “How Labor
Could Control” (1921) 28 New Republic 37 [Berle, “Labor Could Control”].
27

Ibid.
105

board, the directors, as well as the oilers and feeders and loomfixers.”28 He suggested
that organized labor (unions) could pool its resources to purchase or create
corporations, and then could grant the shares of such corporations to the “staff of the
plant.”29 Berle further explained:
How shall the stock be distributed? According to the fairest appraisal
of the value of the employee-stockholder’s services. The general
manager ought to have more stock than the unskilled worker. His vote
at a stockholders’ meeting ought to be worth more. He has earned it.
What about wages? Every employee ought to draw a regular base pay
just as a partner in a firm is entitled to his drawing account; he must
live. How about labor turnover? One hopes this scheme would lessen
it; but men will always leave old jobs for new. When a man leaves his
job he must leave his stock too, resell it to the corporation, to use the
vocabulary of corporation law, for a price. What price? The amount by
which the value of the stock has been increased while that employee
held it.30
Each worker would be given ownership and control of the corporation in
proportion to his contribution to the firm. Berle argued that if this occurred: “No
single process in the industry would have to be changed, but each man would be
working for himself and his ‘wage slavery’ would become merely an occupation in
cooperative endeavor.”31

28

Ibid at 38.

29

Ibid.

30

Ibid.

31

Ibid at 37.
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What about the role for traditional shareholders in the corporation? He
suggested:
These stockholders are, in many corporations, not true investors; they
“took a chance” . . . . They would not say so, but they looked for
something for nothing; they bought the stock for a rise, and to collect
large dividends if they can. This class is under attack as exploiters.32
So, Berle advocated for shareholder control of the corporation, but he wanted
to change who populated the shareholder class. According to his article, if he had his
way, the deserving “staff of the plant”33 would replace the undeserving exploiter–
gambler shareholders. That said, he did see a place in the shareholder class for
manager–investor shareholders who, although rare, were of value to the corporation.
He wrote:
The legitimate side to [the operation of traditional shareholders in
corporate governance] lies in the fact that these stockholders have a
power of management. . . . As matter of plain fact however they
usually do not manage . . . [but a] small group do manage and earn
much of what they receive.34
In summary, Berle not only advocated for keeping the corporate structure of
the business organization, but also for repopulating the shareholder class. He wanted
to remove those shareholders who merely bought, hoped, held, and cashed in “when

32

Ibid at 38.

33

Ibid.

34

Ibid at 37-38.
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they [could] reap where they did not sew.”35 These shareholders did not deserve more
than “the current rate of interest”36 because “the value of their management was
nil.”37 Berle concluded that his argument was “[n]o . . . attack on private property; on
the contrary, it [was] the emphasis of the strength of property. It [was] not a blow at
our settled economic institutions; it [was] the sane use of them.”38
After this article, Berle shifted his position slightly. He began to focus on how
the American economy was evolving. He witnessed the greater dispersion of share
ownership out of the hands of business elites and into the hands of the middle and
working classes.39 Berle viewed this transfer of power as a positive development,
which could achieve the same ends as his previously devised scheme: the
democratization of economic power.40 To his disappointment, the legal community
was compensating for this change in ownership by advocating for less shareholder
control and more managerial control over the corporation. Berle thought that this
advocacy of managerialism would compromise this transfer of power. In his more

35

Ibid at 38.

36

Ibid.

37

Ibid.

38

Ibid at 39.

39

See Schwarz, supra note 15 at 65-66.

40

Ibid at 66.
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personal and candid writings, he revealed that these concerns motivated him to
promote shareholder primacy.41
Berle envisioned how an empowered shareholder class, with its expanded
working- and middle-class membership, could transform American society.42 This
corporate liberal revolution43 was, as Berle put it, merely “the logical working out of
[the American] system,” which, as a liberal, he believed to be a sound foundation for
social order.44 His vision of the corporate liberal revolution placed the corporation at
its center because the corporation had the capacity to disperse ownership and
economic power widely with little change to the legal structure of the corporation and
the economy.45 All the safeguards were in place to protect this emerging class of
shareholders; all that was needed was the will to follow through.
Berle became convinced that the key to unlocking the potential of the
corporation as a tool of economic revolution was to firmly establish the property and
41

Ibid; see also Berle, Navigating the Rapids, supra note 21 at 19 (entry from
Berle’s personal diary on 25 August 1932, in which he reflects upon how the fact that
directors and managers abused their authority inspired him to advocate for greater
fiduciary protection of shareholder rights from 1923 to 1926).
42

Schwarz, supra note 15 at 66.

43

Although Schwarz uses the terms “corporate,” “liberal,” and “revolution,” there
is no clear evidence that Berle used this language. Yet this language aptly describes
his vision. See ibid.
44

Ibid.

45

Ibid.
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fiduciary rights of shareholders within the governance mechanism. This governance
mechanism would be a safeguard against the action of powerful elite interests that
would want to counteract the threats of the egalitarian operation of the corporation.
Although too radical to be an explicit policy-reform agenda, the Corporate Liberal
Revolution was at the core of the shareholder primacy argument that Berle would
develop in the 1920s.
Berle’s theory of the Corporate Liberal Revolution is significant to understand
because it makes clear that his motivation for endorsing shareholder primacy was to
shape the corporation to be a tool to democratize the American economy.
Understanding this motivation helps one appreciate Berle’s later shift away from
shareholder primacy toward other strategies to bring economic power under
democratic controls. Shareholder primacy was not an end for Berle, it was merely a
means to an end.
C. Berle’s Shareholder Primacy Theory
Berle’s 1923, 1925, and 1926 articles map the progress of his shareholder
primacy theory.46 Berle stated explicitly in his diary that these articles “led to the next

46

For a complete record of Berle’s published works up to the early 1960s, see
Manne, “Theoretical Aspects”, supra note 1.
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stage of [his] career.”47 In a diary entry from August 1932, he further reflected upon
these four articles, writing:
The attempt I was then making was to assert the doctrine that
corporate managements were virtually trustees for their stockholders,
and that they could not therefore deal in the freewheeling manner in
which directors and managers had dealt with the stock and other
interests of their companies up to that time. It was the beginning of the
fiduciary theory of corporations which now is generally accepted.48
Put differently, Berle emphasized shareholder rights, arguing that managers were
accountable to exercise their discretion within, and only within, the scope of their
preexisting obligations to shareholders in order to ensure some measure of
accountability within corporate operation and thus avoid at least some incidents of
managerial opportunism.
The first article, published in 1923, argued that the discretion of management
was not so broad that it could ignore the contracted procedure for the manner in
which dividends were to be distributed.49 In his second article, Berle advanced his

47

Berle, Navigating the Rapids, supra note 21 at 19 (entry from Berle’s personal
diary on 25 August 1932).
48

Ibid.

49

Berle noted that the trend in corporate law to grant directors broad power to
distribute dividends could violate shareholders’ rights, which necessitated a more
narrow interpretation of managerial power. Although the discretion to withhold
dividends to bolster the capital of the corporation was absolute and equitable, if the
corporation used the dividends of non-cumulative preferred stockholders, these
dividends were not lost to this class, but had to be recorded and returned to them
before common shareholders could receive dividends. See AA Berle, Jr, “Non111

theory, arguing that managers had an equitable duty that controlled managerial
discretion when financial innovations (like the discretionary issue of non-par stocks)
created holes in preexisting contractual obligations.50
The final two articles were both written in 1926. The first, published in the
Columbia Law Review, argued that equity guided managerial discretion beyond
contract. Essentially, when contractual safeguards failed to protect minority
shareholders, management still had an equitable duty to defend weaker shareholders
from powerful ones who might exercise their influence over management in a manner
oppressive to the minority.51 Finally, in his 1926 Harvard Law Review article, Berle
Cumulative Preferred Stocks” (1923) 23 Colum L Rev 358 at 358-59, 367 [Berle,
“Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock”].
50

In this article, preexisting shareholders’ rights were challenged by discretion to
issue non-par stocks. This challenge was significant because such contractual
arrangements could not have foreseen this innovation. Berle acknowledged that such
unforeseen evolutions in corporate law created a crisis because they potentially freed
management to act without regard for the interests of shareholders. To remedy this
failure of the contract, Berle asserted that the rights of shareholders created an
obligation for management (like agents) to manage the corporation in shareholders’
best interests, regardless of whether this obligation was explicitly contractual. Berle
appeared confident that courts would recognize that shareholders could rely on equity
to protect their rights. See AA Berle, Jr, “Problems of Non-Par Stocks” (1925) 25
Colum L Rev 43 at 43-46, 63 [Berle, “Non-Par Stocks”].
51

Berle explored how management allocated dividends (and losses) between
share classes of the corporation. Once again, he employed the theory of the
corporation as the private property of shareholders. He asserted that even after
management allocated initial preferred dividends in accordance with explicit
contractual requirements, the remaining surplus, if it was be to be allocated as
dividends, was subject to an equitable distribution. This illustrated how principles of
equity, beyond contract, provided a rationale for ordering how dividends were to be
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furthered this argument by demonstrating that equity compensated for the de facto
imbalance of power between shareholders. He argued that the law would ensure that
management treated all shareholders evenhandedly, guaranteeing that the interests of
ownership were not undermined.52
When these articles are read with Berle’s biographical context in mind, it
becomes clear that his prime concern was controlling the self-interested and
irresponsible actions of management, who controlled one of the most important
political actors within American society: the corporation.53 More importantly, Berle’s
more candid writings indicate that he wanted the corporation to help American
society avoid the internal strife that Europe appeared doomed to suffer. 54
Accordingly, his objective was to help empower shareholders (which he saw as
representative of the middle and working classes) to make corporate managers firmly
accountable to their control: in other words, the wider polity. He envisioned the
distribution of corporate ownership through the middle and working classes as a

portioned among shareholders. This protected weaker shareholders from the influence
of powerful ones. See AA Berle, Jr, “Participating Preferred Stock” (1926) 26 Colum
L Rev 303 at 303, 305, 317 [Berle, “Preferred Stock”].
52

See AA Berle, Jr, “Non-Voting Stock and ‘Bankers’ Control’” (1926) 39 Harv
L Rev 673 [Berle, “Non-Voting Stock”].
53

Berle, Navigating the Rapids, supra note 21 at 19 (entry from Berle’s personal
diary on 25 August 1932).
54

Schwarz, supra note 15 at 66.
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mechanism to place the power of economic concentration under a form of democratic
control through shareholder power. In fact, Berle had the bold ambition of becoming
the prophet of the shareholding class, or as he so modestly put it, “the American Karl
Marx.”55
Berle’s articles did not express his radical hopes for the corporate-liberal
revolution. This restraint is understandable. As a young academic attempting to
establish his reputation, it would have been unwise to frame his shareholder primacy
theory in line with his radical labor and anticapitalist views. Although the hostilities
and violence that characterized America’s industrial relations at the turn of the
century seemed to have ended,56 the “age of industrial violence” was still fresh in the
minds of Americans.57 Consequently, such extreme opinions would likely have been
either rejected outright or would have drawn serious and unnecessary criticism to
Berle’s project. He figured that he did not have to preach the revolution because the
market was evolving the corporate form toward an ever-more widely dispersed share
55

Berle exclaimed to his wife that “his real ambition in life is to be the American
Karl Marx—a social prophet.” See Schwarz, supra note 15 at 62; see also Thomas K
McCraw, “Berle and Means” (1990) 18 Rev Am His 578 at 579.
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In 1928, only 694 strikes occurred representing the fewest since 1884, and in
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For more details on how the rise of living standards in the 1920s helped smooth the
way for more peaceful industrial relations, see Robert H Zieger & Gilbert J Gall,
American Workers, American Unions: The Twentieth Century, 3d ed (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002) at 45.
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ownership. So, as long as the rights of shareholders were protected, his more radical
surreptitious agenda would be furthered without making his goals explicit. In other
words, Berle predicted that the existing regulation and market function would guide
the radical social work so long as the corporate legal infrastructure was in place to
protect the rights of shareholders.
Confident in the direction the market was moving, Berle constructed
arguments based on property rights, justifying shareholder authority over corporate
management.58 Each article followed a similar logic: the corporation was the private
property of its shareholders, and because managers had a fiduciary relationship with
these owners, managers owed a duty of care to owners. This relationship was
captured in law by contract and, as Berle noted in later works, by equity as well. Each
article noted how corporate management was granted discretion over the
administration of shareholder rights, which prima facie appeared quite broad.59 But
each area of discretion was held in check by a broad interpretation of shareholder
rights, and thus the range of managerial choice that actually existed was more
restricted than an observer might have assumed.
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Berle, “Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock”, supra note 49; Berle, “Non-Par
Stocks”, supra note 50; Berle, “Preferred Stock”, supra note 51; Berle, “Non-Voting
Stock”, supra note 52.
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See supra notes 44-47.
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It makes sense to track Berle’s work up to 1927 because that is when he likely
wrote the first article in the Berle–Dodd debate, “Corporate Powers as Powers in
Trust.” And this article is a word-for-word reproduction of most of a chapter from
The Modern Corporation and Private Property (a point noted in detail in the
following sections). And because Berle’s work on the book started in 1927, a draft of
this article could have been written anytime between 1927 and 1931. Thus, the article
could have been drafted in 1927.60 This fact creates a reasonable end point for the
consideration of Berle’s shareholder primacy argument prior to the writing of The
Modern Corporation and Private Property.

60

The obvious challenge to drawing a distinction as early as 1927 is that the
footnotes in “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” make reference to cases as late as
1930. But this detail is less significant in light of the fact that in practice, drafts of
articles are constantly modified prior to publication so that they reflect the current
commentary on the law. Therefore, it is very plausible that the footnotes only indicate
that a revision of the article occurred during or after 1930, which is much different
than the potential claim that a draft of the article could not have been written before
1930. Furthermore, one should consider how similar “Corporate Powers as Powers in
Trust” is to the other law review articles up to 1927. In fact, this article could easily
be regarded as a direct extension of the 1923, 1925, and 1926 articles. Thus, it is quite
reasonable—even if unconfirmed by the historical record—to suggest that “Corporate
Powers as Powers in Trust” might have been one of the first parts of the book written,
making 1927 a cautious and prudent ending point for Berle’s history up to the BerleDodd Debate.
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III. THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
A. The Making of The Modern Corporation and Private Property
In 1927, a Harvard connection helped Berle to land a sizable grant from the
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation to study recent trends in corporate
development. 61 The grant was contingent upon him obtaining an academic
appointment, 62 which he soon received from Columbia University. 63 The grant
requirements also demanded that the project use the expertise of an associate
economist.64 By chance, his old bunkmate from officer training at Plattsburg Camp,65
Gardiner C. Means, had just enrolled at Harvard as a candidate for a Ph.D. in
61

Edwin F. Gay actually devised the project. Gay was an economic historian who
became the founding dean of the Harvard Business School. He was advising various
foundations (including the Social Science Research Council, which sponsored the
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation) on what types of economic issues deserved
funding. For his Rockefeller project, he wanted to blend the expertise of a lawyer and
an economist to study the modern corporation. See Herbert Heaton, A Scholar in
Action: Edwin F. Gay (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952) at 211.
62

Berle, Navigating the Rapids, supra note 21 at 21 (entry from Berle’s personal
diary on 25 August 1932).
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Jr.”
online:
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Adolf A Berle & Gardiner C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, 2d ed (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968) at xxxix.
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Schwarz, supra note 15 at 51; see also Julius Goebel, A History of the School of
Law, Columbia University (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955) at 299-305,
316-17.
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economics.66 Means’s interests in the economic implications of the separation of
ownership and control dovetailed nicely with Berle’s legal study of the modern
corporation, 67 so Berle invited him to assist. 68 The end result was The Modern
Corporation and Private Property.
Berle intended The Modern Corporation and Private Property to become a
classic and purposefully crafted the book with this intention. He wanted this work to
make him an opinion-maker for the intellectual elites of America.69 Berle was not in
favor of antitrust measures because he believed that the large modern corporation,
with a widely dispersed share base, ought to be the primary actor of the American
economy. But he knew that in order to appeal to the legal intelligentsia, he would
have to be careful to achieve the favor of American legal icons like Louis Brandeis
and Felix Frankfurter, who were staunch critics of big business and strong advocates
of antitrust measures.70
As planned, the book became famous as a warning of the potential threat of
corporate managerial plutocracy over American society, demonstrating how modern
66

Berle, Navigating the Rapids, supra note 21 at 20 (entry from Berle’s personal
diary on 25 August 1932).
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Ibid at 51.
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Ibid at 20 (entry from Berle’s personal diary on 25 August 1932).
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Schwarz, supra note 15 at 62.
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Ibid at 14, 67-68, 83-85, 89, 104.
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corporations were consuming the American economy 71 and how unrestrained
managers were controlling these modern corporations. By focusing on the latter and
ignoring the former when making his recommendations, he could offer a sacrifice to
powerful antitrust advocates but still focus his recommendations on the distinct issue
of the control of management. In short, he appeased the antitrusters for the time being
while still progressing with his alternative agenda of transforming the corporation
into a mechanism that ensured the greater democratization of economic power. In the
end, Berle succeeded in his ambition; when published, the book was celebrated as one
of the most important of its time.72
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For a later and far more advanced understanding of how corporations capture
economies, see Coase, supra note 6 at 389-91.
72

In Liberal: Adolf A. Berle and the Vision of an American Era, Schwarz notes
that the book review from the New York Herald Tribune applauded the book as a
“masterly achievement of research and contemplation” and wondered if it could be
“the most important work bearing on American statecraft” since the Federalist Papers.
Jerome Frank wrote, “This book will perhaps rank with Adam Smith’s Wealth of
Nations as the first detailed description in admirably clear terms of the existence of a
new economic epoch.” Ernest Gruening called it “epoch-making.” Harry W Laigler
proclaimed it was “bound to make economic history.” In 1932, Justice Brandeis cited
the book calling it the work of “able, discerning scholars” in Liggett v. Lee, 288 US
517 (1933). By the spring of 1933, Time magazine dubbed it “the economic Bible of
the Roosevelt administration.” Schwarz, supra note 15 at 60-61 (internal citations
omitted).
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B. The Modern Corporation and Private Property
Berle and Means pointed to the key features of the modern corporation’s
evolution, namely: an increase in corporate concentration of property73 and a decrease
in control over corporate management by owners,74 which was a by-product of everincreasing stock ownership dispersion.75 They noted that this led to an increased
concentration of power for corporate managers76 and elite financial groups.77 The
book cast the threat of corporate hegemony over freedom, suggesting that plutocracy
could supersede state democracy as the dominant form of social organization.
Berle and Means centered on the need for shareholders to have meaningful
control over their corporations. What Means’s empirical research proved was that the
73

Berle & Means, supra note 64 at vii-viii, 44-45; see also Adolph A Berle,
“Property, Production and Revolution” (1965) 65 Colum L Rev 1 at 1 [Berle,
“Property”].
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Berle & Means, supra note 64 at 119-40.
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Ibid at 64-65.
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Berle and Means prophesize:
What will be the development in the field of ‘control’? It is not easy to
proph[esize]. . . . Economically, the problem is likely to change in
form as corporations gradually increase in size and as stock
distribution increases, to the point where the ‘control’ is virtually in
the hands of a self-perpetuating Board of Directors.

Ibid at 217-18.
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See ibid at 206. For an example of such control groups, see Berle, “Non-Voting
Stock”, supra note 52 at 673-77.
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opposite was occurring,78 resulting in a fracture between ownership and control of
property. 79 The authors warned that this emergent situation might cause market
distortions,80 especially if the gap between ownership and control continued to widen,
amplifying the perversion of the classic theory of market function.81 To explain their
logic, if profit was to work as a virtuous incentive, the traditional logic demanded that
only a “fair return” be dispersed to the shareholders (as the owners of the property
without control) and that the remainder go to the management (who control the
property) because profit would induce the most efficient decision-making, and
management made the decisions.82 The authors concluded that: “The corporation
would thus be operated financially in the interest of control, the stockholder
becoming merely the recipient of the wages of capital . . . [running] counter to the
conclusion reached by applying the traditional logic of property to precisely the same
situation.”83
78

Berle & Means, supra note 64 at 128-31, 245; see also Gardiner C Means, “The
Separation of Ownership and Control in American Industry” (1931) 46 QJ Econ 68
(an article that Means published a year before with much of the core research
findings).
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What Berle and Means probably meant by “the traditional logic of property”
is that there is control of that piece of property. Or, as Morris Cohen characterized it,
a right over a possession,84 which implicitly is assumed to grant a right to selfassertion, 85 or a claim to a sovereign power 86 over a possession, without the
interference of government power.87 To put the term more concretely, in the context
of the authors’ suggestion, it means that owners ought to receive the profits of the
corporation because they acquired ownership of the corporate venture and are the
rightful benefactors of all corporate economic surplus to the exclusion of all
nonowners.
Berle and Means predicted that separation of ownership and control would
create a new logic for property,88 which would be inspired by the better appreciation
of the “economic relationships” between economic actors.89 They did not provide any
hints as to what these new “economic relationships” would be like. And no evidence
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exists that Berle ever seriously entertained the more radical ideas of the legal realists
regarding property.90
C. A Note on the Use of Corporatism
William W Bratton and Michael L Wachter discuss how Berle and Dodd
competed in their advocacy of rivaling models of corporatism.91 In Bratton and
Wachter’s opinion, Berle endorsed planners’ corporatism, 92 which describes the
cooperative relationship between business, civil society, and government. Together,
these parties determine and coordinate policies that satisfy the public interest. Bratton
and Wachter also suggest that Dodd endorsed business commonwealth corporatism.93
Like planners’ corporatism, this form of corporatism focuses on the collaborative
relationships shared by different groups in order to establish what is in the public
interest.94 After the public interest is established, policies are adopted, adapted, and
90

One’s imagination can easily attach Cohen’s critique of the long-established
understanding of property rights and his seemingly sensible, but explosively
contentious, redefinition of property rights as having “positive duties” to public
interest included. See Cohen, supra note 84 at 15-21.
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Bratton and Wachter adopt their models of corporatism from Ellis Hawley. See
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Princeton University Press, 1966) at 36-43.
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coordinated among different groups in order to achieve the agreed-upon goals. The
distinction between the two models of corporatism is that while planners’ corporatism
advocates that the government take the lead role, business commonwealth
corporatism argues for industrialists to take the lead, “relegating government to a
backstop, supporting role.” 95 This chapter agrees that Berle could have been
characterized as a planners’ corporatist, but rejects the notion that Dodd was a
business commonwealth corporatist.
John Cioffi offers complexity to Bratton and Wachter’s use of “corporatism.”
Cioffi argues that characterizing Berle as an advocate of corporatism is misplaced.96
He argues that, at best, Berle advocated for “quasi-corporatist arrangements during
the early New Deal,” which were contradictory and vague in nature.97 Mindful of
Cioffi’s position,98 this chapter will continue to use the term “corporatism” (more
95
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Rev 1081 at 1085.
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Upon reflection, Cioffi’s article ought to be considered in light of the role that
corporatist thinking now plays in the merging forms of regulatory capitalism that are
visibly emerging today. So much more could be said about Berle, corporatism,
regulatory capitalism, and Cioffi’s article, but an aside will have to do for now. For
more on the role that corporatism is playing in regulatory capitalism, see David LeviFaur, “Regulatory Capitalism and the Reassertion of the Public Interest” (2009) 27
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precisely, Bratton and Wachter’s planners’ corporatism and business commonwealth
corporatism) in order to maintain a continuity of language between this chapter and
the ongoing discussion about Berle and corporatism that Bratton and Wachter
sparked. This chapter, however, is also mindful that planners’ corporatism cannot be
said to be a form of corporatism as classically defined.99 To be clear, “corporatism” in
this chapter refers to the “quasi-corporatist arrangements” that Berle envisioned and
not corporatism as classically defined.
D. The Importance of The Modern Corporation and Private Property
to the Berle–Dodd Debate
It may be useful to sum up before moving forward. In the 1920s, Berle
regarded the trends toward managerialism as a dangerous mistake that could
destabilize American society. He feared that managerialism, without safeguards,
could amplify the economic inequalities in America and provoke Bolshevist elements
in American society. As a result, Berle started to construct arguments based on
property rights, which justified shareholder authority over corporate management.
99

Corporatism is classically defined as “a system of interest representation in
which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular,
compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered, and functionally differentiated
categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate
representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands
and support.” Cioffi, supra note 96 at 1088 (quoting Philippe C Schmitter, “Still the
Century of Corporatism?” (1974) 36 Rev Pol 85 at 93-94).
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Underpinning Berle’s efforts (and this is important for understanding Berle’s
arguments throughout the debate) was the evolution of the public corporation with its
ever-widening ownership class, which continued to increase the potential of
democratizing economic power within American society. For this reason, if corporate
managers could be compelled to act for the sole benefit of shareholders, the
corporation ought to be the primary actor of the American economy. This ties his
early shareholder primacy arguments firmly to the perceived needs of the broader
polity of American society.
Against this background, the importance of The Modern Corporation and
Private Property to the Berle–Dodd debate becomes clear. The first article in the
debate was an exact replication of a chapter from the book, with one key omission.
The article did not contain his candid admission that his arguments were constructed
“with full realization of the possibility that private property may one day cease to be
the basic concept in terms of which the courts handle problems of large scale
enterprise.”100 In the missing text, he also argued that it was possible that “the entire
system [had] to be revalued” and that “the corporate profit stream in reality no longer
[was] private property,” asserting that a new theory, which adequately explained the
phenomenon of the modern corporation, would likely develop.101 But he qualified
100

Berle & Means, supra note 64 at 219.
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these views as a matter of sociological study, which regardless of their factual merit,
had not yet attained a standing as a “matter of law.”102 He suggested that finding a
superior theory to explain the distortion created by modern corporations upon private
property was “rather the [reflection] of a movement which [was] likely to take form
in the future, than the statement of a present ordering of affairs.” 103 Berle
recommended that until a new corporate theory became a “matter of law,” lawyers
and legal academics must do their best within the existing legal framework—that
being to think “in terms of private property.”104 And that is exactly what Berle did in
the 1931 article with his bullish argument that “all powers granted to a
corporation . . . are . . . at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefits of all the
shareholders as their interest appears”105 without qualification.
At first glance, Berle’s apparent support for planners’ corporatism might seem
to contradict his argument for shareholder primacy. Berle’s arguments, however, are
consistent because he only meant judicial protection of shareholder primacy to be an
interim measure. He concluded that the shareholder primacy position, which he fully
acknowledged was less than adequate, would need to be advocated until a satisfactory
102
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Ibid at 220; AA Berle, Jr, “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” (1931) 44
Harv L Rev 1049 at 1049 [Berle, “Corporate Powers”].
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solution to the corporate power problem could be established.106 Berle thought that
the chapter endorsing planners’ corporatism was the most important107 because it
pointed toward what he believed to be the future direction of corporate law. Thus, the
book is rightly interpreted to be both endorsing planners’ corporatism 108 and
shareholder primacy. This clarification provides critical insight into the nature of his
shareholder primacy argument and contextualizes it with the rest of the arguments
from the book.109 As a result, Berle’s evolving position was not inconsistent, as most
scholars suggest.110
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It is unfortunate that none of Berle’s personal writings, his biography, or any
of his other publications acknowledge this connection between the article “Corporate
Powers as Powers in Trust” and The Modern Corporation and Private Property. As a
result, no explanation exists for why he omitted this important insight from the 1931
article that was published just before the book was released. The missing text is
critical to properly contextualize the Berle–Dodd debate. This insight clearly
establishes that, although Berle appeared to be entirely committed to his shareholder
primacy argument in the 1931 article, he undoubtedly acknowledged that this
argument represented no more than an interim solution. Thus, although the argument
in “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” appeared unequivocal, the missing text,
which would soon appear in the book, established that his argument was equivocal.
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see generally CA Harwell Wells, “The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An
Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century” (2002) 51 U Kan L Rev 77 at
128

This discussion leaves one final loose end: Berle’s understanding of the
corporation as a democratizing actor within modern society in the future. It can be
argued that his vision of how the corporation related to the wider polity shifted from a
vision of private government in which managers ran larger corporate actors,
controlling the American economy for the benefit of shareholders representing all
classes of American society, to a vision of hybrid public–private government in
which a democratized corporate actor took a partnership role in the co-governance of
the economy with government. But this shift is not such a dramatic shift as one might
first assume. Both roads lead to the same end: using the path of democracy through
the corporate governance mechanism to achieve the alignment of corporate action
with public interest.
IV. THE BERLE–DODD DEBATE
A. Berle’s Declaration: “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust”
While working on The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle
continued to publish other pieces.111 These works continued to argue for greater

95-99, 101-04 (describing Berle’s transitions of opinion from 1931 up to the 1960s)
[Wells, “Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility”].
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Those pieces were the following: Adolf A Berle, Jr, Cases and Materials in the
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Materials]; AA Berle, Jr, “The Organization of the Law of Corporation Finance”
(1931) 9 Tenn L Rev 125 [Berle, “Organization of the Law”]; AA Berle, Jr,
“Corporate Devices for Diluting Stock Participations” (1931) 31 Colum L Rev 1239
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protection of shareholder rights. His writing inspired a range of reactions. Although
some agreed that new safeguards were needed to protect shareholders (especially to
secure a higher rate of investment),112 the majority argued that Berle’s assessment
was a reactionary overstatement that ran “counter to the historical evolution of the
corporation.”113 With “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust,” he probably expected
[Berle, “Corporate Devices”]; AA Berle, Jr, “Liability for Stock Market
Manipulation” (1931) 31 Colum L Rev 264 [Berle, “Stock Market Manipulation”];
AA Berle, Jr, “Compensation of Bankers and Promoters Through Stock Profits”
(1929) 42 Harv L Rev 748 [Berle, “Compensation”]; AA Berle, Jr, “Promoters’ Stock
in Subsidiary Corporations” (1929) 29 Colum L Rev 35 [Berle, “Promoters’ Stock”];
AA Berle, Jr, “Investors and the Revised Delaware Corporation Act” (1929) 29
Colum L Rev 563 [Berle, “Investors”]; AA Berle, Jr, “Subsidiary Corporations and
Credit Manipulation” (1928) 41 Harv L Rev 874 [Berle, “Subsidiary Corporations”];
AA Berle, Jr, “Convertible Bonds and Stock Purchase Warrants” (1927) 36 Yale LJ
649 [Berle, “Convertible Bonds”]; AA Berle, Jr, “Publicity of Accounts and
Directors’ Purchases of Stock” (1927) 25 Mich L Rev 827 [Berle, “Publicity of
Accounts”].
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Karl McGinnis believed that the law was progressing toward greater protection
of shareholders and that Berle’s Cases and Materials in the Law of Corporation
Finance was an important contribution toward understanding the problem of
shareholder protection. See E Karl McGinnis, Book Review of Cases and Materials
in the Law of Corporation Finance by Adolf A Berle, Jr (1931) 10 Tex L Rev 122.
Irving Levy observed that Berle’s suggestions in Studies in the Law of Corporation
Finance were heterodox, acknowledging the protest of corporate lawyers to Berle’s
advocacy of the equitable control of management by shareholders. He explained that
some practitioners believed that Berle’s theory in action would be paramount to
judicial interference with the ability of managers to exercise their professionally
informed discretion over the corporation. That said, Levy sided with Berle because he
believed that establishing safeguards over managerial dissertation was prudent. See
Irving J Levy, Book Review of Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance by Adolf
A Berle, Jr, (1929) 7 NYULQ Rev 552.
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Joseph L Kline, who was a Wall Street corporate lawyer, argued, “Any
movement to increase the power of shareholders as such runs counter to the historical
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more of the same criticism; however, his most formidable critic would be unexpected.
In the Harvard Law Review, E. Merrick Dodd accused Berle of being a dangerous
conservative. This was too much for the self-styled American Karl Marx to bear, and
he promptly penned a reply in the following issue.114
In the initial article, Berle argued that because “all powers granted to a
corporation . . . [were] at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefits of all the
evolution of corporations. Mr. Berle’s thesis is therefore essentially reactionary.” See
Joseph V Kline, Book Review of Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance by Adolf
A Berle, Jr, (1929) 42 Harv L Rev 714 at 717. Laylin K James, in reviewing Berle’s
Cases and Materials in the Law of Corporation Finance, attacked his arguments for
the greater protection of shareholders as too zealous. See Laylin K James, Book
Review of Cases and Materials in the Law of Corporation Finance by Adolf A Berle,
Jr, (1932) 26 Ill L Rev 712. Franklin S Wood responded to Berle’s 1926 article “NonVoting Stocks and “Bankers’ Control,” arguing that Berle’s equitable remedies
solution to the problem of managerial control was unjustifiable under sound
principles of law and equity. See Franklin S Wood, “The Status of Management
Stockholders” (1928) 38 Yale LJ 57. When reviewing Berle’s Studies in the Law of
Corporation Finance, Robert T Swaine disagreed with Berle’s position, but did not
question his statement of the law, writing: “But, however much one may dissent from
Mr. Berle’s underlying philosophy, these essays must be recognized as an excellent
and stimulating bit of advocacy. As a statement of the present state of the law they are
of doubtful accuracy.” See Robert T Swaine, Book Review of Studies in the Law of
Corporation Finance by Adolf A. Berle, Jr, (1929) 38 Yale LJ 1003 at 1004. And
Wilber G Katz argued that Berle overstated the law; he also rejected his shareholder
primacy theory, arguing that Berle underemphasized the potential downside of his
equitable solutions, condemning him for being too critical of management and being
too eager to create the impression that the complexities of many financial and
intercorporate transactions are all the result of “corporate skullduggery.” See Wilber
G Katz, Book Review of Cases and Materials in the Law of Corporation Finance by
Adolf A Berle, Jr, (1931) 40 Yale LJ 1125 at 1128.
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For the observation that Berle considered himself the American Karl Marx, see
McCraw, supra note 55. For his outrage at being accused of being a Tory, see
Schwarz, supra note 15 at 66.
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shareholders as their interest appears,”115 a legal foundation, based on the property
rights of shareholders, could be bolstered to develop and enforce fiduciary ties
between management and shareholders. He explained that the existing rights and
restrictions of corporate law were no more than “nominal[]” rules,116 in the sense that
they were only guidelines for how corporate governance ought to function. But when
these guidelines conflicted with the equitable rights of shareholders, he opined that
equity prevailed.117 As a result, managerial actions were bound by equity, no matter
how absolute the power granted to managers might appear or how technically correct
the exercise of such power was. 118 Although the argument was obviously antimanagerialist, he explained the nature of the equitable protections of shareholders in a
manner that did not appear to be limiting managerial discretion; rather, he suggested
that such interpretation of the rules expanded managerial authority to go beyond the
technical limitations in order to better protect the interests of shareholders.119
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Berle further described five scenarios 120 in which shareholders granted
management wide discretion over corporate conduct. 121 In each, no matter how
absolute the discretion appeared, such power had to be exercised in accordance with
equitable limitations.122 The underlying theory that bound managerial discretion to
equitable control in each of the five scenarios was the understanding of the
corporation as being exclusively private property, which supported the argument that
all powers granted to management were exclusively for the benefit of shareholders.123
But Berle hesitated to assert that this understanding of the fiduciary duty of
management could evolve into a branch of trust law because such a duty must be less
rigorous than other trust situations. Otherwise, the burden placed upon corporate
management could be too great to reasonably optimize market efficiency.124
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The five examples are: (1) power to issue stocks, (2) power to declare or
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The timing of the publication of “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” is
noteworthy because it occurred just months before the publication of The Modern
Corporation and Private Property.125 It was much like Means’s publication of “The
Separation of Ownership and Control in American Industry,” which was published at
about the same time and was designed to have much the same effect in the world of
economics.126 Given the academic community’s anticipation of the upcoming book,
the article provided Berle with an opportunity to emphasize his central argument prior
to its release.127 This early exposure was important to Berle because he wanted to
ensure that other important points in the book did not overshadow his shareholder
primacy argument. In other words, the early release of this argument can be
interpreted as Berle’s effort to prevent shareholder primacy from becoming obscured
by the pandemonium the book was anticipated to create about the looming threat of
corporate power.
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B. Dodd, the Anti-Managerialist
Edwin Merrick Dodd, the son of a wool merchant, was born in Providence,
Rhode Island, in 1888.128 He entered Harvard College in 1910.129 His first teaching
position in law was at Washington & Lee,130 but the Great War interrupted his
fledgling career. During the war, he served as a member of the legal staff for the War
Industries Board.131 After the war, he practiced law for a short time but soon realized
that he preferred academia.132 He taught at both the Universities of Nebraska and
Chicago133 before returning to Harvard Law School in 1928,134 where he taught for
twenty-three years.135
Two recurring anti-managerialist leanings can be found in Dodd’s work. First,
he emphasizes the promotion of the fiduciary duty of corporate management. Second,
he places importance on the protection of fairness and equity between classes of
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security holders.136 Dodd consistently asserted that managers were in a position of
trust and confidence, which led him to urge courts to be more diligent in enforcing
managerial obligations.137 His works indicated that he generally argued the antimanagerialist position, so one would assume that he would agree with Berle’s
position. But this was not the case, for although they may have shared much common
ground, upon reading Berle’s 1931 article (and possibly all of his legal articles up to
136
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relevant article, Dodd traced the radical change in the impact of the fiduciary
principle from small-scale to large-scale capitalism. See E Merrick Dodd, Jr,
“Modern Corporation, Private Property, and Recent Federal Legislation” (1941) 54
Harv L Rev 917 [Dodd, “Modern Corporation”]. In another, Dodd argued that
corporate management’s ability to purchase and redeem its own company shares
ought to be brought within the fiduciary obligation. See E Merrick Dodd, Jr,
“Purchase and Redemption by a Corporation of Its Own Shares: The Substantive
Law” (1941) 89 U Pa L Rev 697 [Dodd, “Purchase and Redemption”]. Dodd again
argued that corporate management ought to act in light of their fiduciary obligation
for the benefit of security holders in relation to their interest. See E Merrick Dodd, Jr,
“Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations” (1942) 55 Harv L Rev 780 [Dodd,
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fiduciary principles, especially in relation to the obligation of majority shareholders to
minority shareholders or to a particular class of shares. See E Merrick Dodd,
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1931), Dodd deduced that Berle was too radical in his protection of shareholder
rights. Berle’s radical stance, from Dodd’s perspective, was sacrificing the broader
responsibility of managers to the community, as well as the potential that corporatism
had to stabilize American capitalism at the time.138
In fact, Dodd was so disturbed by the implications of Berle’s argument that he
uncharacteristically employed a managerialist argument in order to attempt to
undermine Berle’s shareholder primacy theory. He determined that Berle’s extreme
stance was dangerous, making management no more than advocates solely for
shareholders by limiting the scope of managerial accountability to the maximization
of profits, and when necessary, doing this at the expense of all other corporate
constituents.
C. Dodd’s Response to Berle: “For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?”
Both authors had different views on to whom duties should be owed. Dodd
argued that the managers’ duty ought to be extended to other stakeholders. From his
perspective, managers were granted many freedoms to conduct business in a manner
that would not necessarily maximize profits.139 Dodd observed that this freedom
appeared to have agitated Berle to place undue emphasis on the fiduciary relationship
138
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between managers and shareholders. 140 Dodd’s assumption regarding Berle’s
motivations was incorrect, even at face value: Berle was clearly attempting to prevent
managerial opportunism.141 In other words, he wanted to bring managerial discretion
under legal control, not line shareholders’ pockets regardless of the consequences.
Dodd also wanted to maintain the gap between ownership and control of the
modern corporation so that private property rights would not restrict management’s
decisions. He adopted an understanding of the underlying structure of the corporation
and agreed with Berle that managers owed a fiduciary duty to the shareholders, not as
individuals, but only to shareholders as a group.142 What Dodd meant by this was that
it was not the actual interest of particular shareholders (actual people), but a
constructed interest of “the shareholder,” to which management owed a duty. He
argued that this conceptualization of shareholders required corporate managers to
treat the corporation differently than merely an amalgamation of contractual and
fiduciary obligations owed to actual and immediate shareholders. This created a space
for management to find a balance between the optimal immediate and perpetual
performance of the organization by serving the best interest of the corporation as a
whole.
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Dodd further asserted that his suggestion was not a dramatic shift of
perception from Berle’s understanding of the firm, for the picture was altered “more
in form than in substance”143 because the sole function of the corporation (to make
profit for its shareholders) remained unaltered. 144 But this statement was not
altogether true. Although the sole function of the corporation was still profit-making,
Dodd’s perspective would further jam the wedge between ownership and control,
aligning managerial discretion with the best interests of the corporation rather than
the shareholders. This opened a debate as to what was in the best interests of the
corporation. Such ambiguity was what Berle was attempting to eradicate, so as to
limit managerial opportunism—at least in the interim. Dodd hoped that if this
theoretical tweak were accepted, it would free management enough to take into
consideration the interests of other stakeholders, even at the expense of maximizing
profits.145
Dodd was aware that he was placing power into the hands of management. He
argued for placing faith in management rather than shareholders to guide the
corporation, asserting that the fiduciary relationship, as Berle conceived it, would
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create a serious obstacle to achieving socially responsible managers.146 Dodd wrote:
“Desire to retain their present powers accordingly encourages [managers] to adopt
and disseminate the view that they are guardians of all the interests which the
corporation affects and not merely servants of its absentee owners.”147 He suggested
that one must look to the managers, not to the owners, for professionalized corporate
conduct,148 for it was “hardly thinkable” that absentee owners, who have little or no
contact with their business other than collecting a dividend, would be filled “with a
professional spirit of public service.”149 Moreover, if corporate managers had a duty
solely to shareholders, all other stakeholders with a vested interest in the corporation
(including employees, consumers, and the community) would have to find protection
from corporate power when their interests were contrary to maximizing profits for
shareholders. 150 Therefore, to promote socially responsible behavior, corporate
managers needed to be the guardians of all interests that the corporation affected, and
this result could only happen if corporate managers were freed to be able to employ
the corporation’s “funds in a manner appropriate to a person practicing a profession
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and imbued with a sense of social responsibility without thereby being guilty of a
breach of trust.”151
If freed from the constraints of a shareholder primacy agenda, why would
managers use this broad discretion for the betterment of the community when they
could use it to enrich themselves instead? Dodd acknowledged the problem of
opportunism and then stated that it was not the concern of his article to question
“whether the voluntary acceptance of social responsibility by corporate managers
[was] workable, but whether experiences in that direction [ran] counter to
fundamental principles of the law of business corporations.” 152 But he tacitly
contradicted himself by appealing to the claims of high-minded managers who
espoused the virtue of public duty. 153 He used this approach to establish that
managers might be worthy of trust.154
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But why would one attempt to wrench managers out of fiduciary relationships
without understanding the outcome? As William W Bratton has pointed out, the
advocates of greater corporate responsibility have followed Dodd down this slippery
slope ever since by asking observers to bet on the fact that if management had greater
freedom from shareholder expectations, they would be more responsible to the
community. See Bratton, “Welfare”, supra note 12 at 73-74; William W Bratton,
“Never Trust a Corporation” (2002) 70 Geo Wash L Rev 867 at 867 (arguing this
point to Lawrence Mitchell in response to his book Corporate Irresponsibility:
America’s Newest Export) [Bratton, “Never Trust”]. For an example of such Doddish
assumptions, see Lawrence E Mitchell, Corporate Irresponsibility: America’s Newest
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Dodd merely employed optimism for the new generation of managers who
claimed to be enlightened enough to use their discretion to assist other stakeholders,
like employees, who needed protection from the inequities of their bargaining
positions with the corporation.155 He romanticized the potential to transform modern
business from a “purely private matter” into a “public profession,” in which managers
would undertake a role as stewards of society.156 His arguments were inspiring, but
also lacking substance, rendering them no more than corporate futurism.
But, when one considers Dodd’s broader publication record,157 it becomes
questionable whether the suggestion that Dodd was a business commonwealth
corporatist can stand up to scrutiny. Admittedly, Dodd’s argument from the 1932
article suggests that he was using the business commonwealth corporatists (in
particular, Owen D Young and Gerald Swope) as examples of professionalized
corporate managers who voluntarily accepted a responsibility for achieving publicinterest ends.158 But when one puts the 1932 article to one side and reviews Dodd’s
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other writings before and after the 1932 article, it becomes clearer that Dodd was
primarily an anti-managerialist. Therefore, one can conclude that Dodd was merely
open-minded to Young and Swope’s business commonwealth corporatism, adopting a
wait-and-see approach to “whether experiences in that direction [ran] counter to
fundamental principles of the law of business corporations.”159
Dodd sided with business commonwealth corporatists merely because he
needed examples of potentially enlightened managers to counter what he believed to
be Berle’s alarmingly extreme shareholder primacy position. In other words, Dodd
did not use the examples of Young and Swope because he genuinely endorsed their
specific agenda, but merely because he was encouraged by their efforts, which
appeared to be moving in the direction of corporate responsibility. Dodd’s point was
that such attempts at enlightened managerial behavior would be stamped out by
Berle’s strategy to bind managers to the whims of absentee profiteers.
In sum, Dodd’s 1932 article ought to be regarded as a reaction to Berle’s
position. The argument in this article contradicted his own best judgment (as
established by the archive of his work).160 This is why he later admitted that this
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argument was “rash” and riddled with “legal difficulties.” 161 Thus, it should be
regarded more as a consequence of Berle’s extremism and less as a sincere
endorsement of business commonwealth corporatism. Dodd was merely petitioning
those potentially lured by Berle’s perceived extremism to keep an open mind to the
potential for enlightened managerial behavior, but Dodd was overzealous in making
this point, at least in Berle’s opinion. Therefore, though the case can be made that
Dodd advocated business commonwealth corporatism, his level of enthusiasm
actually skews understanding of what Dodd was doing. To be more accurate, one
must emphasize that the contradictory nature of Dodd’s other writings, before and
after this article, point to the conclusion that he was not a business commonwealth
corporatist.162
D. Berle’s Reply: “For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note”
One could imagine a number of ends to this story. For instance, Berle could
have explained his position in a congenial manner, highlighting the similarities of his
arguments with those of Dodd and explaining their differences as not so dissimilar
after all. But this never happened. Instead, Berle’s biographer explains that Berle was
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outraged by Dodd’s accusation that he was a conservative, writing: “Dodd’s real
crime was making Berle seem like a Tory in the midst of an American revolution.”163
Imagine how agonizing it must have been for the sometimes pompous Berle to
endure such an affront on the eve of the release of his crowning achievement, which
was to be (by his design) his coming-out party into the world of the left-leaning
intellectual elites of America.164 Berle had expected a managerialist attack from
conservatives, who would rhetorically defend the status quo ante of managerial
discretion, but he did not expect to be accused of being a conservative. Dodd was
probably equally surprised that Berle’s reply was left-leaning. This family feud of the
left exposed Berle’s argument as being less than ideal, based on the weak assumption
that the interests of absentee owners would make management more accountable,
while also exposing Dodd’s corporate responsibility argument as being naively
trusting of corporate managers.165
To address Dodd’s criticism and, one surmises, to defend his own reputation
and exact a little revenge, Berle elaborated on his main thesis that “all powers granted
to a corporation . . . are . . . at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefits of all
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the shareholders as their interest appears.” 166 He argued that the present law
established that managers were required to manage the corporation in the interest of
its shareholders, and that although many groups, notably labor, were gaining
recognition as having claims against the corporation (which created legitimate cost to
industry), the recognition of these costs (which reduced profits) did not alter the main
objective of the corporate managers.167 Berle continued to fire back at Dodd by
arguing that the “real justification” for Dodd’s opposition to his thesis stemmed from
Dodd’s underlying assumption that industrial managers of the day functioned more as
government officials than as merchants, 168 which Berle tacitly (and spitefully)
suggested was a foolhardy reason because managers did not see themselves as
such.169
Berle did not dispute Dodd’s suggestion that the corporation needed to be
accountable to the wider polity.170 This concession probably shocked Dodd because it
was a slippery slope, which opened the door to the primacy of the public interest over
property rights. This is an argument that a clever and conservatively minded liberal,
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like Dodd accused Berle of being, would never make. After making clear his colors,
Berle then went on the attack, clarifying with slightly condescending undertones that
managers did wield immense (government-like) power over society, but did not
regard themselves as stewards of society and did not assume social responsibilities.171
And to make matters worse, no mechanism existed to enforce the applications of
Dodd’s pseudo-theory of the corporation.172 Furthermore, if the fiduciary obligation
of mangers to shareholders was ignored, then the management and control173 would
become “for all practical purposes absolute”—resulting in greater corporate
irresponsibility. 174 Therefore, until such time as Dodd (or any others who
sympathized with the noble manager) was prepared to offer a “clear and reasonable
enforcement scheme of responsibilities,” emphasis would have to be placed on the
fact that the corporation’s sole purpose was to make profits for their shareholders.
This was because there existed no other legal control over corporate power, however
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imperfect it may be.175 Berle emphasized that shareholder primacy was the best
option available to take “responsibility for control of national wealth and incomes” in
a manner that properly protected the majority of the community.176
Berle provided an echo of his corporate-liberal revolution by arguing that the
only way to slip public interest through the backdoor of what today’s observer would
call corporate governance was through the shareholder primacy model. Berle noted
that the working and middle classes were ever-more populating the American
shareholder class and thus the construction of shareholder interests ought not be
characterized as the interests of greedy profiteers, but as the interests of the average
American. Admittedly, he does not come right out with this argument, but he did hint
at its potential, writing:
The administration of corporations—peculiarly, a few hundred large
corporations—is now the crux of American industrial life. Upon the
securities of these corporations has been erected the dominant part of
the property system of the industrial east. A major function of these
securities is to provide safety, security, or means of support for that
part of the community which is unable to earn its living in the normal
channels of work or trade. Under cover of that system, certain
individuals may perhaps acquire a disproportionate share of wealth.
But this is an incident to the system and not its major premise;
statistically, it plays a relatively minor part. Historically, and as a
matter of law, corporate managements have been required to run their
affairs in the interests of their security holders.177
175

Ibid.

176

Ibid at 1368.

177

Ibid at 1365.
148

In his conclusion, Berle reiterated that the law could not surrender the present
fiduciary controls over management before the social sciences could more adequately
explain the corporate form in a manner that could frame a substantial reform of
corporate law, noting that “legal technique [did] not contemplate intervening periods
of chaos,”178 but would only respond to new outcomes or theories as they were
established.179 He foresaw that social theorists would guide the establishment of a
revised institutional design of American society, and that at this point, the law could
play a role stabilizing expectations and relations between stakeholders as they
emerged.180 But until such a time, lawyers were in a position where they needed legal
tools to meet day-to-day situations. The fiduciary duty of management to
shareholders was presently the best legal tool they had to control corporate
behavior.181 And as it stood, the shareholder primacy model worked as a method to
ensure public interest, if envisaged in the correct manner.
Berle punctuated his reply to Dodd, declaring that “it is one thing to say that
the law must allow for such developments. It is quite another to grant uncontrolled
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power to corporate managers in the hope that they will produce that development.”182
Berle’s bad-natured reactions aside, he focused his attack on what Dodd had actually
attempted to accomplish in his article, namely weakening the fiduciary obligations of
managers to shareholders before social theorists could rationalize the modern
corporation in a manner that could be adopted by law. Berle did so because he
thought that the application of Dodd’s argument would result in a carte blanche for
corporate irresponsibility, and because Dodd did not appreciate what Berle was
attempting to accomplish with shareholder primacy.
In sum, Berle argued clearly that shareholders’ fiduciary controls over
management could not be abandoned by lawyers until a new order emerged. He noted
that “legal technique [did] not contemplate intervening periods of chaos,” but would
only respond to new outcomes or theories as they were established. 183 Berle’s
argument in the 1932 article mirrored the missing passages from the 1931 article
(which were published in The Modern Corporation and Private Property). He argued
that social science needed to better guide the legal understanding of the evolving
corporate form and that only after this was done could the law play a role in the
emerging new order.184 Without providing hints as to what sort of reforms might be
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implemented, Berle emphasized that lawyers needed new legal tools to bring
corporate behavior under greater control.185
E. Berle’s Reluctance in “For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note”
One question may be nagging the reader at this point: Why did Berle not take
the time to write a more thorough response to Dodd? If Berle had more to say about
the future regulation of corporations and how the shareholder primacy argument was
merely to be an interim solution before adoption of planners’ corporatism, why did he
not present it in the Harvard Law Review? The Modern Corporation and Private
Property was merely weeks away from release, and his 1932 article could have been
a great support for the book’s launch, which Berle so desperately wanted to be a
success. And yet, Berle’s response can be interpreted as guarded. One answer may be
that Berle was irritated by Dodd’s reply, firing off an emotional response rather than a
thoughtful clarification of his position. Another possibility is that he feared alienating
Brandeis-style antitrust advocates. But William W Bratton and Michael L Wachter
provide a more provocative alternative. They write:
We suspect he thought that the timing was wrong. The battle between
his progressive vision of corporatism and business commonwealth
corporatism was taking place behind closed doors. Berle wanted to
ensure his vision of corporatism was the one that would be adopted by
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the Roosevelt Administration and presumably was jealous to protect
his influence.186
They note that Raymond Moley, a colleague at Columbia University, lured
Berle away from full-time academia in 1932 by convincing him to join Roosevelt in
his bid to win the presidency.187 But the authors are vague as to when this offer was
made, writing only: it was “early in [Roosevelt’s] 1932 presidential campaign.”188
The argument calls for more precision. If a connection is to be established between
Berle’s reply to Dodd and Berle’s Roosevelt years, pinpointing months matters. So to
be more exact, Berle was aware that he would be functioning in his new position as a
political advisor for a presidential candidate in May.189 Dodd published his reply to
186
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Berle on May 8, 1932,190 and Berle fired back his reply to Dodd after that date in the
following edition.191 The “New Individual” speech (presented about three months
later), which was penned by Berle for Roosevelt, clearly established that corporatism
was on Berle’s mind.192
The “New Individual” speech argued that citizens had the right to have their
interest in the economy protected from the irresponsible exercise of corporate power,
and that the government needed to protect this right.193 As Bratton and Wachter
explained, this speech called for “government controls” over managerial power so
that managers would be compelled to “assume responsibility for the public good, end
their internecine disputes, come together as industrial groups, and cooperate toward a
common end.”194 If industrial groups failed to do so, the government would make
them do so.195
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Berle understood that shareholder primacy was only one manner of enforcing
the public interest in corporate governance. In 1932, the political landscape was
shifting. Berle believed that planners’ corporatism, which he endorsed in the last
chapter of The Modern Corporation and Private Property, was possible if Roosevelt
won the election and if Berle could convince Roosevelt to see things his way. In sum,
Berle wanted to ensure that corporate governance could be directed to take into
consideration the wider polity, and he believed that he had an opportunity to make
this happen.
Bratton and Wachter, however, did not get it totally right. The battle behind
closed doors was not between Berle’s corporatism and business commonwealth
corporatism. The battle was actually between: (1) his corporatism, and (2) Brandeisstyle antitrust economics.196 The champion of the latter was Felix Frankfurter and his
acolytes, whom Berle called “the would-be Brandeis followers of today” who “lacked
the great man’s admirable genius for being both radical and practical.”197
The tension between Frankfurter and Berle goes back to their time at
Harvard.198 Frankfurter joined the faculty at Harvard when Berle was in his first year
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of law school.199 Frankfurter’s biographer describes his chief personality imperfection
in the following passage:
Because his self-image was inflated, and because his psychological
peace rested upon that self-image, Frankfurter could not accept
serious, sustained opposition in fields he considered his domain of
expertise; he reacted to his opponents with vindictive hostility.200
When one considers this idiosyncrasy in light of the following passage from Berle’s
biographer, one begins to appreciate how a young Berle would be particularly
irritating to Frankfurter:
Later in life neither man cared to discuss the other, and there are only
snippets of stories concerning their Harvard years. Yet, what emerges
is an arrogant young Berle bent on cutting others down to size. The
young Adolf relentlessly challenged Frankfurter in class, thereby
making himself an unforgivable embarrassment to the professor.
According to William O. Douglas, later a Columbia Law School and
New Deal colleague, in the years following Berle’s enrollment in
Frankfurter’s course, Berle began attending it for a second year in a
row. Frankfurter was puzzled and asked Berle if he had taken the
course the previous year. Berle replied affirmatively and Frankfurter
asked, “Then why are you back?” “Oh,” Berle responded, “I wanted to
see if you had learned anything since last year.” Another story had a
vengeful Frankfurter blocking the young Berle from making the Law
Review.201
From one perspective, Frankfurter’s animosity was understandable. From
another, it was not. It is difficult to image a pupil exhibiting such disrespect for a
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professor without inciting disciplinary action. But for Frankfurter to personally
retaliate against the immature Berle (remember Berle started law school three or four
year earlier than most students), thereby exhibiting transparent signs of vindictiveness
to a poorly adjusted (yet arrogant) student might be seen as unprofessional.
Putting this relationship into relevant context, Roosevelt strategically divided
his advisors so that no one camp within his ranks enjoyed the position of privileged
insider,202 thus creating a competitive decision-making process. Berle and Frankfurter
fit this mold because any decision-making process that involved both men could be
nothing less than competitive. While on the campaign trail before Berle had written
the “New Individual” speech, Roosevelt invited Frankfurter’s opinion regarding
policy development. Berle’s biographer writes: “Felix Frankfurter’s intrusion into the
campaign [was] intolerable. Aside from his old personal animus to the Harvard law
professor, Berle saw in Frankfurter an ideological adversary—a Brandeisian
“atomist” who opposed the brain trust consensus on large economic units for
industrial planning.”203
Berle warned Roosevelt that he should not give Frankfurter’s “New Freedom”
speech, which was similar to what Brandeis had drafted for Woodrow Wilson.204
202
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Berle thought that Brandeis-style individualism was what the Coolidge and Hoover
Administrations used as a euphemism for inaction. He argued, “Whatever the
economic system does permit, it is not individualism.”205 He then advised Roosevelt:
[I]t is necessary to do for [the American] system what Bismarck did
for the German system in 1880, as [a] result of conditions not unlike
these . . . . Otherwise only one of two results can occur. Either [the]
handful of people who run the economic system now will get together
making an economic government which far outweighs in importance
the federal government; or in their struggles they will tear the system
to pieces. Neither alternative is sound national policy.206
Berle pressured Roosevelt to make a “pronouncement” arguing for “public
collective planning.”207 Berle suggested to Roosevelt that this pronouncement “would
probably make at once [Roosevelt’s] place in history and [have] political significance
vastly beyond the significance of [his] campaign.”208 Five weeks later, Roosevelt
gave the “New Individualism” speech, which Berle named in order to contrast
Frankfurter’s old freedom mantra and to make the statement that he had
countermanded Frankfurter’s attempts to make individualism a core principle of the
campaign.209
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The antipathy between Berle and Frankfurter helps explain why Berle did not
defend his ideas as strongly as he could have against Dodd. Indeed, the timing was
wrong. But the battle was not between his corporatism and business commonwealth
corporatism, it was between his vision and Frankfurter’s vision. As far as the business
commonwealth corporatism model, no evidence exists that Frankfurter, or others in
the democratic camp, directly advocated it. Furthermore, Berle did want, as Bratton
and Wachter put it, “to ensure his vision of corporatism was the one that would be
adopted by the Roosevelt Administration.” 210 He “was jealous to protect his
influence,”211 but not from his few members of the brain trust at the time (Moley,
Rexford Tugwell, and James Warburg), rather from his old nemesis—Felix
Frankfurter.
From the outset of joining Roosevelt’s campaign, Berle would probably have
known that Frankfurter had been informally advising Roosevelt from the time that
Roosevelt was Governor of New York State,212 and that at some point Frankfurter
would be called in to assume a similar role during this campaign. Furthermore,
Frankfurter was Brandeis’s protégé, and Berle knew the ideological connection
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between Frankfurter and Brandeis.213 So Berle, being a former student of Frankfurter
and a young lawyer for a year at Brandeis’s law firm, would have known that a battle
was coming. He also would have known the position that Frankfurter would be
espousing to Roosevelt. Here, Berle had an advantage because he knew Frankfurter’s
plan of action, but Frankfurter was blind to Berle’s. Berle’s biographer sets the scene
in the following passage:
Both men were anxious to succeed and there developed between them
a strong animus that would ripen into the bitterest and most ideological
of New Deal rivalries . . . the issue between them being whether the
antitrust laws should be used to break up big corporations and restore
the competition [Frankfurter’s view] or whether big corporations were
the products of natural economic forces and should be controlled
through federal regulation [Berle’s view].214
Berle would have appreciated that he had an ace up his sleeve, being that his
planners’ corporatism pitch to Roosevelt was unknown to Frankfurter. It is easy to
imagine Berle wanting to write a much different reply to Dodd, outlining planners’
corporatism, but Berle had not won the ideological struggle with Frankfurter by the
time that Berle fired back his reply to Dodd.215 Berle must have felt that it was too
risky to reveal his position in the Harvard Law Review (Frankfurter’s backyard).
213
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Berle could have foreseen the “vindictive” Frankfurter not only being aware of, but
also enjoying, Dodd’s reply to Berle on the eve of the much-anticipated release of
The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Berle must have figured that
publishing a full disclosure to Frankfurter of how he would advise Roosevelt in the
coming months would not be worth the possibility of Frankfurter winning the opinion
of Roosevelt on this issue at such a critically sensitive moment in American history.
Having a hand in the future course of American society at a time when it was on the
verge of economic collapse raised the stakes so high that Berle had to play his cards
close to his chest.
F. A Final Word From Berle and Dodd
In the end, Dodd rejected his original arguments from the debate. In a 1942
book review, Dodd expressed regret for taking the position that he did in the debate,
reflecting:
I was rash enough to suggest that our law of business
corporations . . . might develop a broader view which would make the
proposition that corporate managers are, to some extent, trustees for
labor and for the consumer more than meaningless rhetoric. The legal
difficulties which were involved were clear enough, as Mr. A. A. Berle
was quick to point out.216
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On the other hand, Berle never made such a concession. 217 Even when
confronted by contemporaries for his apparent shift in opinion without sufficient
explanation,

218

he denied he ever made concessions, claiming that others

misunderstood his writing. 219 Hopefully, revisiting the Berle–Dodd debate has
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clarified Berle’s position, rectifying the long-held misunderstanding of his
shareholder primacy argument.
V. THE RISE OF FINANCE, BERLE, AND SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
A. Commoditization, Financialization, and Society
Commoditization means to treat something as though it were a product that
could be bought and sold. Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation: The Political
and Economic Origins of Our Time tells the story of a critical point in the
commoditization of English society.220 It describes how peasant farmers were evicted
from land that was communally used for generations and then were forced to accept
harsh factory work. In other words, Polanyi explains the result of transforming the
natural environment and the traditional ways of life of a people into commodities
(property and labor)221 and harnessing these commodities to the price mechanism in
order to create a new social order. 222 Although Polanyi regarded this social
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experiment as a “stark utopia,”223 others disagreed, arguing that it was an essential
step in the birth of modern society.224
The financialization of society has much in common with this story of The
Great Transformation. Financialization is an evolution of the commoditization
process that Polanyi contemplated. Financialization holds great potential benefits for
society by dispersing risk throughout society; however, it is also dangerous because it
makes society more complex to manage by creating layers of interconnected markets
for commodities. Maybe the best example of such financialization is the operation of
derivatives.
B. Some Questions and Answers on Berle’s Shareholder Primacy and Today’s Rise of
Finance
Can corporate legal scholarship contribute to a better understanding of
financialization? On one hand, stocks are different from other exchangeable
instruments in the sense that only shares have rights attached to them that grant
shareholders power within corporate governance. 225 Yet many shareholders treat
223
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stocks much the same as they would other exchangeable instruments: “buy, hope,
hold, and cash in.”226 In other words, they do not participate in corporate governance
directly. As with financialization, the existence of stocks creates two worlds: the
market world (stock markets) and the social world (the corporation’s social
relationship227 or “nexus of contracts”228). For these reasons, events in corporate
governance that are affected by stock price and passive investors are comparable to
the phenomena of financialization.
Do Berle’s thoughts provide insight on today’s financialization? The answer is
yes, but in considering today’s political economy, Berle would likely want to revisit
three of his more antiquated positions.
First is that government was capable of determining the course of the
economy and that it could enforce this course.229 Modern governance theory resists
the sort of heavy-handed government interference that Berle envisioned, preferring to
226
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relegate government to steering market actors toward targeted ends without dictating
the means by which market actors achieve these ends.230 And yet, Berle believed in a
responsible exercise of private economic power in harmony with public authority,
which carried with it the implicit understanding that government would step in to
protect the public interest as a measure of last resort.231 So, it is possible to interpret
Berle’s insights in a manner that is not so far from what modern governance theory is
attempting to do today.232
Second is that a new theory would resolve the public–private tension trapped
within corporate theory.233 One could argue that Bratton and Millon have made short
work of the argument that a theory could have such influence.234 But upon further
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inspection, it may not be a theory of the firm that resolves this public–private
tension.235 As will be explained below, there are ever-more frequent examples of the
“private” corporation adopting roles once reserved for the very “public” welfare state,
causing what Braithwaite calls the “reality of hybridity between the privatization of
the public and publicization of the private.”236
Third is that Berle argued that when a theoretical model of the corporation
emerged, it would reject classical economic theory and might make the property
theory of corporations obsolete. 237 To date, the winner of the race for a better
theoretical model of the corporation might be Oliver Williamson and his theory of
markets, networks, and hierarchies (New Institutional Economic Theory). 238
Williamson’s work is derived from classical economic theory and is based on the cost
of exchanging property (transaction cost theory).239 Berle would certainly adjust his
arguments to compensate for the realities of the modern corporation and governance
today, but as suggested, at least in some cases, the adjustment need not be that drastic.
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Taking into account Berle’s body of work covered in this chapter from 1921
to 1932, it can be concluded that he argued that the shareholder class needed to
provide something more to the corporation and society than merely creating passive
investors.240 He envisioned three different ways that the shareholder class could be
legitimatized: first, by being a mechanism for the egalitarian distribution of profits
and power to labor;241 second, by being a mechanism for the egalitarian distribution
of profits and power to the broader American population;242 and third, by attracting
sophisticated business expertise that could take an active and constructive role in
managing the corporation toward the creation of a wealthier and more stable
society.243 Assuming that the shareholder class was legitimatized, he argued that “all
powers granted to a corporation [ought to be] at all times exercisable only for the
ratable benefits of all the shareholders as their interest appears” 244 without
qualification. But Berle did not have complete faith in its legitimacy, admitting that it
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was a less than fully satisfying interim measure to help eliminate the democratic
deficit within the American economy.245
Would Berle still endorse shareholder primacy today? The answer is probably
not. Consider the three different ways that he believed the shareholder class could
legitimatize their position within corporate governance. The first was the
emancipation of labor through worker control of the shareholder class. This never
happened and is only realizable in one’s imagination today.246
The second was the egalitarian distribution of profits and power within the
corporation through broader shareholder distribution. Today, the middle- and lowerwage workers that invest in shares generally do so through institutional investors
(pension funds and mutual funds). These individuals have contracted away their
rights, allowing that institutional investors can participate in corporate governance on
their behalf with few exceptions.247 In terms of profit, what these “shareholders” gain
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through such investments, they may be losing through pension privatization.248 Thus,
the egalitarian distribution of profits and power has not lived up to Berle’s high
hopes.
The third can be posed as a question: Can today’s greater shareholder
empowerment lead to the sort of active and constructive roles for management that
Berle had in mind? In other words, can good decisions in the financial world translate
into good decisions in the social world? The answer to this question is less than clear
and invites debate. Yet, this tension is healthy249 because private entrepreneurs and
public lawmakers need to be reminded that the gaps between markets and society
must be bridged as they create the new hybrid regulatory mechanisms of tomorrow.250
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C. The Hybrid Regulatory Mechanisms of Tomorrow: Bridging the Gaps Between
Markets and Society
As will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5, the privatization of public
services 251 and the use of meta-regulation 252 demonstrate how governments have
placed the day-to-day regulation of public interest in the hands of private actors.
Business readily accepts these government gifts when they are granted, and rightly so.
Business wants the profits from managing segments of the public sector. It also wants
to self-regulate in order to achieve flexibility and a competitive edge. At the same
time, investors want to capitalize on a full menu of investment opportunities that are
only limited by the capacity of the imagination of the financial engineers of Wall
Street and the Square Mile.
These private actors may soon learn that there is a darker side to privatization
and financialization. Private actors and governments are blurring the line between
government responsibility and private freedoms. This blurring of traditional roles is
shifting some of the underlying assumptions about how society ought to be governed.
Letting markets regulate society was supposed to fix the problems of political
organization by removing government from governance.253 But when the power of
251
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the market is unleashed, it can create as much vice as virtue.254 Thus, the shift to the
market may have solved some problems of political organization, but as the credit
crisis demonstrated, it has also created new problems of market organization.
The problems associated with social organization, whether political or market
based, will never go away. The shift to the market has resulted in two things. One is a
transfer of power from the state to private actors. The other is confusion over whether
public or private actors are responsible for areas in which there have been these
transfers of power. As governments scramble to get away from welfare state
obligations, investors and business actors gamble that they will be able to profit from
these traditional areas of public interest without attracting greater social
responsibilities. But a sober look at what is occurring today leads one to believe that
this gamble is a bad bet for private interests in the long term. Fundamental changes in
the public–private distinction are occurring, and private actors are being lured into a
precarious situation.
What is this precarious situation? It is the circumstances in which private
actors may find themselves if there is a swing in public opinion. To explain, Polanyi
argued that there is a “double movement” within society in which people eventually
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refuse to tolerate the market overwhelming other social needs.255 Simon Deakin has
emphasized the opposite side of the “double movement.” He explains that when
social needs overwhelm the needs of the market, then there is a backlash from
business interests.256 If this “double movement” exists, then there will be a constant
tension between favoring the needs of markets and the needs of society. According to
Deakin, the pendulum is now swinging toward the needs of markets,257 but if Polanyi
is correct, this shift will not be permanent.
As these swings occur, New Institutional Economics suggests that institutions
and organizations will not remain the same, but will evolve in correspondence with
these swings.258 As the pendulum’s weight swings, the pendulum’s pivot shifts as
well, thus the weight never returns to precisely the same point. In other words, if
Polanyi’s “double movement” is right again (as it was in 1944), and the primacy of
the political over the economic is once again restored, there will be no welfare state
255
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welcoming the swing back, nor will there be a classic twentieth-century public–
private divide to protect the interest of capital. What is unnerving about this
precarious situation is that the permutations of how it could be mismanaged
dramatically dwarf the potential productive ways it could be managed. One thing is
for certain: the smaller the gap between the needs of markets and the needs of society,
the easier it will be for the swing to be managed prudently.
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, it is suggested that a more robust dialectic about the pros and cons of
the rise of finance is needed in order to properly deal with the present developments
and their potential impacts on markets and society. Furthermore, it is suggested that
Berle’s insights into the possibilities for, and limitations of, shareholder primacy offer
a starting point for a more nuanced conversation about how today’s investors can
attempt to meet the challenges of governance in a manner that protects both their own
interests and the interests of society.
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CHAPTER 4: THE PLACE OF CORPORATE LAWMAKING IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of “embeddedness” can be traced to Karl Polanyi’s The Great
Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time.1 The book is a
history of the commoditization of English society from the eighteenth century
forward, recounting how markets became unstitched from the fabric of society. As
markets became more distinct from everyday life, society began to change in order to
meet trending economic needs. One example of this transformation was the enclosure
of English farmlands and the end of the ancient system of farming on land that was
considered free for the use of all. This created a radical disruption in social function.
Without farmland, thousands were forced to move to sites of industrial production,
generating a radical shift in society from traditional agrarian life to one that was
dominated by factory work. In other words, Polanyi’s book explains how markets
became disembedded from society and then how these disembedded markets altered
social activities as they became re-embedded into market function.2
Polanyi never believed that society could become completely embedded
within the market function, concluding that society’s members would never tolerate a
1
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market function which completely overwhelmed their social needs. This resistance to
market pressures is what Polanyi called the “double movement.”3 Simon Deakin has
elaborated on Polanyi’s idea of the double movement, explaining how it also operates
in reverse.4 In other words, market actors will resist projects for greater equality when
these social demands compromise market functionality. The balance between
favoring the needs of markets with the needs of society has fluctuated throughout the
twentieth century. 5 According to Deakin, the pendulum is swinging toward the
modern economy’s increased need for markets as societal governance has become
ever more closely tied to the expectations of investors. 6 Today, certainly, the
pendulum appears to be swinging in a different yet still unknown direction.7
In his seminal article of 1985, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The
Problem of Embeddedness,” Mark Granovetter elaborated upon Polanyi’s
disembedded market theory and expanded it into a more complete (and complex)
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sociological theory of how embedded social behavior affects economic institutions.8
Granovetter argued that to adequately study economic institutions, like corporations,
one must take into consideration how the behavior of such institutions is “constrained
by ongoing social relations.” 9 Granovetter’s central contention was that when
economic reasoning ignores an institution’s social embeddedness, such reasoning is
blinded to the actual social relationships within it and, accordingly, it is unlikely one
will be able to understand how a particular institution functions (or fails to
function).10
Granovetter’s call to scrutinize the social relationships that affect an
organization’s function has been seen as a sociological plea explaining why
institutions behave as they do. He criticized the assumptions of New Institutional
Economics by highlighting how actual social networks inside and outside of the
corporation operate in ways that handcuff economic thought. Specifically,
Granovetter took issue with Oliver Williamson’s theory of transaction costs, arguing
that while there was a certain analytical value to Williamson’s eventually highly
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influential market/hierarchy model of the corporation,11 it remained blind to the social
reality of corporate function.12
Up until now, Granovetter has served as something of a connector between
Polanyi’s efforts and current ongoing investigations into the concept of
embeddedness.13 Certainly, the new interest in economic sociology and its relevance
in bridging discourses in sociology, legal theory, and political economy14 contributes
to a better understanding of the merits and boundaries of “economic governance;”15
something of particular importance at a time of fundamental readjustments to the
financial credo of the last two decades.
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Legal theory itself reflects the early beginnings of such critical engagement
with an exclusively economistic bias. John Dewey, in a famous inquiry into the law’s
constitution of the corporation, 16 identified the law as a powerful tool with the ability
to take an abstract idea (such as the suggestion that the corporation was a “person”)
and transform it into something more concrete and real (by, for example, granting a
corporation the right to contract or equipping it with constitutional protections). Such
legal reification, according to Dewey, shapes how people think about a corporation.
As a consequence, this reification also shapes people’s behavior within, and in
relation to, corporations.
An important strand in studies on embeddedness and comparative variations
in national political economies around the world has been to focus on different forms
of market organization. 17 Central to such inquiries has been the analysis of the
particular dynamics of reform politics that often emerged against the background of
historically evolved path-dependencies.18 Similarly, sociologists have long focused on
sites where law is produced as “sites of contestation” between influential groups
attempting to maintain or change the embedded patterns of social relationships. In
16

John Dewey, “The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality”
(1926) 35 Yale LJ 655.
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Peter A Hall & David Soskice, eds, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional
Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
18

John W Cioffi, “Restructuring ‘Germany Inc.’: The Politics of Company and
Takeover Law Reform in Germany and the European Union” (2002) 24 Law & Pol’y
355.
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“Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon,” Karl Mannheim detailed how preferences
become entrenched or embedded within society through social processes like
lawmaking and, in particular, through the competitive actions between influential
social groups within these social processes.19 From this perspective, Mannheim can
be seen as providing a promising approach for connecting Polanyi’s and
Granovetter’s ideas of embeddedness with Dewey’s understanding of the legal
reification of business ideas. Building upon this connection of ideas, Mannheim’s
article explores one of the most important sites of contestation between influential
business groups; namely, the place that has historically triumphed in attracting the
highest number of Fortune 500 business incorporations in America: Delaware –
America’s regulatory laboratory for de facto “national” corporate law.
The social process of how preferences become entrenched or embedded
within American corporate charters is of particular importance to understanding such
behavior within the American corporation. If Dewey was correct and the law shapes
the behavior of actors within the business world, then the corporate charter and its
bylaws form essential tools in this process. They form the foundational contract of the
corporation, establishing the distribution of wealth and power between its members
and. Although the charter and bylaws do not dictate all social relations within the

19

Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, Paul Kecskemeti, ed
(London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952) at 197-98.
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corporation, they do set a standard for expectations for social relations and are
influential in the embedding process.
This chapter provides a history of the legal debates over corporate charters in
the American context beginning with a famous dispute that originated in a series of
contesting law review articles in the 1970s. A brief literature review will recount the
academic arguments that have provided the intellectual support for sustaining
Delaware’s primacy over corporate lawmaking in the face of constant attack. By
understanding the debates that have sustained Delaware’s ability to lead the American
competition for incorporation, this chapter provides insight into what is regarded as
the most important legal instrument for maintaining status quo for actual social
relationships within the American corporation: the “market for incorporation.”
However, this chapter will also draw attention to the growing skepticism over
Delaware’s ability to consistently legislate optimal corporate law. This skepticism is
most clearly evident in the federal government’s growing willingness to design and to
pursue corporate law policies in the face of corporate governance scandal,
notwithstanding the fact that corporate law in the United States is governed by the
states. The consequences of these developments are subject to much discussion and
debate. In sum, this chapter provides an example of how shifts in lawmaking
networks outside of the firm demand the potential to shift the embeddedness of the
behavior of social relationships inside the firm.
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II. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
During the American republic’s early decades, state legislatures restricted the
rights of corporate action by scrutinizing petitions for incorporation just as they
would any other piece of legislation.20 In theory, democratic representatives granted
incorporation only if it served the public interest, but healthy skepticism should be
reserved for anyone who claims that this was always the case.21 Restrictions on the
corporation were severe by today’s standards; for instance: 1) a corporation could not
accumulate more than a set amount of capital;22 2) a corporation’s life was usually
fixed to the time required to finish the task(s) that it was incorporated to
accomplish;23 3) a corporation could not engage in activities that were not explicitly

20

For the boundaries of government’s authority over incorporation, especially
after the corporate charter was issued by the state, see Trustees of Dartmouth College
v Woodward, 17 US (4 Wheat) 518 (1819). For greater detail, see David Millon,
“Theories of the Corporation” (1990) 1990 Duke LJ 201 at 206-10.
21

David Sciulli, Corporations vs. The Court: Private Power, Public Interests
(Boulder: L. Rienner, 1999) at 85 (arguing that each request for incorporation was
subject to the same lobbying and debate as any other bill, including “power plays,
personal intrigues and local favoritism”).
22

For a thorough collection of references to specific legislation from the 19th
century, see Liggett Co v Lee, 288 US 517 at 550-54 (1933) (Brandeis, J, dissenting)
[Lee].
23
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defined in the terms of its incorporation;24 and 4) a corporation’s business activities
could not extend beyond the boundaries of the state in which it was incorporated.25
Yet in spite of such limitations, the corporation was still a coveted investment
vehicle. One reason for this was that the status of shareholders was a rare and
prestigious privilege. 26 However, it would be misleading to conclude that this
investment vehicle was desired merely because it offered a degree of social status.
The main attraction to the corporation was more likely the limited liability protection
it offered to businessmen27 and the opportunities for power and profits which large
“public interest” projects presented.28
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Bank of Augusta v Earle, 38 US (13 Pet) 519 at 588 (1839) (holding that since
the powers conferred on the corporation can be no greater than state power, which
granted the incorporation, the firm had no authority to operate outside the state).
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14, 25, 28.
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Morton J Horwitz, “Santa Clara Revisited: The Developments of Corporate
Theory” (1985) 88 W Va L Rev 173 at 208-09 (arguing that although the common
law had evolved to the point of presuming limited liability, state legislatures enacted
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share).
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Millon, supra note 20 at 207 (arguing that there was fear that the potential for
power and wealth associated with incorporation caused Americans to fear that such
organizations could threaten the opportunity of others to enter the market; adding
that, as a result, governments rarely confer monopoly privileges).
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By the Panic of 1857,29 Americans had endured a depression, multiple stock
market crashes, and witnessed what was perceived to be the floundering public
management of large interstate canal projects. These events provoked a profound shift
of public opinion regarding the relationship between public and private power in
American society. 30 People began viewing government intervention in private
transactions less as a means of securing liberty and more in terms of restricting it.
Public authorities found themselves faced with a public that demanded justification
for why the corporation must be a servant of public interest and, more importantly
from the individual’s perspective, why private citizens should not use such
corporations solely for personal advantage in the pursuit of happiness.31 Citizens also
became less trusting of government discretion in granting incorporations because
29

For more, see generally James L Huston, The Panic of 1857 and the Coming of
the Civil War (Baton Rouge, La: Louissiana State University Press, 1987); Timothy J
Riddiough & Howard E Thompson, “Déjà Vu All Over Again: Agency, Uncertainty,
Leverage and the Panic of 1857” (HKIMR Working Paper No 10/2012, 2012) online:
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Columbia University Press, 1960); see also Carter Goodrich et al, Canals and
American Economic Development, ed by Carter Goodrich (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1961) at 241, 246-47 (describing what was perceived to be the
costly financial failures of the nineteenth century canal projects, of which almost 3/4
of the $188 million invested between 1815 and 1860 came from the public purse). For
more on how the other mentioned financial crisis affected public opinion, see William
G Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) at 71-75.
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accusations of favoritism and corruption became widespread.32 With these adverse
changes in public opinion, the government walls that confined corporate behavior
began to crumble. Emerging state policy began to challenge the long-established
understanding that the function of the corporation was solely to serve the
community.33 This shift, in turn, opened the door for the considerably activist U.S.
Supreme Court to determine that corporations had constitutional rights, protecting
corporations from the threat of public meddling in their affairs.34
With the loosening of state policy and advancements in technology, the
number of incorporations increased exponentially. Professional management teams,
in turn, were hired more frequently as majority shareholders became less commonly
involved

in

the

corporation’s

day-to-day

management.

35

These

radical

transformations created a flood of new and complex issues into state courts –
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necessitating the call for legal clarity.36 This inspired the creation of specific state
judiciaries to oversee corporate practice.37 Willing jurisdictions (in particular, New
Jersey and Delaware) customized regulatory environments to attract those
businessmen shopping for the most advantageous jurisdiction to incorporate their
businesses.38 Such states also began to adopt new management-friendly legislation,
mostly because the franchise taxes, fee revenues, and taxation on extra business
opportunities (which followed incorporation) filled state coffers.39
Beginning in the mid-1800s, a gradual loosening of government policy
occurred. For example, in 1846, New York started a trend in state reform which
blocked the legislature from creating corporations by special act, except in the rare
case where the objectives for devising the corporation could not be attained under
36
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37
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on State Competition in Corporate Law” (1992) 105 Harv L Rev 1435 at 1443
(describing the pressures and incentives, which started jurisdiction competition for
incorporation) [Bebchuk, “Federalism and the Corporation”]; William L Cary,
“Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware” (1974) 83 Yale LJ 663
at 669-70 (arguing that state competition has led to a “a race for the bottom” in terms
of the standards for corporate governance – in particular to the disadvantage of
shareholders).
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Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards” (1987) 8 Cardozo L Rev 759
at 762.
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general law. 40 In addition, in 1867, the U.S. Congress expanded bankruptcy
protections to include corporations.41 Further, in 1875, New Jersey eliminated the
restrictions on the corporation’s ability to accumulate capital.42 In 1886, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the private corporation was a legal person entitled to similar
rights afforded a natural person under the U.S. Constitution, therefore protected by
the Bill of Rights, which broadly protected the corporations from public authority.43
New Jersey offered the first standard articles of incorporation for private businesses
in 1888. 44 In one reflexive jerk away from the growing power of the mighty
corporation, the Sherman Antitrust Act was signed in 1890.45 But still racing forward
at the state level, in 1896, New Jersey adopted what could be recognized as the first
modern corporate statutes and, thus, it became the home to the majority of America’s
largest corporations (a title that Delaware would steal within twenty years).46 In 1910,
the Supreme Court nullified restrictions on corporate capacity to conduct business

40

NY Const of 1846 art VIII, § 1.

41

Sciulli, supra note 21 at 91.

42

Ibid.

43

See Santa Clara, supra 34; see also generally Horwitz, supra note 27, Millon
supra note 20.
44

Roy, supra note 30 at 152-53.

45

Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 USC § 1 et seq (2006).

46

Bebchuk, “Federalism and the Corporation”, supra note 38 at 1443.
186

outside the states in which it was chartered. 47 By 1933, Mr. Justice Brandeis,
reflecting on this historical trend toward state competition in corporate law in Liggett
Co v. Lee,48 expressed concern over how the fear of losing existing state revenue and
the allure of earning greater state revenue was eroding the diligent construction of
corporate legal development by replacing it with a permissive consumer product that
pandered to powerful corporate interests.
III. THE FIRST WAVE: DRAWING THE DISTINCTION
In 1974, William Cary reconsidered the trends in federalism and corporate law
from the nineteenth century forward and declared that modern state corporate law was
a product of state competition. 49 Most importantly, states were legislatively
competing to attract incorporation to increase state revenues, creating a dangerous
“race-to-the-bottom” for corporate governance standards. 50 Cary’s focus quickly
turned to the by-then leader of this race, Delaware. He opined that Delaware’s
motivation for its considerably softened stance on corporate governance standards
was motivated by the state’s budget dependence on revenues from incorporations,
therefore creating an inversely indebted relationship between the state and those
47
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corporate managers looking to incorporate. This compelled Delaware to offer
advantageous corporate legal arrangements that allowed managers broad and
unchecked authority; therefore, corporations were no longer faced with the
disincentive required to curb less-than-optimal corporate performance.51 Cary argued
that it was time for the federal government and the judiciary to “import lifting
standards” that would set a level beyond which corporate standards would not be
allowed to fall below and “deteriorate.”52
Three years later, in 1977, Ralph K Winter wrote a reply to Cary’s position
which by this time had almost universally become endorsed as a matter of fact. In the
face of this general consensus, Winter boldly rejected Cary’s position arguing that
state competition should “tend toward optimality so far as the shareholders’
relationship to the corporation is concerned” and thus corporate governance
standards, like those of Delaware, “are optimal legal arrangements.”53 Put differently,
what Cary regarded as a “race-to-the-bottom” Winter replaced as a “race-to-the-top.”
Borrowing from the ideas of Henry G Manne,54 Oliver E Williamson,55 and
Armen A Alchian,56 Winter constructed an argument which suggested that because
51
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188

corporations acquired capital by selling bonds and equity, management was therefore
forced to weigh the interests of such financial actors and instruments. 57 Winter
posited that “the state which ‘rigs’ its code to benefit management will drive debt and
equity capital away.”58 Furthermore, he argued that, although Cary was correct in
assessing that managers ultimately had the consumer power to decide which
jurisdiction to incorporate, managers would not select a jurisdiction that would cause
their business to: 1) earn lower-than-normal returns; and/or 2) have a higher cost of
capital. 59 On the contrary, managers would select jurisdictions that afforded the
opposite for the sake of self-preservation. Thus, state competition, also known as the
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charter market, produced an optimal corporate law regime which accurately reflected
the demands that corporate constituents had for corporate governance.60
The rationale for the charter market that causes the race-to-the-top can be
restated as follows: If the corporate legal regime is structured so that management
cannot maximize the corporate output (profits), debt holders may make it more
expensive to: 1) hold debt; and 2) raise new debt.61 This corporate legal regime will
also depress stock price potential thereby making it more expensive to raise new
capital as well as maintain optimal relations with shareholders and creditors. Such
underperforming firms will become targets for takeover, and the threat of takeover
will create a market for managerial control. 62 Thus, managers will have ample
incentive to demand an off-the-rack default statutory model of corporate governance
that encourages shareholder wealth maximization.63 Since such a default model can
be assumed to be what managers are shopping for when they select a jurisdiction to
incorporate, this is what state competition will foster.64 Thus, the charter market
creates a race-to-the-top. Furthermore, it creates a system of legal innovation that is
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not compromised by political interference – which would ultimately be the result of
Cary’s recommendation for federal government intervention.
With the two sides of the Cary–Winter debate delineated, the stage seemed set
for the next three decades with the advocates of Cary’s position representing: 1) antimanagerialism; 2) federal intervention in state competition; and 3) more centralized
planning, and the advocates of Winter’s position representing: 1) managerialism; 2)
unfettered state competition; and 3) more decentralized market rationality. 65
Underpinning both positions was an understanding that the firm was a distinct market
actor that focused squarely upon finding an optimal solution to the shareholdermanagement problem.
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IV. THE SECOND WAVE: EVENT STUDIES AND THE ATTEMPTS TO SETTLE THE CARY–
WINTER DEBATE
Winter’s economic analysis of charter markets forced Cary proponents to
adjust their arguments by taking a more economically sophisticated position.
Following Winter’s lead, they employed more economically savvy arguments to
suggest that shareholders (and creditors) had much less control over managers’
incorporation preferences in practice than Winter’s charter market theory suggested
and, thus, the race-to-the-top argument was flawed.66 In response, others became
inspired to settle this theoretical tit-for-tat debate by engaging in empirical research in
the form of “event studies.”67 These studies established that many stocks affected by
the amendments rose in value when the markets learned of the amendments, thereby
bolstering Winter’s position that state competition was advantageous for
shareholders.
Those defending Cary’s position fired back. Melvin Eisenberg rejected these
event studies, arguing that they had “only limited usefulness” in the context of the
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Cary-Winter debate.68 Specifically, Eisenberg contended that if a uniformly lowgrade corporate law regime existed – as Cary seemed to suggest – then the notice of
an amendment from “one low-grade regime to another would not be a significant
event.”69 He also suggested that Delaware’s mature case law increased predictability,
which helped to countervail potentially suboptimal rules and amendments. More
importantly, Eisenberg emphasized that other contributory factors may have skewed
the results of the event studies.70 One example of such factors included packaging
negative amendments to existing law with positive ones.71 Eisenberg suggested that
such event studies were limited because the economic analysis was so superficial that
it could not adequately appreciate the complexity of the American “charter market.”72
Lucian Bebchuk made similar arguments that suggested how negative information
can be packaged with positive information in order to maintain or improve stock
value, while also re-emphasizing that Cary’s position was still correct.73
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Within four years of Eisenberg’s reply, Roberta Romano published what
would become the landmark statement in support of Winter.74 Aimed at responding to
Eisenberg’s demand for “deeper economic analysis,”75 Romano employed the lenses
of: 1) financial risk management within equity markets; 2) agency cost theory; and 3)
the relational understanding between socio-legal norms and market forces, which –
taken together – helped to better understand the mechanics of the charter market. In
the end, this deeper economic analysis led both Eisenberg and Romano closer to a
centrist position, with Eisenberg leaning toward Cary’s position 76 and Romano
toward Winter’s.77
V. THE THIRD WAVE: POST-ENRON
Alas, the debate was not dead. Lucian Bebchuk took Cary’s side and warned
that state competition encouraged a race-to-the-bottom given the states’ obvious
inclination to make rules attractive to managers and controllers.78 In 1999, Bebchuk
and Allen Ferrell illustrated how anti-takeover statutes were inefficient and reduced
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shareholder wealth,79 and illustrated one clear example of how states provided default
rules that benefited only managers to the detriment of all other constituents, and
“should lead the many who offer unqualified support of state competition to reassess
their position.”80 But in 1999, the U.S. economy was hot, the inflation-adjusted
aggregate output was up, real gross domestic product was up, corporate profits were
up, employment was up, and everyone was making money. Bebchuk’s concerns were
inaudible over the sound of investors’ portfolios filling with money. Corporate
America seemed to be anything but broken.
All that changed in 2001 when the Enron scandal outraged Americans and
pulled corporate governance under the microscope.81 In step with this change in
climate, Bebchuk reiterated his position that the empirical evidence supported the
view that state competition offered harmful incentives, which privileged managers to
the detriment of all other corporate constituents.82 Building on this critique, Bebchuk
went on to argue that Delaware’s position in the charter market was so strong that
assumptions about the operation of state competition were false. In other words,
Delaware was more sheltered from the influence of other states’ actions than was
79
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assumed in the literature, producing suboptimal corporate rules and justifying federal
intervention.83
In the summer of 2002, the federal government induced measures to appease
populist reactions to the Enron scandal. Suddenly, there was a rash movement toward
Cary’s federal intervention that may have been procedurally pleasing to some
corporate governance observers, but was ultimately substantively disappointing to
most. With this came renewed interest in the Cary–Winter debate.
Mark Roe set out to offer some fresh insight building on Bebchuk’s
suggestion that Delaware was in fact insulated from state competition, not its
catalyst.84 Roe concluded that the nature of corporate regulatory competition had been
“misconceived – and badly so,” arguing that Delaware’s chief competition was never
other states but, instead, the federal government.85 Other states did not have the
constitutional authority to trump Delaware’s default rules for corporate governance,
but the federal government did. In other words, Delaware’s incorporation regime
existed because the federal government tolerated it. Accordingly, the results of
corporate law evolution may have been due in part to state competition, but the everlooming threat of federal intervention was also a major factor. Which of these two
83
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factors affected the evolution of corporate law was difficult to determine because the
world of Delaware policymaking was opaque.
Roe further suggested that if the competition between Delaware and the
federal government was considered when attempting to understand the traditionally
conceived mechanism of state competition, the state race debate did not play out the
way charter market analysis had been assuming all along.86 He suggested that a new
theory was necessary to explain how policy networks forged American corporate law,
arguing that top-down “centralized strategic” planning had as much responsibility for
corporate law outcomes as did lateral state competition.87 This would give support to
the idea that the federal political dimension compromises the narrow quest for solely
understanding state competition through the assumed model of charter markets as
constructed during the second wave of the debate.
In 2003, Stephen Bainbridge took a polarizing position as far to the Winter
end of the continuum as Bebchuk had taken to Cary’s.88 Bainbridge blasted the
federalization of corporate law, calling the actions of Congress and other regulators
“deeply flawed.”89 He argued that, since the Enron scandal, the actions of the federal
government represented “the most dramatic expansion of federal regulatory power
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over corporate governance since the New Deal.”90 Rejecting the federal reforms as an
unnecessary encroachment on state jurisdiction, Bainbridge pointed to Romano’s
event study in support of his claim that state competition, and Delaware’s default
rules, favored shareholders by maximizing shareholder wealth.91 When addressing
Bebchuk’s 1999 argument about the negative effects of state competition upon
shareholder wealth by legislating anti-takeover statutes, his response was, “[S]o
what? Nobody claims that state competition is perfect.”92 He also proclaimed that
“even if Bebchuk could prove that state competition is a race-to-the-bottom, basic
principles of federalism would still counsel against federal preemption of corporate
law,” because the potential for regulatory innovation would be seriously
compromised.93
In 2005, Roe reemphasized that American scholars ought to recognize that the
presumptions on state competition were skewing their perception, arguing that instead
of looking at the results of horizontal state competition, observers needed to
understand when the federal government decided to leave such authority in the hands
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of the states and when it decided to claw back such authority for itself.94 Instead of
Delaware being the product of market pressures, Roe viewed Delaware as a political
group with a narrowly-defined range of concerns within the larger policy network of
corporate law development.95 In this light, Delaware’s policymaking network was
like a caucus of managers and investors. And within this caucus, Roe deemed that
managers clearly had the “upper hand” in guiding policy development, but these same
managers also appeared to exercise self-restraint because they understood “the game
could move to Washington” if the scales were pushed too far toward managerialism.96
Also in 2005, Leo E Strine, Jr, Vice Chancellor of Delaware’s Court of
Chancery, set out to “take some of the mystery out of Delaware’s role in the
governance of American public corporations.”97 When discussing the politics of state
competition, however, Strine was noticeably reserved. He alluded to the fact that
Delaware was and will be in the lead for some time to come in the state race for
corporate law.98 In defining the boundaries of state competition, he stated that the
94
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issues of competition, labor, trade, and disclosures to public investors were generally
regulated federally, while Delaware governed the “internal affairs of the
corporation.”99 He never more than tacitly acknowledged that the federal government
had full authority to regulate in this area as well.100 In other words, Strine failed to
directly acknowledge that Delaware’s power was a privilege granted to the state, not a
constitutional right. Accordingly, Strine does not elaborate on this federal power
other than to say that present interventions like SOX and the amendments to listing
requirements were suboptimal reforms.
In an exchange in the Harvard Law Review, the issue of federal intervention
in the Delaware caucus was raised once again. Bebchuk argued that managers were
too powerful and were blocking shareholders from maximizing shareholder value.101
Accordingly, he asserted that, since managers dominated state law, the federal
government had to intervene.
proposal,
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primary source of substantive corporate law” reform.105 Bainbridge, in his response to
Bebchuk, did not exhibit any of the potential flexibility that Strine did. He flatly
rejected Bebchuk’s call for greater shareholder empowerment by arguing that if
Bebchuk’s proposal could really enhance the value of the firm, why did it not already
exist? In challenging Bebchuk in this manner, Bainbridge employed a classic
Winteresque race-to-the-top argument. 106 Bainbridge rejected any changes to
Delaware’s law and lawmaking capacity.
In reply, Bebchuk was somewhat encouraged by Strine’s opinions (although
he believed they did not extend far enough).107 Bebchuk attacked Bainbridge’s raceto-the-top argument by referencing a Winteresque argument from 1983, which
advocated against federal intervention to better regulate insider trading. The 1983
article argued there was nothing wrong with the existing standards since charter
competition would have already corrected them if they were suboptimal. This
example illustrated the error of assuming that state competition already provided
optimal corporate governance arrangements as Bainbridge suggested. 108 In an
105
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interesting twist, Bebchuk pointed out that the innovative nature of state competition
implied state law was subject to improvement in an evolving context.109 Thus, even if
one assumed Delaware produced optimal corporate law, it did not mean his
proposition ought to be rejected outright.
The recent Bebchuk–Strine–Bainbridge debate helps to confirm Roe’s
observation that the true motivator for shaping corporate governance is the threat of
federal intervention. Bebchuk’s call for such intervention caused a defense of
Delaware from both Strine and Bainbridge, and also a willingness on Strine’s part to
seriously entertain various shareholder empowerment initiatives. This reflects what is
at stake in these debates over Delaware: the spectrum of embedded relationships
between public and private power in American society.
VI. WHAT PLACE DOES DELAWARE RESERVE FOR THE CORPORATION IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY? A REFLECTION OF BAINBRIDGE
A. The Delaware Status Quo
Delaware attempts to enshrine managerialism within American corporate
governance. Delaware’s defenders have made good use of the race-to-the-top
argument,110 but recent history challenges whether favoring managerialism is the
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optimal strategy for regulating the corporation. Amidst corporate scandal and
economic downturns over the past decade, managerialism has garnered much scrutiny
and created agency issues. The solutions for these agency relationship problems,
which were inspired by the work of Michael Jensen and William Meckling,111 appear
insufficient to cope with managerial opportunism as well as responsible risk
management.
This section explores the writing of one of Delaware’s most loyal defenders:
Stephen Bainbridge. Bainbridge defends Delaware while simultaneously distancing
himself from managerialism. Bainbridge claims that American directors are
undergoing a transformation, becoming more than de facto rubber stamps for
managerial power.112 He has developed a theory he calls “director primacy,” which
re-invents the managerialist position in a way that can appeal to both managerialists
and anti-managerialists. 113 By taking the shareholder–manager dichotomy and
splitting it into a shareholder–director–manager trichotomy, Bainbridge places
corporate directors firmly in the middle of the struggle between ownership and
control. The brilliance of this position is that it personifies what Delaware’s corporate
law has de jure attempted to enforce since the rise of the modern corporation. The
111
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weakness in Bainbridge’s argument, however, is that history proves that American
directors have not always lived up to the model of corporate governance.
If American directors are becoming more loyal to shareholder concerns, then
director primacy is the driving force in a coup d’état in American corporate
governance. However, those skeptical of Bainbridge will argue that this shift is not
occurring and that his director primacy argument is no more than managerialism with
a twist, albeit a clever twist that distances his position from the criticism of
managerialism, while still sustaining the status quo in American corporate
governance. And to a degree this criticism is fair – the ends of Bainbridge’s director
primacy position are still the same as those of managerialism in one important
respect: both empower managers, at least until such time as the boards of America’s
large public corporations start behaving in the manner that Bainbridge projects they
will.
Even with federal initiatives to bolster director independence, Bainbridge
himself acknowledges the Panglossian nature of being optimistic about the present
potential for director primacy. For example, he fully recognizes the problem of
directors side-stepping their accountability to important constituents, such as
shareholders.114 And yet, just under the surface of American corporate law may be
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another managerial revolution115 which will blur the classic distinctions between
shareholder–manager and managerialist–anti-managerialist by encouraging the board
of directors to take their duties more seriously. The director primacy norms may
cause directors to start standing up to the special interests of managers and protecting
shareholder interests more diligently. As a result, this may foster a better relationship
between ownership and control and help resolve some of the serious agency issues
that exist today.
B. Bainbridge’s Director Primacy
The necessary shift in corporate governance, which can make director
primacy transcend from theory into business reality and become the dominant model,
will occur when boards of directors become more than mere rubber stamps for CEOs
and other top executives. Bainbridge claims that this shift has commenced, arguing
that directors are finally about to seize the mantle of power that corporate law has for
so long reserved for itself.116 However, until this time, directors have rarely been
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separated from “managers” in the managerialist forum, and for good reason since
directors are rarely distinguishable from corporate executives in their decision making
choices.117 For this reason, beneath Bainbridge’s director primacy lays a contentious
theory that a functional revolution is occurring in American corporate governance.
This functional revolution may or may not be happening and is difficult to
substantiate, but if Bainbridge is correct, then director primacy will mark a historic
shift in governance away from Chandler’s model of managerialism toward the boardcentered fiat model, which director primacy endorses.
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including: decision-making by fiat; the primacy of the board of directors over
shareholders and managers; the relationship between the director primacy model and
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In promoting director primacy, Bainbridge strongly advocates Delaware’s offthe-rack default statutory model of corporate governance which protects the board’s
authority against direct shareholder influence in day-to-day decision making. In fact,
it has even been suggested that Bainbridge advocates a more pro-board position than
even Delaware dares.118 He describes how Delaware’s corporate law protects the
primacy of the directors to govern the corporation, asserting that this doctrinal
position sits well with prevailing corporate theory.119 In particular, he contends that
Delaware’s director primacy fits nicely with the contractarian concept of the firm.120
Bainbridge explains that decision making by fiat, which the board represents, is
where the nexus of contracts meet and where the decision making power about how
to manage this nexus is most efficiently allocated.121
Bainbridge explains that there will always be a need to balance the authority
and accountability of directors, but the complexities and demands of managing this
nexus suggest that careful consideration must be taken before limiting the authority of
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the board. 122 Bainbridge offers a number of arguments for broad directorial
discretion, 123 possibly providing his best defense of Delaware’s allocation of
authority to directors (which may be at the expense of greater shareholder
empowerment). However, if what he contends is true, this broad discretion is
ultimately in the shareholder’s best interest.
Although Bainbridge argues that corporate boards do (and should) have final
authority over decision making, his arguments also align with the shareholder
primacy position: that such decision making authority must be for the sole benefit of
shareholders. He justifies this position normatively by using the majoritarian default
model. This model suggests that the shareholder wealth maximization norm is what
all stakeholders of the firm ultimately want because default rules that pander to
management are inefficient, increasing the cost of capital, creating greater
vulnerability to hostile takeover, and negatively affecting the overall health of the
corporation. The distinction that Bainbridge makes between director primacy and
shareholder primacy is that the advocates of shareholder primacy extend their backing
of shareholder power beyond the shareholder wealth maximization norm by pushing
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for shareholders to have more direct control over the day-to-day affairs of the firm.
Director primacy advocates argue only the shareholder wealth maximization norm.
Putting the collective action problems of a widely dispersed shareholder class
aside, Bainbridge suggests that directors will more vigilantly care for the firm’s
wellbeing for the benefit of shareholders than direct shareholder empowerment.124
One reason for this is the ease with which shareholders can exit the firm. Such
unattached shareholder influence can shift the firm’s focus to short-term, ill-informed,
and/or self-serving goals that can possibly corrupt prudent corporate strategy over the
long-term. Another reason for endorsing director primacy is that such direct
shareholder empowerment would serve only to endorse the special interests of those
who have power within the shareholder class: institutional investors.
Bainbridge justifies why authority ought to rest with the board of directors
within the corporate governance structure by arguing that a governance group (that
acts collegially) is superior to a single autocrat at the apex of the corporate
governance hierarchy. 125 In making this argument, he offers evidence from the
behavioral economics literature which explains why group decision making is of
higher quality than individual decision making.126 This leads Bainbridge to conclude
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that corporate boards are more effective at monitoring corporate governance than a
single autocrat, and thus the fiat model is generally the best option.127
The main problem with the fiat model remains: who watches the watchers? In
other words, who keeps the board of directors from being poisoned by groupthink
and/or other forms of collective action failure? And who keeps the board of directors
from social loafing and/or other serious opportunistic behavior? Bainbridge’s answer
is the board itself.128 The arguments justifying this answer are at best hopeful. The
optimism of his answer may make some hardened anti-managerialists smile cruelly at
the lack of realism that one must embrace to whole-heartedly be at ease with the
potential of directors self-monitoring.
To be fair, this is a serious problem with no easy answer; and to his credit,
Bainbridge attacks it directly. Ultimately, though, his arguments are more sound
regarding the avoidance of collective action failure than they are regarding the
avoidance of opportunistic behavior. Albeit, the group dynamic makes opportunism
less attractive for one individual within the group than it would for an all-powerful
autocrat with no equals. That said, the suggestion that social norms (like reputational
Governance” (2002) 55 Vand L Rev 1 (exploring why the default statutory model of
corporate governance promotes a governance group that acts collegially, using
evidence from the behavioral sciences to help explain why group decision-making is
generally superior to individual decision-making) [Bainbridge, “Why a Board?”].
127
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cost and the virtues of the communal life within the boardroom) will prevent the
board from acts of opportunism at the expense of all other constituents of the firm
may be too sweet for some intimate observers of director politics to swallow.
Bainbridge suggests that a key problem for corporate governance is locating
the appropriate balance between providing enough authority for the board to govern
the firm in an efficient manner, while not providing so much discretion that authority
becomes unreviewable, uncorrectable, and ultimately unaccountable.129 Therefore, at
one extreme, efficiency demands that board decisions are shielded from shareholders
and courts; otherwise, optimal risk-taking will be discouraged and the internal team
governance structure could be seriously compromised by the fear of hindsight review.
What about the courts protecting shareholders from extensive director
discretion? Bainbridge reasons that shareholders are protected from “optimal” risktaking by the dual functioning of limited liability and portfolio diversity.130 At the
other extreme, if directors flagrantly violate their obligation to maximize shareholder
wealth, the threat of judicial accountability must come out as a deterrent for corporate
irresponsibility. However, this is not an easy balance to strike. Bainbridge warns that
judges must use caution because they are not business experts, and because hindsight
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can make decision making look more irresponsible when the consequences of those
decisions are known to have been negatively magnified.
In determining the balance to be struck between authority and accountability,
Bainbridge sides with the Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co case, which provides a
conservative interpretation of the application of the business judgment rule.131 The
Unocal interpretation views the business judgment rule through the lens of the
doctrine of abstention. This interpretation suggests that the business judgment rule
allows the courts to go no further than to assess whether a board was disinterested and
independent in their decision-making process (good faith) and that the decisionmaking process was reasonable (sans gross negligence).132 Thus, Bainbridge endorses
a presumption in favor of strong judicial deference to board decisions as long as there
is some evidence of good faith and competence. He ultimately justifies this position
by reasoning that directors cannot be made more accountable without compromising
their authority, leading to less-than-optimal risk-taking.133
The key to director primacy, therefore, is establishing that directors are
becoming agents of change by: 1) severing their loyalty to “managers;” 2)
championing the rights of all shareholders; and 3) forging further corporate
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governance. It is here that director primacy either lives or dies by the sword, for when
Bainbridge attacks managerialism as inadequate he is indirectly challenged to
establish how the distinction drawn between managerialism and his director primacy
is in fact defensible.
Before Bainbridge, most traditional managerialists assumed that their readers
understood that directors were included in the term “managers” because no clear
distinction between the decision making outcomes of directors and senior executives
was thought to exist. One major reason for this pre-determination was that the CEO
was generally the office where actual power consolidated in public corporations. In
practice, the CEO had tremendous control over: 1) who would be on the ballot for
board elections; and 2) the flow of information from corporate operations to the
board. Many times, the CEO was on the board (if not the chairman of the board),
making frank discussions about managerial performance during board meetings
difficult at best. Thus, the CEO accumulated a great deal of power to manage the
corporation. So much that if there was one individual that Bainbridge had in mind in
his comparison between group decision making and individual decision making, the
CEO would likely be that individual as he or she has historically been the
corporation’s best approximation of the single autocrat at the apex of the corporate
governance hierarchy. In fact, it is not always clear how much the influence of the
CEO has changed in the day-to-day function of the corporation.
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When Bainbridge looks to the future of corporate governance in America, he
sees two competing models: shareholder primacy and director primacy. 134 He
petitions for greater vigilance in the face of today’s pressure to extend the shareholder
franchise.135 Bainbridge notes that there is very good reason why shareholder power
is so limited.136 He argues that shareholder primacy is a flawed account of American
corporate governance and, accordingly, in appreciating the reasons for this, director
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primacy emerges from the cries that proclaim greater shareholder primacy is the
enlightened path for corporate governance.137
Bainbridge contends that no shareholder empowerment amendments are
needed in order to ensure that the American corporate governance model optimizes
shareholder protection.138 He argues that director primacy satisfies this objective by
ensuring that corporate governance abides by the shareholder wealth maximization
norm.
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shareholders additional powers to exercise direct control over the corporation, but this
will prove to be detrimental to the shareholder class as a whole.140 This is because
special interests (institutional investors), which have consolidated power within the
shareholder class, will exploit these additional powers at the expense of weaker
shareholders.141
Within the existing corporate governance order, Bainbridge suggests that
shareholders are happy to be rationally apathetic because it is easier to exit than it is
to fight.142 He contends that this is true even for institutional investors because of: 1)
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the costs of monitoring corporate activities and engaging in activism; 2) the frequency
of free riding on such efforts; and 3) the marginal gains that result from such
activism.143 Bainbridge asserts that the apathy of shareholders is normally a good
thing because when institutional investors are motivated to interfere with corporate
governance, they usually do so in order to champion their narrow interests which
undermine shareholders’ interests as a whole and hamper the ability of directors to
make decisions in the best interest of the firm.144
There are a number of existing vehicles for shareholder activism including: 1)
exit; 2) proxy contests; 3) withholding votes in director elections; 4) shareholder
proposals; and 5) private negotiations between institutional investors and corporate
management. Bainbridge asserts that shareholder primacy advocates view these
vehicles as inadequate and that they promote expansion of the shareholder franchise
by: 1) reforming the director nomination process; 2) reforming the mechanics of the
voting process; and 3) expanding the substance of what shareholders can vote
upon. 145 Bainbridge flatly rejects that the expansion of shareholder voting rights
would be prudent, reinforcing his main argument which calls for adherence to the
status quo. Ultimately, he reminds his reader that one should not take lightly the
dangers of interfering with board authority for the sake of greater accountability
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because “the preservation of managerial discretion should always be [the] default
presumption.”146
The biggest test for the canonization of director primacy is whether it is
simply a semantic technique to maintain the defense of the professional bureaucracy
that runs the corporation or whether the function of the board can be established as
changing. If the behavior of “managers” (excluding directors) is what shareholder
primacy advocates are up in arms about, and if directors are really the true champions
of the whole of the shareholder class, then director primacy might be the “Third
Way” of corporate governance. However, if the distinction between managerialism
and director primacy cannot stand the test of the Devil’s Advocate, and directors
cannot be established to be different than “managers,” this theory will fail to be
convincing as a new path for corporate governance.
For this reason, the stakes are at their highest when Bainbridge makes the case
for the distinction between directors and managers in the post-Enron function of the
American board of directors. Although Bainbridge argues that director empowerment
started much earlier than the enactment of SOX147 and other amendments to the
listing requirements of various American stock exchanges, his position is that these
legal changes have finally tipped the scales as directors are now starting to enjoy
146
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enough freedom from executive officers to be able to independently exercise
authority over the corporation.148
Bainbridge’s narrative of the shift from managerialism to director primacy is
persuasive to read. He discusses the director’s evolving role from being the rubber
stamps of CEOs to potentially having a legitimate monitoring function.149 He explains
how starting in the 1970s, the pressure mounted to improve what was seen at that
time as the board’s failure to rein in the excesses of executive officers and improve
management’s performance.150 From this arose the recognition of the important role
that independent directors could play within the corporate governance structure. He
explains how post-Enron developments have bolstered a director’s ability to police
managers for shareholders by: 1) improving best-practice norms; 2) strengthening the
threats to a director’s reputation for turning a blind eye to managers running
roughshod over shareholder interests; 3) increasing judicial pressure for better
information flow from management to directors; and 4) increasing requirements for
more independent directors on boards.151
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Bainbridge’s argument is weaker when he fails to provide strong empirical
evidence that these changes are creating “strong, active independent directors with
little tolerance for negligence or culpable conduct.”152 Again, there is little empirical
evidence to support his claims that this functional shift is, in fact, occurring.153 In the
end, Bainbridge sounds like E Merrick Dodd, Jr who, in his reply to Adolf A Berle,
Jr, merely employed optimism for the new generation of managers.154 They are both
very optimistic about the potential of a bureaucratic revolution, an event which would
transform the ruling fiats of the great American corporations into group decision
making centers and, thereby, helping manage the economy in a manner that is more
beneficial to society.155 Both arguments are inspiring, but also lack substance and
amount to no more than corporate futurism.
In the end, even in his best argument for director primacy to date, Bainbridge
makes quite a weak statement arguing that the “real world practice” of directors is
still “supine,” but is “closer to the director primacy model than it was in earlier
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periods.”156 One must respect Bainbridge’s candor on this point, but it does lay bare
the weakness of his argument.
VII.

REFLECTIONS ON THE BATTLE FOR DELAWARE: FORM OR SUBSTANCE?

Strine was obviously opposed to more federal meddling within Delaware’s
national corporate law regime and Bainbridge was clearly a defender of the Delaware
status quo. But by encouraging greater federalization of corporate law, Bebchuk
appeared willing to risk Delaware’s caucus and the American corporate law status
quo in order to gain greater shareholder engagement. Although Bebchuk did not
appear to want to open the Delaware arrangement to the flood of other interests that
might follow the federal government into the internal affairs of the corporation, he
was willing to risk it.
In “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power,” Bebchuk used empirical
evidence to establish that the power between directors and shareholders of larger
American corporations with dispersed ownership was too unbalanced, as it blocked
shareholders from maximizing shareholder value when management refused to
cooperate.157 Bebchuk argued that allowing shareholders to be directly involved in
corporate decision making would enhance corporate governance by motivating
management to be more cooperative because shareholders had the power to directly
156
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intervene. With respect to the reformation process, Bebchuk predictably stated that it
should be through federal intervention.158
Bebchuk’s writing indicated that he did not want to open the floodgates
beyond shareholders and managers to other interests that influenced the federal
government.159 If he did not want these populous interests to start meddling in the
internal affairs of the corporation, what was he doing? Doubtless, he was familiar
with Roe’s position on the matter, so maybe he: 1) did not believe that his petition for
federal involvement seriously threatened the Delaware caucus; 2) did not care if the
Delaware caucus was threatened (if managers monopolized it); or 3) maybe he was
using the Cary card as leverage to up the stakes and, perhaps, make Delaware
concede without federal intervention. Regardless, the Cary card caused different
reactions which were interesting to observe. In response to Bebchuk’s proposal,
Strine suggested that the traditionalist investor would prefer the status quo to what
Bebchuk proposed.160 This was because the traditionalist investor would fear that
Bebchuk’s proposal might subvert their interests by compromising managerial
authority.161 If managerial authority was undermined, institutional intermediaries with
no interests to serve but their own would further compromise the corporate
158
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governance structure. Strine suggested that the traditionalist investor would thus
“leave things where they [stood] even if the status quo [was] not ideal.”162 But Strine
still entertained Bebchuk’s proposal (with some slight reframing) in order to be
“open-minded” to the idea that the traditionalist investor “might embrace reform that
[was] consistent with Bebchuk’s call for greater managerial accountability.”163 Strine
bit Bebchuk’s bait, but why? The answer came when Strine asserted: “Therefore, if
reform attractive to the traditionalist is to come, it must emanate from state
policymakers who can implement a reform that coheres with an overall approach to
corporate law.”164 Strine longwindedly made this argument, but he reinforced his key
point: whatever amendments needed to be made, Delaware and not the federal
government needed to make them.165
Strine offered hope to Bebchuk that there might be flexibility on the issue of
shareholder empowerment but Delaware needed to be the innovator, not the federal
government, because state competition must be preserved. It made sense that, if the
choice was between Delaware (form) and the status quo (substance), Strine would
advocate sacrificing some substance and managerial power and protect Delaware’s de
facto preeminence. If this situation was to arise it would be ideal for Bebchuk because
162
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Ibid at 1777.
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Ibid at 1780.
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it would maintain Delaware’s influence while increasing shareholder influence within
the political caucus.
As one might expect, Bainbridge opposed Bebchuk’s proposal by employing
the race-to-the-top argument.166 He argued that existing corporate law was optimal
because it survived the competitive forces of the charter market.167 He then made his
director primacy argument defending why this model was the appropriate model to
protect shareholder interests.168 He concluded that, since director primacy was the
superior model and since Delaware’s default rules already enshrined director
primacy, no reform was necessary.169 The bottom line was that Bainbridge rejected
any changes to the form or the substance of Delaware’s law and lawmaking capacity.
In sum, within the battle over corporate governance, there appears to be an
impasse which allows managers to have the luxury of a heavy hand in shaping its
evolution. Bebchuk, champion of the shareholder and, to a lesser degree, of Cary, is
unhappy with this state of affairs and is petitioning federal intervention to shake
things up. Strine, champion of Winter and, to a lesser degree, managerialism, is happy
with Delaware’s position as the manufacturer of “national” corporate law but appears
willing to negotiate with Bebchuk’s position. And Bainbridge is the warrior of the
166

Bainbridge, “Shareholder Disempowerment”, supra note 106 at 1737-42.
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Delaware status quo and is deeply entrenched in his position. Or is he? For, although
he initially attacked creeping federalism, he now uses the provision of SOX and the
amendments to listing requirements to support his director primacy argument.170 This
might suggest that his race-to-the-top argument gives way at times to pragmatism, as
does Strine’s defense of the Delaware status quo.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The power to influence the development of the corporate charter within the
Delaware caucus is the power to potentially influence Granovetter’s actual and
ongoing social networks inside and outside of the corporation and, hence, underscore
its embeddedness. The above narrative highlights the levels of contention between
managers and shareholders for control over future reforms. To date, managers have
dominated the caucus, marginalizing efforts by shareholder advocates who want other
shareholders to have greater direct participation within America’s corporate
governance structures. Historically, the Delaware caucus has weathered tremendous
economic transformations, remaining relatively unchanged when compared to the
reforms Britain and Australia took over the last twenty-five years.171 Delaware has
been less prone to amendment partly because its corporate law regime is regarded to
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Bainbridge, New Corporate Governance, supra note 65 at 176-87.
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For more on this, see Jennifer G Hill, “Regulatory Show and Tell: Lessons
From International Statutory Regimes” (2008) 33 Del J Corp L 819 at 823.
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be the result of an innovative and inspirational regulatory lab that harnesses the power
of state competition.172
With a view to the still-open questions regarding state competition, Bebchuk
petitioned for more federal intervention, challenging whether the market for charters
inspires the optimal lawmaking which is claimed to exist. He called for greater
power-sharing between the federal and state governments in this process, hoping this
would crack open the Delaware caucus and result in more direct shareholder
influence over corporate decision making. In response to Bebchuk, Vice Chancellor
Strine argued that greater power-sharing with the federal government would be a
mistake because Delaware’s regulatory machinery was not influenced by managers to
a degree that would prevent greater shareholder participation within corporate
governance (if such reforms were what shareholders really wanted and what
American corporate governance really needed). Meanwhile, this dialogue between
two highly regarded and influential discourse participants – the Vice Chancellor of
Delaware’s Court of Chancery and America’s top legal academic advocate of
shareholder empowerment – has been unsettling to the avid champions of Delaware’s
present status quo.
Confidence in Delaware, like that heralded by Professor Bainbridge, has made
some American corporate observers less likely to look beyond national borders for
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inspiration in corporate reforms and also less likely to assume that such reforms are
necessary.173 In this way, the charter competition argument has been very successful
at maintaining a status quo in which corporate managers have greater control over
corporate governance policy than similar managers have in either Britain or Australia
– countries that have both seen an increase in the participatory rights of
shareholders. 174 However, American corporate governance can be said to be in
transition as there has clearly been a shift of power away from the Delaware caucus in
response to its “modest and incremental” approach to reform.175 Starting with the
post-scandal regulatory responses (such as SOX), the federal government has been
more willing to interfere with the presumed preeminence of the charter market.176
This may prove to be the harbinger of the demise of the monopoly which Delaware
has enjoyed for the past century,177 providing new opportunities to increase the
participatory rights of shareholders.
Today, corporate managers are under attack for having failed to provide for
adequate monitoring and oversight of their firms’ investments before the credit crisis.
The situation has called into question the balance between managerial authority and
173
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managerial accountability. Eyes are on the capacity of state-level legal mechanisms
(in particular Delaware) to deal with these corporate governance failures. 178
Meanwhile, federal reforms (such as “say on pay” and other shareholder
empowerment initiatives) have either been established,179 or are in the works.180 Such
federal interventions demonstrate a continued willingness to intercede in corporate
regulatory development at the state level.
It is difficult to foretell the long-term impact of such federal interventions in
the area of corporate governance. If this attitude prevailed, the federal government
would likely face increased pressures from a number of interest groups – not just
shareholder groups – pushing for further corporate governance reform. But is this a
Pandora’s Box in the making? Alternatively, Delaware may want to answer to the sort
of pressures that prompted the federal government’s activity in the first place. It
seems that, either way, more shareholder participation rights in American corporate
governance is a likely outcome.
The likelihood of such an outcome brings this argument full circle. As noted
in the beginning, the British corporate governance expert Simon Deakin observed
178
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how Polanyi’s double movement had in recent times been off-set to favor market
interests to the detriment of society, driven predominantly by the power exercised by
investors in this era of financialization. Now, with the regulatory responses against
the crisis still forthcoming, one of the questions arising out of the foregoing is
whether increases in shareholder participatory rights are likely to further increase the
movement toward the financialization of the firm in the American context? While
only a few years ago we would have found it hard to see how it would not, the current
crisis and the emerging regulatory responses might suggest otherwise. 181 This
uncertainty hints at the political stakes in the Delaware debate and beyond.
Of course, the issue is more complex. Greater shareholder participation may
not be a bad thing. As Berle argued in response to Dodd in the classical American
debate over managerialism, although shareholder empowerment may not be an
adequate solution to managerial opportunism, enforcement of property rights is the
only legal tool available to safeguard against it.182 But how much has changed almost
eighty years later? In 1932, Berle was hopeful that new theories in sociology would
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See AA Berle, Jr, “For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note”
(1932) 45 Harv L Rev 1365.
228

soon provide the support for legal innovations which would better regulate corporate
governance183 . . . the law is still waiting.
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Adolf A Berle, Jr & Gardiner C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, 2d ed (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968) 219-20.
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CHAPTER 5: THE CORPORATION, NEW GOVERNANCE, AND THE
POWER OF NARRATIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
In Regulatory Capitalism: How it Works, Ideas for Making it Work Better,
John Braithwaite wrote an eye-catching phrase: regulatory capitalism represents the
“reality of hybridity between the privatization of the public and publicization of the
private.”1 The privatization of the public had been well documented,2 but the idea of
publicization of the private appeared to hold new promise.3 I had spotted this new
optimism of Braithwaite earlier in a 2006 working paper, when he admitted that he
had been concerned about the “neoliberal” shift toward privatization,4 even though,
for some time, he had been endorsing the self-governance of private actors.5 But now

1

John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How it Works, Ideas for Making it
Work Better (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar,) at 8 [Braithwaite, Regulatory
Capitalism].
2

See e.g. Daniel Yergin & Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The
Battle for the World Economy, revised ed (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002).
3

For the origins of the concept, see Jody Freeman, “Extending Public Law Norms
Through Privatization” (2003) 116 Harv L Rev 1285 at 1285 [Freeman, “Extending
Public Law”].
4

See generally John Braithwaite, “Neoliberalism or Regulatory Capitalism”
(RegNet
Occasional
Paper
No
5,
2005)
online:
<https://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/jbraithwaite/_documents/Articles/Neoliberalism_Re
gulatory_2005.pdf> [Braithwaite, “Neoliberalism”].
5

See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the
Deregulation Debate (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992).
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(as of 2006), he was convinced that his fears over “neoliberalism” were excessive and
that it was merely a stage of “regulatory capitalism.”6
In April of this year, Braithwaite released a new working paper that further
extrapolates upon publicization, explaining that it means “the percolation of public
law values into private law and into corporate self-regulation, [including] the most
critical public law values such as transparency, accountability, stakeholder voice and
separations of powers.” 7 Jody Freeman, the originator of this idea, described
publicization as a process by which “private actors increasingly commit themselves to
traditionally public goals as the price of access to lucrative opportunities…that might
otherwise be provided directly by the state.”8
For the past decade since Freeman hypothesized that this publicization would
occur, the evidence of this transformation has not been convincing.9 For better or
worse, business actors do not appear to be any more or less imbued with the spirit of
public service than in the past, leaving questions as to whether or not endorsing recent
regulatory experimentation has not been at the expense of the long-term integrity of
governance. Both the collapse of Enron and the Credit Crisis have been, in large part,
6

Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 4 at 8, 18.

7

John Braithwaite, “Strategic Socialism, Strategic Privatization and Crises”
(2013) [unpublished, archived at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2249544] at 4 [Braithwaite,
“Strategic Socialism”].
8

Freeman, “Extending Public Law”, supra note 3 at 1285.
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See e.g. Braithwaite, “Strategic Socialism”, supra note 7 at 5.
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attributable to the regulatory failures caused by the decisions of for-profit
“gatekeepers,” 10 such as Arthur Anderson 11 and Standard & Poor's, 12 who were
enjoying the sort of lucrative opportunities that Freeman had envisioned, but who
failed to adequately publicize.
In light of the continued interest in the idea of publicization, this chapter
offers some considerations that might be taken into account when attempting to

10

John C Coffee, Jr, Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 1-6 [Coffee, Gatekeepers].
11

See e.g. Kristen Hays, “Enron at Eye Level: A Reporter’s View of the Trials” in
Nancy B Rapoport, Jeffrey D Van Niel & Bala G Dharan, eds, Enron and Other
Corporate Fiascos: The Corporate Scandal Reader, 2d ed (New York: Foundation
Press, 2009); Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R Macey, “Was Arthur Andersen
Different? An Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large
Clients” (2004) 1 J Empirical Legal Stud 263 (concluding that after controlling for
client size, region, time, and industry, there was no evidence that Andersen’s
performance significantly differed from other large accounting firms).
12

For how investment banks exploit new governance regulations in order to more
than double the maximum leverage (15:1) allowable under regulatory requirements,
see John C Coffee, Jr, “What Went Wrong? An Initial Inquiry into the Causes of the
2008 Financial Crisis” (2009) 9 J Corp L Stud 1 at 10-13 [Coffee, “What Went
Wrong?”]. Frank Partnoy argues that credit rating agencies have “little incentive to
‘get it right,’” which “pose[s] a systemic risk.” Frank Partnoy, “Rethinking
Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: An Institutional Investor Perspective” (Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 09-014, 2009) at 3, online:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430608>. Timothy Sinclair identifies that the issue is
conventionally conceived as that the way that credit rating agencies are remunerated
generates a conflict of interest. He suggests that this conflict of interest is overblown
and that focus should be upon the challenges rating agencies (and similar
gatekeepers) face, more generally, in a market system. Timothy J Sinclair, “Credit
Rating Agencies and the Global Financial Crisis” (2010) 12 Econ Soc 4 at 4.
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evaluate its potential. To do so, this chapter in part takes a second look at the
literatures supporting “new governance” initiatives.
New governance is an umbrella term for theories of governance that
encourage regulatory architects to marry the best of both the public and private
orderings.13 It celebrates a “blurring” of public and private functions within areas of
regulation.14
The publicization dimension of new governance rhetoric invokes an out of
focus image of the democratic delegation of power to for-profit agents, who, it is
assumed, will exercise this power in a benevolent and competent manner. For many
regulatory scholars, with market failure to their left and regulatory failure to their
right, publicization of the private represents a best-case metaphor in which
governance enjoys the optimal balance between the functional efficiencies of
decentered actors,15 and the integrity of idealized public servants. But again, the
13

See generally David Trubek & Louise Trubek, “The World Turned Upside
Down: Reflections on New Governance and the Transformation of Law” (2010) 2010
Wis L Rev 719; William H Simon, “New Governance Anxieties: A Deweyan
Response” (2010) 2010 Wis L Rev 727; Lisa T Alexander, “Reflections on Success
and Failure in New Governance and the Role of the Lawyer” (2010) 2010 Wis L Rev
738.
14

See generally Jason M Solomon, “New Governance, Preemptive SelfRegulation, and the Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice”
(2010) 2010 Wis L Rev 591.
15

See e.g. Julia Black, “Critical Reflections on Regulation” (2002) 27 Austl J Leg
Phil 1 [Black, “Critical Reflections”]; see also Friedrich A Hayek, “The Use of
Knowledge in Society” (1945) 35 Am Econ Rev 519 [Hayek, “Use of Knowledge”].
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vision of publicization is out of focus, lacking detail, and this may be a serious
problem if it is creating a false promise of a Panacea for the social ills attributed to
privatization—such as the “democratic deficit” it creates.16
This chapter invites other scholars to reconsider whether or not such blurring
of public and private functions is to be encouraged. It will be argued that the
publicization of for-profit activities is a goal that is unlikely to be achieved. As a
result, this chapter suggests that the best-case scenario for new governance may be
merely the privatization of the public—without the publicization of the private. And
if this is the case, then new governance, and its call for a further blurring of public
and private functions, may merit a critical re-evaluation.
Part II of this chapter provides an introduction to some of the literatures that
inform new governance. Part III explores the normative strength of corporate
governance to resist publicization. Part IV looks at the challenges that technocratic
narratives pose to publicization within both public and private governance. Part V
concludes by suggesting that, based on the arguments presented, for-profit actors will
not publicize as the literature suggests. This conclusion invites further discussion as

16

Alfred C Aman, Jr, “Law, Markets and Democracy: A Role for Law in the NeoLiberal State” (2007) 51 NYL Sch L Rev 801 at 810-11 [Aman,”Law, Markets and
Democracy”]. Of course, the concerns over the “democratic deficit” exist beyond
privatization issues and are considered by those who are concerned about the entire
project of new governance. See e.g. Victor Bekkers et al, eds, Governance and the
Democratic Deficit: Assessing the Democratic Legitimacy of Governance Practices,
(Burlington, Vt: Ashgate Publishing, 2007) at 307-11.
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to the possibility of a more directed process that engineers a reconstitution of the
public and private in light of the challenges facing modern governance, rather than
just leaving it to the fortunes of market-driven “spontaneous evolution.”
II. THE FOUNDATION FOR NEW GOVERNANCE
It is yet to be determined how new governance will play out.17 Thus, its merits
are difficult to assess. The literature—if it is a single literature—is fragmented:
collaborative, 18 incentive-based, 19 reflexive, 20 responsive, 21 and decentered22 notions
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For reflection upon the present transformation, see Lisa Blomgren Bingham,
“The Next Generation of Administrative Law: Building the Legal Infrastructure for
Collaborative Governance” (2010) 2010 Wis L Rev 297; Mark Dawson,
“Transforming into What? New Governance in the EU and the ‘Managerial
Sensibility’ in Modern Law” (2010) 2010 Wis L Rev 389; Poul F Kjaer, “The
Metamorphosis of the Functional Synthesis: A Continental European Perspective on
Governance, Law, and the Political in the Transnational Space” (2010) 2010 Wis L
Rev 489; Trubek & Trubek, supra note 100.
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See e.g. Jody Freeman, “Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State”
(1997) 45 UCLA L Rev 1 [Freeman, “Collaborative Governance”]; Philip J Harter,
“Collaboration: The Future of Governance” (2009) 2009 J Disp Resol 411.
19

See e.g. Richard B Stewart, “A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?”
(2001) 29 Cap U L Rev 21 at 94-127; Daniel H Cole & Peter Z Grossman, “When is
Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and The Comparative
Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes are Environmental Protection” (1999)
1999 Wis L Rev 887 at 887-894, 935-938; Lily N Chinn, “Can the Market Be Fair
and Efficient - An Environmental Justice Critique of Emissions Trading” (1999) 26
Ecology LQ 80 at 80-88, 102-125.
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See e.g. Peer Zumbansen, “Law After the Welfare State: Formalism,
Functionalism, and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law” (2008) 56 Am J Comp L 769
[Zumbansen, “Law After the Welfare State”]; Ulrich Beck, Wolfgang Bonss &
Christoph Lau, “The Theory of Reflexive Modernization: Problematic, Hypotheses
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of governance are not necessarily mindful of each other and appear not to be moving
toward a single cohesive position. Attempts to synthesis the new governance
literature23 have been charged with being “overzealous,”24 because to do so invites a
level of generalization, which threatens to ignore important differences between the
literatures. In this way, new governance is like critical legal theory, 25 and legal
realism for that matter,26 in the sense that, although a number of authors can be

and Research Programme” (2003) 20 Theory, Culture & Soc’y 1; Ulrich Beck, Risk
Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 1992).
21

See e.g. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 5; David Levi-Faur, “The Global
Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism” (2005) 598 Annals Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 12
[Levi-Faur, “The Global Diffusion”]; Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, supra note
1.
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See e.g. Julia Black, “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of
Regulation and Self Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World” (2001) 54 Current
Probs 103 [Black, “Decentring Regulation”].
23

See e.g. Orly Lobel, “The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought” (2004) 89 Minn L Rev 342 [Lobel,
“The Renew Deal”].
24

See Bradley C Karkkainen, “New Governance in Legal Thought and in the
World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping” (2004) 89 Minn L Rev
471.
25

For a discussion of the nature of the movement and its fragmentation, see
generally Mark Tushnet, “Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to Its Origins and
Underpinnings” (1986) 36 J Legal Educ 505.
26

Joseph Singer discusses the competition notion of legal realism and the idea
that “we are all legal realists now.” Joseph William Singer, “Legal Realism Now”
(1988) 76 Cal L Rev 465 at 467.
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identified as being under the conceptual umbrella, the nature of the movement as a
whole defies an all-inclusive definition.27
That being said, it is safe to assert that new governance is the study of the
ways in which governments release their authority to regulate, or to enforce
regulation, within regulated spaces,28 allowing non-government organizations to share
in providing administrative functions traditionally associated with government.29 New
governance may be the replacement of the command-and-control model of the
welfare state. If so, it may become the replacement of the welfare state as the
ideological30 binary pole to a pure free market,31 within the spectrum of “models of

27

See e.g. ibid.; Tushnet, supra note 25.

28

A prime example of this is regulatory capitalism. See generally Braithwaite,
Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 1. Although this does not bring additional clarity
to the distinction between the sphere of new commerce and the locus of new
governance, it is significant to note the distinctions that Braithwaite makes between
understandings of neoliberalism, privatization, and regulatory capitalism. See
Braithwaite, “Neoliberalism”, supra note 4.
29

See Colin Scott, “Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet of
Contemporary Governance” (2002) 29 JL & Soc’y 56 at 57-60 [Scott, “Private
Regulation”].
30

Cukierman emphasizes the importance of ideology, among other forms of
rationality, for its influence on economic policies, and thus the impact that ideology,
for better or worse, has on macroeconomic developments. Alex Cukierman, “The
Roles of Ideology, Institutions, Politics, and Economic Knowledge in Forecasting
Macroeconomic Developments: Lessons from the Crisis” (2010) 56 CESifo Econ
Stud 575 at 575-79. Thus, to reject ideology, when your opponents use it effectively
as a tool for policy, is a disadvantage, pragmatically speaking, if the end goal is to
influence policy development.
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capitalism.”32 Accordingly, new governance may become the newest champion of
“embedded liberalism.”33
Most new governance literature today appears to be hopeful of the
“reassertion of the public interest” within governance.34 Instead of framing the issue
just35 within the context of the “turn to the market,”36 the “withdrawal of the welfare
31

See Yergin & Stanislaw, supra note 2; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
“Markets and Society: The Life and Thought of Karl Polanyi, Part 5: The Legacy”
(webcast) (Posted 8 August 2006, 9:53 pm) (interviewing Fred Block), online:
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation <http://www.insidethecbc.com/ideas-seriesmarkets-and-society-available-for-download/>.
32

See generally Colin Crouch, “Models of Capitalism” (2005) 10 New Pol Econ
439; see also Richard Deeg & Gregory Jackson, “Towards a More Dynamic Theory
of Capitalist Variety” (2007) 5 Socio-Econ Rev 149.
33

Ruggie coined this term. John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes,
Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order”
(1982) 36 Int’l Org 379 at 392. However, Ruggie was inspired to coin the term
because of Karl Polanyi work on “embedded” and disembedded” economic orders.
See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of
Our Time, 2d ed (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001) at 79.
34

See generally David Levi-Faur, “Regulatory Capitalism and the Reassertion of
the Public Interest” (2009) 27 Pol’y & Soc’y 181 [Levi-Faur, “Reassertion of the
Public Interest”].
35

Of course, this is not to take away from these debates because they are
important. It is only to say that different debates ought to also continue to emerge.
Furthermore, the distinction drawn here is a precarious one in the sense that many of
the authors of the privatization literature will also have voice in these other literature.
Thus, although Braithwaite, in particular, is drawing a similar distinction when he
distinguishes between neoliberalism and regulatory capitalism, see Braithwaite,
“Neoliberalism”, supra note 4, such distinctions are not embraced by many and are to
some degree artificial. However, it has been drawn presently in order to see what
follows.
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state,”37 or the “welfare state retrenchment,”38 new governance provides a place to
imagine the “reconstituting,”39 “restructuring,”40 “reasserting,”41 or the “rise”42 of the
public dimension of governance function. This appears to be the essential promise of
new governance: to provide an alternative, which is not antibusiness, 43 yet still
attempts to balance the demands of markets with the interests of society in a way that
generates sustainable and balanced policy options, and a governance mechanism that
stabilizes wealth creation, protects human dignity, and ensures a habitable natural
36

Bob Jessop, “Governance Failure” in Gerry Stoker, ed, The New Politics of
British Local Governance (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000) at 11.
37

Vito Tanzi, Government Versus Markets: The Changing Economic Role of the
State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 273.
38

See e.g. Judith Treas, “Can Families Compensate for Welfare State
Retrenchment?” (2012) 41 Contemp Soc 33; Nathalie Giger & Miora Nelson, “The
Electoral Consequences of Welfare State Retrenchment: Blame Avoidance or Credit
Claiming in the Era of Permanent Austerity?” (2011) 50 Eur J Pol Res 1.
39
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Regulatory Capitalism: The Global Diffusion of a New Order” (2005) 598 Annals
Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 200; Black, “Decentring Regulation”, supra note 22.
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environment for future generations. As a result, new governance’s boundaries, like
those of corporate governance, are assumed to be “blurred and porous,”44 and in a
state of disequilibrium,

45

which allows for a high level of pragmatic

“experimentalism”46 within new governance’s learning processes.47 Again, all of this
points to the hopefulness of publicization—hopefulness this chapter wishes to temper.
Below, a number of literatures on governance are introduced, which help to
construct a greater appreciation of some of the thoughts that have influenced the form
new governance appears to be taking.
44

John R Boatright, “The Implications of the New Governance for Corporate
Governance” in Ingo Pies & Peter Koslowski, eds, Corporate Citizenship and New
Governance: The Political Role of Corporations (New York: Springer, 2011) 133 at
141. Ball and Junemann discusses how governance, by its nature, deconstructs or
transcends organizational boundaries and not these networks are changes alluding to
the understanding of regulated spaces that a governmentality approach might offer,
creating “overlap and confusion.” Stephen J Ball & Carolina Junemann, Networks,
New Governance and Education (Bristol, UK: Policy Press, 2012) at 1-7; see also
Simon, supra note 100.
45

Dewey believed that learning occurred by facing an experience of
disequilibrium and then finding a “more extensive balance,” arguing “equilibrium
comes…out of, and because of, tension.” In this sense, life and learning to Dewey
was a constant cycle of equilibrium and disequilibrium. John Dewey, Art as
Experience (New York: Capricorn Books, 1934) at 14 [Dewey, Art as Experience].
46

For more on the issues related to new governance and experimentalism, see
generally Grainne de Burca, “New Governance and Experimentalism: An
Introduction” (2010) 2010 Wis L Rev 227.
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See Solomon, supra note 101 at 593-97. In the European context, democratic
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coordination of top-down, as well as bottom-up, learning processes. See generally
Erika Szyszczak, “Experimental Governance: The Open Method of Coordination”
(2006) 12 Eur LJ 486.
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A. Deregulation
The deregulation literature portrays governments as removing regulations
from areas of society, allowing markets to operate “freely.” 48 This notion of
deregulation, although still persistent in the imagination of some, has been largely
debunked.49 Not only has the administrative state grown in its size (and expense),50
but there has also been a vast geographical expansion of regulations in previously
unregulated, or less regulated, spaces.51 Thus, the term “deregulation,” which framed

48

For more on this idea and the regulation literature, see, for example, Milton
Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962); see
also Paul L Joskow, Deregulation: Where Do We Go from Here (Washington, DC:
AEI Press, 2009); Daniel Immergluck, Foreclosed: High-Risk Lending, Deregulation,
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much of the conversation about the shift from the welfare state for so long,52 has been
inaccurate as a description of the evolution of government and governance.53 So the
literature is worth mentioning, but not worth much more.
B. Privatization
The privatization literature 54 describes the “withdrawal of the state” as a
provider of public services, and in particular, various forms of social insurance.55 The
narrative of privatization is more dramatic and self-apparent in countries such as the
United Kingdom (which, during the “Golden Age,” had a more robust welfare state
than the United States), 56 but it still strongly shapes how many understand this
regulatory shift in America.57
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Privatization generally refers to the outsourcing of government services58—
“essential services”59—that were provided traditionally under welfare state programs
to for-profit or nonprofit organizations.60
The rationale for privatization is, in essence, that it improves the efficiency of
social services provided by allowing private, usually for-profit, organizations to
manage them. 61 By delegating responsibility, governments achieve more at a
58

For more on privatization in this sense, see Dru Stevenson, “Privatization of
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83-85; Damian Grimshaw, Steve Vincent & Hugh Willmott, “Going Privately:
Partnership and Outsourcing in UK Public Services” (2002) 80 Pub Admin 475 at
475-76; see also Andrew Kakabadse & Nada Kakabadse, “Outsourcing in the Public
Services: A Comparative Analysis of Practice, Capability and Impact” (2001) 21 Pub
Admin & Dev 401.
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authors have a broader definition of essential services than the definition of essential
services in which the right to strike is highly limited. See A Pankert, “Settlement of
Labour Disputes in Essential Services” (1980) 119 Int’l Lab Rev 723.
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Stevenson, supra note 58 at 86-94; see also Aman, “Law, Markets and
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outsourced by government, see generally Eric Werker & Faisal Z Ahmed, “What Do
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“The New Landscape for Nonprofits” in Victor Futter, Judith A Cion & George W
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See William L Megginson & Jeffry M Netter, “From State to Market: A Survey
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Eckel, Doug W Eckel & Vijay Singal, “Privatization and Efficiency: Industry Effects
of the Sale of British Airways” (1997) 43 J Fin Econ 275 at 297. However, this
assertion is contested. See e.g. Shinichi Nishiyama & Kent Smetters, “Does Social
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decreased expense to the public by allowing free market capitalism to shoulder much
of the load.62 The main claim is that the consumers of these services receive better
quality and variety of products, as well as potentially lower prices generated by the
efficiency gains from market competition. 63 These efficiency gains increase the
profitability of providing services and boost economic growth, ultimately leading to
more financially stable economies.64 Economic growth increases the tax base, and
these gains made by governments are then passed down to taxpayers, reducing the
overall tax burden.65 Low taxes leave more money in the economy, further increasing
economic growth.66 In the end, taxpayers enjoy lower tax burdens, consumers enjoy

Security Privatization Produce Efficiency Gains?” (2007) 122 QJ Econ 1677; George
Yarrow et al, “Privatization in Theory and Practice” (1986) 1 Econ Pol’y 323
(arguing the benefits of privatization can often be achieved through better means).
62
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note 2 at 372-74. Additionally, consider the “Washington Consensus.” See John
Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform” in John Williamson,
ed, Latin American Adjustment: How Much has Happened? (Washington, DC:
Institute for International Economics, 1989) 5.
65

For a more detailed understanding of this in a modern context, as well as an
analysis of whether such a policy truly works, see Hang Nguyen et al, How Hard is it
to Cut Tax Preferences to Pay for Lower Tax Rates? (Urban Institute and UrbanBrookings
Tax
Policy
Center,
2012)
online:
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better services, employees benefit from a better economy, and governments can
channel resources with more focus upon a narrower range of functions.67
Unfortunately, this theory has already proven to be too good to be true, and
policies have modified privatization by applying it in a more incremental,
experimental, and responsive manner68 than the initial enthusiasm the “Washington
Consensus” encouraged.69 Still, skepticism remains.70
C. Risk
During the time of the welfare state (approximately from the first Roosevelt
Administration in 1933–1937 until between the Carter Administration in 1977–1981

and Economic Growth” (OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 620,
2008), online: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/241216205486>.
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For a more detailed understanding, see Yergin & Stanislaw, supra note 2.
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See generally John Bennett, Saul Estrin & Giovanni Urga, “Privatization
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(Washington,
DC:
World
Bank,
2005)
at
165-95,
online:
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See Dani Rodrik, “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington
Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning
from a Decade of Reform” (2006) 44 J Econ Literature 973; see also Yergin &
Stanislaw, supra note 2 at 237; Williamson, supra note 64 (of additional note are the
comments to Williamson’s article included in the book).
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See Rodrik, supra note 69 at 986.
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and the first Reagan Administration in 1981–1985),71 a prevailing assumption, at least
in the earlier years, was that an effective regulatory architecture could be modeled
upon command-and-control style regulation. 72 It was predicted that government
experts could employ science in order to determine what the law ought to be, while
administrative and judicial technologies could enforce the regulatory architecture
devised.73 There were also assumptions made about the nature of natural hazards and
manufactured risks and how they related to science and its technologies. However,
these proved to be overly optimistic and simplistic,74 and more problematic than
anticipated.75
Anthony Giddens suggests that it was the manufacturing of uninsurable risk
by progress, and not the financial cost of the welfare state, which led to state
retrenchment.76 There was an inability to devise a way to use regulatory architecture
71

Salamon argues that “the Carter administration began in the latter 1970s to
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Rev 16 at 20-21.
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(1986) 38 Stan L Rev 1189.
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Anthony Giddens, “Risk and Responsibility” (1999) 62 Mod L Rev 1 at 4-10.
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to solve the problems created by progress.77 Faced with this, governments were
caught between a rock and a hard place: the social experiment of using the welfare
state to mitigate the dangers of progress was unworkable, and the prospect of
reverting to a pre-progress, pre-industrial society was similarly impractical. Thus the
social contract, which obliged the state to mitigate the social and environmental risks
caused by industrialization, was in breach.78 The state could not meet these lofty
commitments. As a result, the first project of “embedded liberalism”79 was a failure,
and the state retreated. From this perspective, the welfare state model proved unable
to adequately identify risks, or adequately devise solutions that did not manufacture
new risks and greater complexity.80 This inability left “the path of progress”81 highly

77

Ibid.

78

See e.g. Beck, supra note 20.
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For more on the idea of “embedded liberalism,” see Andrew TF Lang,
“Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist
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ed, Embedding Global Markets: An Enduring Challenge (Burlington, Vt: Ashgate,
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Edward Elgar, 2008).
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uncertain.82 It was this uncertainty, then which ultimately led to the demise of the
welfare state.83
With no way back and no way forward, the state retrenched, resulting in what
Ulrich Beck, Giddens’s colleague, calls “reflexive modernization.”84 Mitchell Dean
uses the term “reflexive government” as an alternative term for “reflexive
modernity.” 85 Dean writes that reflexive government is “a folding back of the
objectives…upon its means.” 86 In other words, government legitimacy is now
measured by the efficiency of how it provides services (means), not what services it
provides (objectives), because, as Giddens explained, the calculus of determining
what services ought to exist has been exposed as unworkable. In other words,
governments are at a loss as to how to solve the challenges they face. As a result, they
outsource responsibilities to the private sector and focus squarely upon improving the
efficiency of the remaining regimes of practice within its purview of power in order
to maintain legitimacy. 87 As long as governments do what they do within a
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legitimated measure of accountability (a calculus of risk management and economic
efficiency),88 the larger issues of whether such government initiatives promote the
long-term sustainability of society can be shadowed by technocratic narratives.89
Thus, governments limit their function, and fixate upon the efficiency of their internal
control systems as a measure of performance.
Before ending this section it is important to at least reference Michael Power,
who details how these technocratic narratives “have filtered into regulatory
organizations [providing] a blueprint for the governance and accountability of the
regulatory decision process.”90 Power also agrees with the above-mentioned thinkers
in this area that such patterns of reflexive government are leading to a new and
potentially dangerous political economy.91
D. Decentered Regulation
The decentered literature covers a broad spectrum of ideology from the
thought of neoclassical economist thinkers, such as Milton Friedman92 and Friedrich
88

Michael Power, Organized Uncertainty: Designing a World of Risk
Management (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 2-7, 91 [Power, Organized
Uncertainty].
89

See Part IV supra for more on technocratic narratives.
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Ibid at 91.
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Ibid at 91–92.
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See generally Milton Friedman & Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal
Statement (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980).
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Hayek, 93 to governance scholars with roots in responsive law, such as John
Braithwaite 94 and David Levi-Fair, 95 to those with roots in systems theory and
reflexive law, such as Julia Black96 and Colin Scott.97
Friedman and Hayek, in particular, have become synonymous with predicting
the failures of the welfare state.98 Historical narratives focused upon their work have
explained that governments, with the United States and United Kingdom leading the
way, privatized and deregulated their regulatory models.99 Top-down, command-andcontrol regulatory techniques were abandoned, and “free markets” were unleashed.100
“Free markets,” rhetoric aside, means regulators create more discretionary, processbased regulation of markets and society, which allows private actors, generally forprofit actors, to exercise more discretion within regulated spaces.101
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One of the foundational claims of this neoclassical academic and political
movement was that the “man on the spot” enjoyed the most intimate vantage point
that helped him understand complex society.102 For this reason, it was assumed that,
with the aid of the price mechanism, the “man on the spot” was in the best position to
make decisions in regulated spaces.103 For instance, Hayek would likely suggest that
Goldman Sachs does not need a centralized public bureaucracy to operate within the
global economy. Goldman Sachs is the “man on the spot,” having the most intimate
knowledge of the ever-changing information it must balance in its decision-making
processes. What about the knowledge Goldman Sachs lacks? Hayek would argue that
no actor enjoys perfect knowledge, but the price mechanism adequately supplements
these limits to be informed about other market actors.104
The “man on the spot” is plugged into the knowledge of the facts on the
ground. As such, groups of these actors are collectively, from various decentralized
locations, in the best positions to exercise governance discretion, since each has an
intimate knowledge of the small segment of the regulated space in which each
operates. 105 Consequently, by exploiting the power of information exchange
102

Hayek, “Use of Knowledge”, supra note 99 at 524-25.

103

Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Of course, this extends beyond what Hayek was suggesting, but imagine how
this applies to Hayek’s knowledge theory. See Hayek, “Use of Knowledge”, supra
note 99.
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technologies (such as the price mechanism,106 knowledge brokers, and auditing and
reporting processes 107 ), regulators can create “knowledge networks,” 108 which
provide decentered actors the additional information they need to coordinate
activities, and accordingly govern society.
This sort of thinking emphasizes that an important dimension of an effectively
regulated space is the willingness of the regulated to respect, follow, and actively
participate (to the best of their ability) as partners in the regulatory process.109 In fact,
106

See ibid at 524.
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(like a regulated space). For more on knowledge brokers, see, for example, Gianmario
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(2000) 5 Corp Comm 97; Andreas Seufert, Georg von Krogh & Andrea Bach,
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such governance strategies are regarded as dependent upon the information that
exchanges between regulators and the regulated in order to learn of and respond to
complex regulatory challenges in a timely and effective manner 110 or, more
dramatically, simply to avoid regulatory failure.
Since such information exchanges between actors within a regulated space
need to be effective, maintaining non-adversarial relationships is given a top priority
in order to facilitate communication, coordination, and learning.111 The problem is
that this priority can hamper meaningful enforcement mechanisms in some cases, as
the regulator becomes fearful that paternalistic punishment of the regulated may
undermine their partnership, and thus may also compromise the information
exchanges within the regulated space.112 This places the regulator in a dilemma: if it
wishes to have effective information exchanges so as to have the best possible
knowledge about a regulated space, then it must not enforce such regulation with
vigor, because it may alienate the regulated, upon whom it relies to inform it about
changes in the regulated space.113 On the other hand, if a regulator does not enforce
its regulations, or has regulations without “real teeth,” then the regulated may not take
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113
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the “law” of the regulated space seriously,114 creating new informal norms, which can
actually dictate how the regulated space functions and can thus compromise the
regulator’s intentions.115
From this perspective, governance is a channeling of discretionary authority
from government agencies to more hybrid and decentered public–private governance
processes,116 in the hope of establishing social relationships with “the man on the
spot.” 117 This channeling is deemed necessary to exploit decentered decisionmaking, 118 by using information exchange technologies. This results in the
replacement of substance-based, state-imposed regulation with process-based, public–
private co-regulation and co-governance.119
Governments restrict their function to devising strategic plans for regulated
spaces (called steering), leaving a large portion of the application, monitoring, and
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enforcement of these strategies (called rowing) to non-state actors.120 As a result,
regulation is becoming intimately linked to other ordering processes, such as markets,
civil society networks, and the internal control and risk management mechanisms of
corporate governance.121 In theory, the steering rules are created by the state, but in
practice this is only partly true, since private participation in strategic rule making is
becoming more common in regulated spaces. 122 Consequently, the distinction
between steering and rowing is blurred.123
For instance, when focusing upon The California Occupational Safety and
Health Act Cooperative Compliance Plan,124 it is not so easy to draw a distinction
between the Act’s regulations (steering) and the rules emerging from the regulated
(rowing).125 Many of the rowing norms are also strategic and steering in nature. The
120
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Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of Workplace” (2005) 57
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blurring between external institutional norms (strategic steering regulations) and
internal organizational norms (operational rowing norms) demonstrates that the
differentiation between who is steering and who is rowing is not so clear.126 In such
heterarchically-regulated spaces, assumptions cannot be made regarding which
norms, control mechanisms, and regulatory participants are, in fact, directing the
evolution of regulatory norms at any given time.127
Regulatory architects within these heterarchically-regulated spaces are
experimenting with reflexive, 128 responsive, 129 decentered, 130 and collaborative 131
techniques to harness incentive mechanisms, many times market-based ones.132 The
Admin L Rev 1071 [Lobel, “The Governance of Workplace”]; Marius Aalders & Ton
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umbrella term, “regulatory capitalism,” captures many of these dimensions of
decentered governance.133 Looking forward, future regulated spaces may host cogovernance mechanisms in which the state, although present, plays a minor role. Such
spaces of the future have been associated with an understanding of the “postregulatory state.”134 Many elements of this post-regulatory state exist today, including
auditing and reporting mechanisms135 and the incorporation of private monitoring of
regulated spaces by non-state gatekeepers.136 These gatekeepers can dwell in civil
society, such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals does, 137 or in the
133
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business sector, such as Moody’s Investors Services does.138 This proliferation of
these mechanisms is the most obvious sign of this emerging decentered order.139 But
the question remains: Will these private actors have the requisite public spiritedness
to sacrifice self-interest when called upon to do so?
E. Conclusion
As already suggested, faith in the reassertion of the public interest within
governance appears in a spectrum of governance literatures. It suggests that a
counterbalance to privatization is occurring.140 The hope is that, as the bright-line
distinction between public and private blurs further, some of the rationalities that
legitimate profit making on the cusp of legality 141 will be brought under more
“unwieldy” public,142 and more careful academic,143 scrutiny resulting in for-profit
actors becoming more socially minded.
138

Moody’s, online: <http://www.moodys.com/>.

139

See generally Power, Audit Society, supra note 135; see also Power, Organized
Uncertainty, supra note 88; Michael Power, The Risk Management of Everything:
Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty (London: Demos, 2004) [Power, Risk
Management of Everything].
140

See generally Freeman, “Extending Public Law”, supra note 3; Braithwaite,
“Neoliberalism”, supra note 4 at 8, 18; Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, supra
note 1; Braithwaite, “Strategic Socialism”, supra note 7.
141

See Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 38-39.
142

“Talking about a Revolution: A Fascinating and Unwieldy Movement in
Search of a Narrative”, The Economist (7 April 2012) online:
258

Linguistically,

the

language

of

“public-private

partnership”

144

and

“governance”145 has been introduced more frequently into the lexicon of regulatory

<http://www.economist.com/node/21552179> [“Talking about a Revolution”]; “Rage
Against the Machine: People are Right to be Angry. But it is Also Right to be
Worried about Where Populism Could Take Politics”, The Economist (22 October
2011) online: www.economist.com/node/21533400 [“Rage Against the Machine”].
143

See e.g. David Vogel, The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of
Corporate Social Responsibility (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,
2005); see also Peer Zumbansen, “Rethinking the Nature of the Firm: The
Corporation as a Governance Object” (2012) 32 Seattle UL Rev 1469; Aaron K
Chatterji & Barak D Richman, “Progressive Visions of the Corporation:
Understanding the ‘Corporate’ in Corporate Social Responsibility” (2008) 2 Harv L
& Pol’y Rev 33; Ruth V Aguilera et al, “Putting the S Back in Corporate Social
Responsibility: A Multi-Level Theory of Social Change in Organizations” (2007) 32
Acad Mgmt Rev 836; Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom Campbell, eds,
The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
144

See generally Aidan R Vining & Anthony E Boardman, “Public-Private
Partnerships: Eight Rules for Governments” (2008) 13 Pub Works Mgmt Pol’y 149;
Chris Skelcher, “Public-Private Partnerships and Hybridity” in Ewan Ferlie, Laurence
E Lynn, Jr & Christopher Pollitt, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Public Management
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 347; Akintola Akintoye, Matthias Beck,
Cliff Hardcastle, Public-Private Partnerships: Managing Risks and Opportunities
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2003); Wolfgang Kleinwachter, “From Self-Governance to
Public-Private Partnership: The Changing Role of Governments in the Management
of the Internet's Core Resources” (2003) 36 Loy LA L Rev 1103 ; Stephen Osborne,
ed, Public-Private Partnerships: Theory and Practice in International Perspective
(London: Routledge, 2000); ES Savas, Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships
(New York: Chatham House Publishers, 2000); Gerry Stoker, “Public-Private
Partnerships and Urban Governance” in Jon Pierre, ed, Partnerships in Urban
Governance: European and American Experience (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan
Press, 1998) 34.
145

See generally Lester M Salamon, ed, The Tools of Government: A Guide to the
New Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Jody Freeman, “The
Private Role in Public Governance” (2000) 75 NYUL Rev 543; B Guy Peters & John
259

discourse. Politically, a “double movement”146 against privatization and deregulation
has increased support globally for greater accountability of for-profit actors. 147
Vocationally, a strong corporate social responsibility discourse has entered into many
top American business schools.148 But functionally, are for-profit actors assuming the
role of public servants? There is scant evidence to support the claim, but faith in the
publicization of for-profit activities within governance remains strong.149
So, is this faith in publicization misplaced? Jody Freeman’s account of
publicization assumes some particular conditions need to be present. She describes
private actors promising to uphold “traditionally public goals,” because this is “the
price” governments demand in order for these private actors to have access to these
Pierre, “Governance Without Government? Rethinking Public Administration”
(1998) 8 J Pub Adm Res Theory 223.
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“lucrative opportunities.”150 Does privatization play out under these conditions? Are
governments generally in the position to make such demands? Short of having to
cope with a crisis of catastrophic political proportions, are governments willing and
able to reverse privatization initiatives merely because they are disappointed with the
performance of private actors?
Some suggest not, arguing that the state withdrew from being a service
provider because it could not afford to provide such services.151 This is a story of
governments amassing debt in a manner that no financially prudent and socially
conscious citizen with an eye to the welfare of the next generation could tolerate,152
so they were forced to privatize. This would not appear to be a situation in which
private actors would be fearful that a government might reverse privatization, if
private actors failed to uphold traditionally public goals.
That said, this financial justification for state withdrawal may not be
altogether
150
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that,
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administration, both Democratic and Republican, since the Reagan Administration
has increased the national debt.153 In fact, the Reagan Administration, which to many
represents the model for fiscal responsibility, did not decrease the overall national
debt over its two terms.154 Either way, considering the massive amount of national
debt in the United States, it appears unlikely that private actors need be too fearful
that the government will reverse privatization—at least in the American context.
Placing the issue of financial capacity to one side, both the risk and decentered
regulation literatures suggest that governments cannot reverse privatization, because
government experts alone cannot determine how to regulate society. In short,
governments need privatization. Thus, the idea that publicization is the price that
governments demand in order for private actors to have access to “lucrative
opportunities” may not be accurate. The more frightening possibility, and possibly the
more accurate one, is precisely the opposite: privatization is the price that private
actors demand in order for governments to be able to govern adequately.
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III. THE GATES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
There are a number of rudimental ideas that have become anchors for how
judges, lawyers, and corporate legal scholars understand the corporation and the law
that regulates it. This section introduces a number of them. Although each of these
ideas is presented in a largely uncontested manner in this section, of course, there are
minority voices that contest them. 155 That said, corporate legal scholars in the
American context tend to be more conservative than their European counterparts, and
thus, many of the ideas presented below are seen by many as commonsense positions
in the American academy.
A. The Free Market and Lex Mercatoria
At its core, free market ideology suggests that if societies strive toward the
ideal free market, many of today’s social problems would be closer to being
alleviated.156 Although many accept this without much investigation, the notion is
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rooted in the story of the medieval European merchant order.157 This order existed
beyond state law. 158 Accordingly, it was developed though custom and best
practice.159 Merchants developed and administered their own laws, and the state
rarely interfered.160 To many, it is a shining example of a period of a purer private
ordering, in which market mechanisms and social norms governed and society
flourished.161 This story of lex mercatoria (merchant law) celebrates the past prowess
and future potential of the free market.
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Although this story is not historically accurate, it still establishes a “common
ground” for the proponents of the free market.162 It is used as the model solution to
solve social problems.163 Free market champions hold this image of the free market
in their minds—and hearts—when they advocate for the protection of the freedom of
contract, the inalienability of property, and minimal government intervention.164 Their
arguments hint that a world without government is possible and desirable.165 Their
views reflect a deep mistrust of government,166 and a conviction that market function
can spontaneously order complex society effectively.167 This faith in free market
ideology loosely underpins much of corporate governance thinking.
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B. Corporate Law as Merely Protector of the Market Mechanism
Much of corporate legal scholarship regards corporate law as the protector of
the freedom of contract and the alienability of property. It is thought that by simply
protecting these fundamentals of market function, corporate law ensures that
corporate management will be driven by competition to constantly strive for lower
transaction costs and, as a result, greater efficiency within the corporation.168
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel explained that unlike administrative
law, in which the discretion of administrative officials needs to be tightly constrained,
corporate law does not have to police corporate managers in the same way.169 The
reason is that there is already an enforcement mechanism in place—the market.170 If
corporate managers do not do their jobs, then corporate profits decrease, which
affects share price and results in ex ante contractual penalties for the managers.171
These penalties potentially include a decrease in the value of stock options,
termination of employment, damage to reputation, and acquisition.172

168

Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 141 at 35.

169

Ibid.

170

Ibid at 2-3, 35.

171

Ibid at 6.

172

Ibid.
266

For the market mechanism to enforce efficient internal order within corporate
governance, corporate law need only address the issues related to agency between
shareholders and management—to be clear, corporate law need only ensure that
corporate managers have one “master:” shareholders.173 The market mechanism will
do the rest. Otherwise, if corporate law directs corporate managers to have loyalties to
both the investor and the community, the law would free managers from the
discipline of the market, opening up the opportunity for them to serve neither.174
An idea that accompanies this thinking is that, for regulators to police
corporate behavior, they need only harness the market. For instance, if a regulator
imposes a large enough fine for a violation of a regulation, the regulator will have
made effective use of the firm’s strength. According to Easterbrook and Fischel, the
firm’s strength is its ability to calculate risks and rewards, and thus, imposing such a
fine will effectively prevent violation of the said regulation.175
Of course, this regulatory solution is not nuanced, effectively enforcing large
fines against corporations, but it does provide an adequate rationality to protect the
operation of the market mechanism within corporate governance, which is what is
really at stake for corporate legal scholars like Easterbrook and Fischel—economic
accountability not social responsibility. With this solution to regulatory challenges,
173

Ibid.

174

Ibid.

175

Ibid.
267

the status quo corporate structure remains. In theory, the corporation is still
encouraged to “maximize wealth” creation,176 while regulators have an effective
mechanism to alter behavior without reforming corporate law.177 This arrangement
leaves “managers free to maximize the wealth of the residual claimants [shareholders]
subject to the social constraints.”178
Upon reflection, Easterbrook and Fischel clearly established the public/private
distinction within corporate law, constructing precisely where the iron gates against
government intervention within corporate law ought to be constructed—at its very
border. Most corporate legal scholars agree with Easterbrook and Fischel that
corporate law best serves society as an economizing device, which facilitates wealth
creation and encourages corporate management to keep transaction costs low and
profits high.179
C. Corporate Law as the Product of the Market Mechanism
In 1974, William Cary argued that states were competing to attract
incorporations to increase state revenues. 180 He thought that this was creating a
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dangerous “race-to-the-bottom” for corporate governance standards.181 He suggested
that Delaware, in particular, created corporate governance standards that favored
managerial interests, because corporate managers tended to be the incorporators, and
the state’s budget was dependent upon revenues from incorporations. 182 As a
consequence, state competition for incorporations was resulting in managers enjoying
broad

and

unchecked

authority,

resulting

in

less-than-optimal

corporate

performance.183
In 1977, Ralph Winter wrote a reply to Cary, rejecting his position by arguing
that state competition should “tend toward optimality so far as the shareholders’
relationship to the corporation is concerned” and, thus, corporate governance
standards, like those of Delaware, “are optimal legal arrangements.”184 He agreed
with Cary that corporate management ultimately had the consumer power over
incorporation, but argued that managers would select corporate law that reduce
transaction costs and led to more profitable business organizations.185 Thus, this state
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competition produced an optimal corporate law regime.186 Put differently, what Cary
regarded as a “race-to-the-bottom” Winter regarded as a “race-to-the-top.”187
This debate has had a number of reincarnations,188 and Winter’s position has
consistently won the debate, creating the impression that corporate law is not a
product of politics, but the product of market forces.189 Even though recent empirical
evidence suggests that there is no competition at all and that other states simply do
not compete with Delaware for its primacy over incorporations for publicly held
corporations in America,190 the perception that US corporate law is the product of
market demands and competition between states still persists.191
When combined with the other normative messages address above, one can
appreciate that many corporate legal thinkers are convinced that a corporate law
shaped by market forces would lead to an optimal corporate law regime, and that any
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political meddling, such as an attempt to publicize corporate governance, would be
rejected out of hand as, at best, suboptimal, and as, at worst, radical, unworkable, and
blindly naïve.
D. The Corporation as a Nexus of Contracts
As regards corporate legal theory, it is important to stress from the outset that
the concession theory, the entity theory, and the aggregate contractarian theory192
always inform the legal understanding of the corporation,193 because the modern
corporation has always been 194 a group of aggregate constituents 195 connected
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through contract, 196 while at the same time the corporation is an entity with
personhood that only exists because of a concession made by the state.197 Today, in
the American legal context, the corporation is generally thought of in terms of a
version of a theory overbalanced 198 with a contractarian understanding of the
corporation, which is captured by the nexus-of-contracts theory.199 This chapter calls
this the aggregate contractarian theory.
This
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within

American
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theory

200

conveys

an

understanding of the corporation as a set of consensual and efficient contracts that
bind corporate constituents.201 This version of corporate theory suggests that a high
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level of efficiency occurs between corporate constituents because relaxed legal
requirements allow market forces to inspire them to optimally negotiate contracts to
satisfy their own interests.202 Since this arrangement is regarded as the best option for
the corporation as an economizing device, 203 it follows that corporate law must
remain permissive, rejecting mandatory legal rules as generally suboptimal.204
Upon closer inspection of corporate governance, this theory suggests that
large sophisticated investors play a central role in making corporate governance work
within this legal-market framework.205 In theory, professional investors and their
consultants provide analysis of corporate management, governance structures,
debt/equity ratios, and relative prowess when compared to competitors,206 which
supplies the price mechanism with enough information for debt and equity markets to
202
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reward good corporate practice and punish poor performance. 207 Thus, just as
Easterbrook and Fischel suggested, what emerges is a corporate law that allows
markets to function competently, encouraging “what is optimal for the firm and
investors.”208
Within this aggregate contractarian theory, fair treatment of corporate
constituents is rationalized as follows. If a corporate constituent does not like the
terms upon which it is about to contract with a corporation, it can negotiate for new
terms, demand a higher price for contracting, or choose not to enter into a contract
with the corporation in question.209 It is a consensual relationship.210 If a constituent
(shareholder) is unhappy and there are highly liquid markets, the constituent can
“exit” the relationship. If enough shareholders exit, this will decrease share value and
trigger a reason for management to prevent further exits, 211 thereby policing
managerial opportunism.
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Furthermore, the cost of contracting will encourage corporate managers to
make choices that balance the transaction costs of making a decision between all of
the constituents affected.212 In this way, contract enforces a balance of power between
constituents, for although corporate managers have much of the ex ante authority,213
the contractual ex post consequences discipline such discretionary behavior.214 For
instance, efficient, rational incorporators will select rules when incorporating that
balance the transaction costs of deviating from the off-the-rack default rules of
incorporation with the perceived benefit of doing so. 215 Such freedom of rule
selection allows the corporate form to have greater flexibility to respond to market
demands and opportunities.216
That said, some mandatory obligations are imposed upon directors and
management in an attempt to counter the inherent potential for power and/or
information asymmetries between actors within corporate hierarchies.
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generally speaking, such mandatory rules are discouraged, since most are deemed to
be unnecessary, because the cost of electing to adopt choices that obviously
disadvantage, for instance, shareholders or creditors is so high that these choices
become de facto mandatory; the market disciplines, while still leaving discretion for
dynamic, entrepreneurial decision-making options.218
This aggregate contractarian perspective also discourages courts from
attempting to compensate ex post facto for any ex ante errors in negotiating. If
constituents of the corporation fail to negotiate for the risks involved in a particular
contractual relationship, courts should just leave it to the market to police.219 Thus,
from this perspective, the role of the courts ought to be as follows: “The courts may
not rewrite [corporate contracts] under the guise of relieving one of the parties from
the hardship of an improvident bargain. The Court cannot protect the parties from a
bad bargain and it will not protect them from bad luck.”220 In this light, corporate law,
and its judicial application, appears somewhat insensitive to the inequalities between
contracting parties, because it is hesitant to impose a stricter standard than freedom of
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contract, since doing so might inadvertently undermine market discipline and,
therefore, the corporation as an economizing device.221
E. Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Law
In the classic corporate social responsibility of the Berle–Dodd debate of the
1930s, the issue was whether corporate power ought to be in the hands of
shareholders as public interest representatives or managers as stewards of society.222
In the 1980s and 1990s, the shift from corporate social responsibility (direct social
obligation) to corporate responsibility (indirect social obligation through wealth
creation) is captured by Easterbrook and Fischel’s classic one master theory: if
managers are only accountable to shareholders as investors, the market will force
corporate responsibility (profitmaking).223 If managers are burdened by split loyalties,
the door is open for managerial opportunism, and accordingly wealth production is
compromised.224 It was claimed that such interference could easily jeopardize profits,
which will have a net negative impact upon all constituents within these
221
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organizations, because the capacity to generate wealth is sacrificed in a blind attempt
to achieve fairness.225 From this perspective, by producing wealth, managers are most
responsible to society.226
The Easterbrook and Fischel position has been so important in shaping the
American position that it deserves some further explanation. As mentioned, they
suggested that using regulations, other than corporate law, to cultivate markets that
better deal with price uncertainties227 would be the best way to circumscribe corporate
for-profit activities without undermining the corporation as an economizing device.228
For instance, if a regulator wants to prevent a corporation from releasing pollutants
into a river, do not try to change corporate function through reforming corporate law,
but create a regulatory mechanism within the Environmental Protection Act for
monitoring and fining potential river polluters. If the enforcement mechanism is
sound, then no rational market actor will attempt to violate this law, because the
potential risk grossly outweighs the potential profit. In other words, if regulators
225
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understand that corporate actors will violate the law if it is profitable to do so, then
regulators can create the appropriate regulatory incentives to manipulate corporate
behavior.
This was a game changer in American corporate legal scholarship; corporate
social responsibility of the Berle–Dodd debate shifted to a corporate responsibility
debate in mainstream corporate legal scholarship. Shareholders were no longer
characterized as proxies of the public interest, as Berle suggested, 229 but as
investors.230 Directors were no longer characterized as stewards of society, as Dodd
suggested,231 but as champions of investors as a class.232 As a result, the corporation
is understood as a tool, which best serves society when it solely focuses upon profit
making, creating the wealth necessary for other segments of society to cope with the
world’s problems.
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F. Conclusion
From the corporate legal perspective today, corporations are not expected, nor
encouraged, to be imbued with public spiritedness. They are profit-making
organizations that are encouraged to act in a self-interested manner. There are a
number of interconnected assumptions that legitimate this perspective. First, the
corporation can best serve society by being an efficient wealth creation devise.233
Second, direct legal intervention in corporate governance undermines the efficiency
of corporate wealth creation.234 Third, if managers serve one master—shareholders—
then markets can police corporate managers and preserve the efficiency of corporate
wealth creation.235 Fourth, corporate law must therefore enforce shareholder interests
within corporate governance.236 Fifth, corporate law then must almost exclusively
engage in agency issues between shareholders and management.237 Sixth, if regulators
want to circumscribe the profit-making function of corporations, then areas of law
other than corporate law must be employed to change the price of doing business that
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corporations face.238 As a result, most corporate legal scholars view corporate law as
legitimate when it serves as a conservative mechanism to avoid public interference
and regulatory reform.
This is the mindset that dominates American corporate legal culture. Although
there are always dissenting opinions, this is the commonsense position in the business
world. Regulators would face serious resistance if they attempted to experiment with
corporate law in ways that might compromise the corporation as an economizing
device.239
So, what about new governance’s hope of “publicization of the private?” If
the normative claims suggested above are accurate, then publicization might have
traction as a marketing campaign if there is money in it; otherwise…well…it is a bit
naïve. Publicization stands in the face of what is deemed to be the common sense
position within corporate governance thinking.
IV. THE NARRATIVE OF ENTRENCHED PRIVATIZATION
From a different perspective than what was outlined in the last section, this
section reconnects to the idea of technocratic narratives, which were mentioned
earlier, suggesting that there is an additional quality that governance narratives
possess, which tends to discourage publicization. This quality is a lack of humanistic
238
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narratives, which can divorce decision-making from what is at stake, namely the
violent consequences of that particular decision upon a segment of society.240
To explain this quality, this chapter draws a distinction between two types of
narrative: humanistic narratives and technocratic narratives. This chapter defines
humanistic narratives as storylines with identifiable characters and a time sequence,
which reveals the causes and consequences of characters’ actions. Humanistic
narratives grant the readers/listeners a digestible message, which mirrors life
experience. On the other side of the distinction are technocratic narratives, which this
chapter defines as accounts used by technical experts and professionals, who are
attempting to employ a spectrum of scientific methodologies, but most predominately
economic ones, in order to attempt to resolve governance issues.
Mae Kuykendall, in her article about the lack of strong narrative in corporate
governance, chooses to label technocratic narrative as “discourses,” and humanistic
narratives has just narrative. 241 She argues that corporate law lacks the sort of
narratives “that attract human interest,” even though the corporation is a significant
site for “human activity.” 242 Accordingly, although one might expect humanistic
narratives, they are rarely present or employed within corporate governance.
240
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Kuykendall further notes that technocratic narratives in corporate governance
generally rely upon economic analysis of corporate interactions, which has the
sanitizing effect of obscuring the social costs of particular choices. 243 David
Westbrook agrees, 244 adding that such lack of humanistic narrative also fails to
provide corporate governance with heroes that inspire virtue.245
One can clearly appreciate that this lack of humanistic narrative is damaging
to the hope of publicization. Yet, the situation may be even more alarming when one
takes into account the effects of technocratic narratives upon governance more
broadly. For instance, Kerry Rittich suggests that the problems identified by corporate
scholars, such as Kuykendall and Westbrook, might reach beyond corporate
governance to impact public administrative agencies as well.246
To digress for a moment, by the twentieth century, enlightened modern
thinkers were painfully aware of the loss of normative certainty that accompanied
accepting Nietzsche’s thesis that the understanding of good was historically
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contingent.247 Without normative certainty, decision makers grasped for the scientific
method, which promised to reveal the “real issues at stake” by providing social facts
upon which sound regulatory frameworks could be constructed.248 This legitimated
decision-making functions in a manner that mere power or politics could not. The
employment of social sciences by administrative agencies to solve social problems in
this manner has been called functionalism.
Reflecting on the work of John Willis, Rittich argues that functionalism was
successful in the New Deal Era, because it provided “a way to depoliticize the
process of adjudication and diffuse the conflicts among the courts, the executive and
the legislature.”249 During the interwar period in England, functionalists, such as
Willis, defended the expansion of the modern administrative state, which was striving
to meet the public's demands for greater state involvement in English society.250 As
Martin Loughlin explains:
The functionalist style offered an alternative way of addressing the
issues that were presenting themselves for resolution as matters of
public law. It was therefore a practical, reformist approach, offering
solutions to a variety of legal challenges facing modern government
247
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and spanning the range from institutional reforms to alternative modes
of interpretation and methods of legal reasoning. This practical
program of law reform was directly tied to the broader political
movement encompassed under the broad heads of new liberalism,
social democracy, progressivism, or democratic socialism.251
The British functionalist movement paralleled that of American Legal Realists,
embracing governance by teams of experts, who could use their mastery of science to
determine what was best for society. 252
John Dewey rejected this expert paternalism, which subsequently made his
ideas unfashionable at the time, but he pressed on, insisting that if a “government by
experts” did not earnestly consult citizens, then such government could amount to no
more than “an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few.”253 He insisted “[T]he
enlightenment must proceed in ways which force the administrative specialists to take
account of the needs [of the masses].”254 But progressives, such as Willis, believed
such administrative expertise could determine what was best for citizens, legitimating
their authority in the modern world by paving the path to progress with their technical
knowledge.
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Today, the technocratic mindset of functionalism remains the same; however,
as Rittich suggests, its use has changed, supporting the conservative interests it once
rivaled. 255 Rittich argues that regulators now measure the performance of their
institutions “by the extent to which they further efficient transactions and encourage
private-sector activity.”256 She continues, “[T[hese objectives, in turn, are typically
understood to involve creating the legal infrastructure that furthers the interests of
investors and capital holders through, inter alia, enhanced protection for property and
contract rights.”257 Rittich describes an emerging power structure for governance in
which “[c]adres of technocrats and professionals…set the terms and conditions under
which states, markets, civil society groups, and individuals interact.”258 This has led
some to agree, in retrospect, that Dewey’s rejection of expert paternalism259 may have
deserved greater credence at the time.
The dangers of technocratic narratives have been clearly echoed by other
scholars. On the more radical end of the spectrum is David Harvey. Harvey regards
this problem of technocratic narrative as reaching far beyond legal discourse. He
views such narratives as part of a conscious campaign over communication to create a
255
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“hegemonic discourse,” which is propagated through mass media, in particular the
entertainment industry.260 In Harvey’s opinion, this hegemonic discourse has already
corrupted “ways of thought and political economic practices to the point where it is
now part of the commonsense way we interpret, live in, and understand the world.”261
Thus, from his Marxian perspective, such narratives are powerful examples of how
Capitalists have adapted and reasserted their ideology so as to once again lure the
Proletariats into undermining their own interests. Harvey believes this to be one of the
central achievements of the neoliberal movement.262
Like Harvey, Rittich suggests that ideology is corrupting governance, using a
scientific and technical language, which appears depoliticized but in fact limits
choices within the “regulatory calculus” to those that embrace “efficiency, expertise,
and cost-containment.” 263 In this way, humanistic narratives are regarded as
unsuitable, and are thus marginalized, within decision-making. Rittich’s argument
demonstrates how technocratic narratives depoliticize, and dehumanize, social
conflicts by divorcing them from the personal, and necessarily political humanistic
narratives in the name of the scientific method. What is dangerous about this
260
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dehumanization of narrative is that social conflicts can be abstractified, practically
concealing the connection between particular choices and the violent consequences of
that particular course of action upon a segment of society. Thomas Nagel brings home
this last point when he wrote: “Once the door is opened to calculations of utility…,
the usual speculations… can be brought to bear to ease the consciences of those
responsible for a certain number of charred babies.”264
What the positions of Kuykendall, Harvey, and Rittich all have in common is
the lament over the underlying ideology that has presently captured technocratic
narratives. They each highlight, in different ways, how technocratic narratives guide
their users to prioritize economic needs over social needs when it is necessary to
choose between the two. As Harvey pointed out, the normative message that
economic needs must always be the priority over all others presents itself as
commonsense, radicalizing any suggestion to the contrary.265
Kuykendall’s approach inspires meaningful discourse between ideological
adversaries, since it allows for a critical reflection upon particular communication
without heightening the distinction between such adversaries. One can imagine that
approaching such a discourse like an embattled Proletariat would probably prove to
be less than successful. Kuykendall approaches sensitive issues with tact, so as not to
264
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alienate a corporate legal audience, which usually tends to be conservative. Consider
Kuykendall’s tact in the following passage:
The absence of [humanistic] narrative from corporate law is
substantially explained by the nature of the undertaking of producing
wealth and by the social formation of business. The absence of [such]
narrative is not a nefarious scheme to undermine critique, although it
tends to have that effect. Rather, the underlying project of generating
wealth does not produce rich human stories.266
Kuykendall’s approach does not point fingers at Capitalists and the cadres of
technocrats, who Harvey would suggest are operating behind the scenes to control
societies. As a result, the chance of constructive bipartisan debate, as well as the
potential emancipation from a particular mindset, becomes more likely, since
criticism can be deftly directed at a normative level rather than a more personal one.
In fact, her article sparked broad debate in the corporate legal community, resulting in
a symposium at Michigan State University College of Law entitled the Business Law
and Narrative Symposium.267
In conclusion, the problem of a lack of humanistic narrative appears not to be
isolated to private governance (corporate governance), but also appears to seriously
threaten public governance (administrative agencies) as well. Again publicization
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suggests that there will be the “percolation”268 of values from public governance to
private governance. So, if this percolation process transports values from public to
private, what happens when there needs to be a publicization of the public as well?
The above account suggests that this might be the case. And if this is the case, then
the project of new governance might be even more dangerously optimistic than this
chapter suggests.
V. CONCLUSION
This chapter has attempted to dash the hopes of those who quell their fear of
privatization with the faith that the clouds shall part and corporate doves imbued with
the twin virtues of benevolent kindness and efficiency shall save us all from the woes
of modern governance. Based on the literatures reviewed, there is little merit in
hoping that this will occur. The blurring of public and private in governance today
will not lead to the publicization of corporations in some spontaneous way—to think
otherwise amounts to magical thinking.
That said, magical thinking has an important role in the cultivation of
ideology. Those that champion privatization have the “foundation myth” of the
medieval lex mericatoria269—the promise of a pure free market, which can shepherd
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a commoditized humanity through the wonders of the price mechanism.270 If this is
so, then does the myth of publicization create an appropriate counterview of social
order, adequately challenging the vision of a pure free market, and legitimating
opposition to it? A better myth is possible.
There needs to be more of a stress on social justice,271 equality,272 and the
socioeconomic impacts of privatization. 273 Maybe there needs to be a louder
campaign that stresses an understanding of privatization through the lens of human
rights,274 which asserts that international customary law obliges275 governments to
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ensure that each of their citizens has the rights to dignity, an adequate standard of
living, housing, social services, and education.276 Maybe there also needs to be further
declarations that these rights are binding upon all nations, 277 and thus, are “not
negotiable!”278 Of course, this is only one of many options, which could coordinate
and galvanize the fragmentation of social reaction that Polanyi predicted in his theory
of the double movement.
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That said, the human rights framing may also be inadequate. In the face of
how countries observe human rights,279 the hope that states will meet these human
rights obligations (in particular social, cultural, and economic rights280) is probably as
close to becoming reality as a reincarnation of the medieval lex mericatoria.281 Yet,
this human rights framing of the privatization issue provides a stronger “foundation
myth” than publicization, providing a better counter to the present spin of the freemarketeers. Either way, there is more work to be done in Nietzsche’s Dark
Workshop.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
The frame of reference for this book has been the intermingling of
potentialities and circumstances, which over time has led to today’s American
corporation and its corporate governance. As the chapters demonstrate, this path to
the present has not been a straightforward progression towards an ideal.
Before the hangover from the heady 1990s, many believed that the global
economy and its central unit of organization—the publically traded corporation—
were back on the heroic track to a pure capitalism,1 and society was finally making
forward progress toward the liberal ideal.2 However a succession of scandals and
crises in the years that followed shook this confidence.3 That said, although most
today acknowledge that there is still work to be done, most American corporate legal
scholars remain steadfast in their belief in the fundamentals of this liberal dream.
This resilient confidence has done much to preserve contractarianism as the
central ideology that drives much of American corporate governance practice.4 This is
1
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(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 55-57.
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good in the sense that the routines and rituals, which follow this contractarian
perspective, are now hardwired into governance processes. This creates a high degree
of predictability within market transactions, which in turn provides opportunities for
more precise determinations of the risks associated with profitmaking over the short
term. It is also bad because this embedding of routines and rituals retards the potential
for responsiveness to the needs of markets and society when either, or both, demands
an evolution in business practices. In other words, the resilience of contractarianism
helps corporations sustain profitability for now, but also creates a kind of
shortsightedness, and possibly social blindness, over the long term.
At the beginning of this research project, I assumed that corporate governance
might be the site to initiate the sort of social reforms necessary to alleviate this
shortsightedness. But as my research and study of American corporate governance
progressed, this assumption no longer appeared as self-evident as I once assumed.
The present American capitalist culture creates a highly incentivized, profitdriven rationality, which fuels a decentered functional capacity. Such decentered
functional capacity, in turn, allows for complex social interactions in centers, such as
New York City, to occur with a relative degree of ease. The secret is the promise of
wealth, which incentivizes market actors to aggressively identify demands in society
and then devise cost-effective strategies to satisfy these demands in a manner that is
competitive and profitable. And thus, it is hard to refute that Hayek was correct in the
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sense that complex social coordination could not exist as it does without the price
mechanism.5
This capitalist culture provides the context within which the corporation
flourishes. The publically traded corporation is like a steroid for markets, allowing
business to attract massive amounts of capital, while dispersing risk, in order to
organize complex distributions of resources—not only in highly populated areas, but
also transnationally, even in spaces international law cannot tame.
The market for control holds American corporate governance together.6 Key
to the market for control is that directors and managers are tied to shareholder
expectations. If such bonds between ownership and control are not strong, the market
for control within American corporate governance does not work.7 If the market for
control does not function, the permissive nature of American corporate law cannot
ensure that there will be the control mechanism available to police managerial
opportunism. Thus, directors and managers must be tied to shareholder interests.8 It
follows from this that in order to institute an alternative would require dramatic
5
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reform—American corporate law would need a complete overhaul. This will not
happen in the foreseeable future.
There are very real dangers in not accepting this pessimism as factual. For
instance, with the blurring of public and private,9 corporate managers are being asked
to take on more public roles.10 From a corporate governance perspective, if taken
seriously, this is highly problematic. If corporate managers were permitted by
corporate law to split their loyalties between shareholders and the wider polity, this
would create opportunities that could undermine the American system of corporate
governance.11 If it is not taken seriously, and the new governance agenda is pushed
forward and corporate actors continue to assume more public roles without real
accountability to the broader polity, the survival of public spaces, as historically
conceived, will be jeopardized.12 This creates a Catch-22, which plays out so that
when corporate managers are used as quasi-public servants, the result is that either
corporate governance suffers or society suffers.
9
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If one looks to this book for an answer to this dilemma, one finds contestation.
The first three chapters, which focus upon the potentialities for change within
corporate legal discourses, appear to indicate that change in corporate governance is
possible and needed. However, the final substantive chapter of this book reflects
pessimism toward publicization, and also the potential for meaningful reform within
American corporate governance in the foreseeable future.
In fact, I even flirt with the idea of whether the American status quo is not the
best outcome presently. If one accepts the corporation as an economizing device, it
should always respond effectively to whatever incentives, understood as prices, it
confronts.13 If this is correct, then the corporation, as a highly responsive mechanism
to price signals, might be a very effective measure of regulatory performance without
reform. In other words, if new governance can calibrate markets to properly price the
social cost of production within society, then the corporation, in theory, will
effectively adjust its function to the new price signals without reform.
However, this hypothesis, although attractive to some, is problematic. If one
uncritically accepts the corporation as an economizing device, corporate governance
can remain in the almost exclusive domain of economic thought. That is not to say
that scholars from the fields of economics and finance ought not to have a strong
voice, just that more voices need to be heard from the fields of behavioral
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psychology,

sociology,

anthropology,

and

others,

which

are

presently

underrepresented. Without reintroducing the whole argument here, this point
dovetails nicely with the arguments made about the dangers of the lack of humanistic
narratives within corporate governance mentioned in the previous chapter.
Either way, corporate governance study needs to branch into a whole new
area. Traditional corporate governance scholars will continue to do what they do—
ensuring that the regulatory mechanisms, which are internal to corporate governance
function, are facilitating efficient low-cost transactions between contractual actors.
However, a new study of corporate governance must also emerge that observes the
impact of the incentive structures created by regulatory mechanisms, which are
external to corporate governance, but which still impact upon its function. By
observing how corporate governance reacts to these new conditions, the broader
governance of society, and the corporation’s roles within that governance, can be
measured.
In the end, research on this project has deconstructed much of my pre-existing
biases about markets and society, while adding layers of complexity and nuance to
my understanding of the tensions between them. It appears to have generated more
questions, and fewer answers. Accordingly, this modest conclusion no more than
suggests a programme of study moving forward.
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